Having seen something of the structures which require inspecting, let us now see what kind of inspection we have in this country, and the result of it; and let us also see the inspection which we might have, and the results that might be produced. Looking first at railroad bridges, it might be supposed that no one could be so much interested in keeping such structures in good order as the companies which own those bridges, and which have the bills to pay in case of disaster. This is, of course, so; but, in spite of the fact, the Ashtabula bridge broke down, on one of the best managed lines in the country, and cost the company over half a million dollars in damages. No railroad bridge ever broke down, which the owners were not interested in keeping safe; but there is always a desire to put off incurring large expenses until the last moment, and thus weak bridges are very often let go too long. A short time since, the superintendent of a large railroad stated plainly before a legislative committee, that many of the smaller roads were not safe to run over, but that such roads were having a hard time, and could not afford to keep their track and bridges in a safe condition. During the past ten years over two hundred railroad bridges in the United States have broken down. These bridges were all kept under such inspection as the railroad companies owning them considered sufficient, or such as they could afford; but either the supervision was defective, or the companies knowingly continued the use of unsafe bridges, and this fault has by no means been confined to the smaller and poorer roads. It would seem, therefore, that inspection by the companies themselves has not been sufficient. It certainly has not been enough to prevent two hundred disasters in ten years. It is the custom in several of the United States to maintain what is termed a railroad commission. The original intention seems to have been for these commissions to keep the railroads under some kind of inspection, and in some way to assist in settling any questions that might arise between different companies, and between railroad companies and the public. As far as we can judge by the results produced, in the States where these commissions have been established, we can hardly pronounce them of any very great importance. In many States, it is very certain, that, in regard to matters of inspection, the work of these boards has been simply a farce; and it could hardly be otherwise in a State which pays its commissioners only $1,000 salary, or, worse yet, as in some cases, only $500. Add to this, that in many cases the appointments have been purely political ones, and we can see the absurdity of expecting any results of value. We should hardly suppose that three men, in many cases entirely unacquainted with mechanical matters, could by riding over a railroad once or twice a year, occasionally getting out to examine the paint on the outside of the boards, which conceal a truss from view, judge very correctly of the elastic limit of the iron rods which they have never seen, and of which they do not even know the existence.
For ample proof of the utter inefficiency of the present system, we have only to compare the reports of the railroad commissioners in almost any State, with the actual condition of the structures described. In one State a late annual report covers a whole railroad with the remark, "All of the bridges on this line are in excellent order;" and yet there were at that very time, and are now, on that road, several large wooden bridges with a factor of safety referred to the breaking-weight of not over two under a fair load, assuming the iron rods to be of the very best material,—a point upon which there is no evidence whatever.
There is, in fact, no difference which any ordinary inspection would detect between these bridges as they stand to-day, and the Tariffville bridge as it stood the day before it fell. In another State, an iron bridge is in use under heavy trains, which has a factor of only 2-1/2 instead of 6, and yet the State report pronounces it an excellent structure and a credit to the railroad company, which recklessly allows its trains to pass over it. In yet another State, the commissioners in 1874 reported that a certain bridge should be removed; and this was quite correct, as it was an eminently unsafe bridge. In 1875 they suggested the same thing again. In 1876 they say, "This bridge must be rebuilt the coming spring." In 1877 they again reported, "This bridge must be rebuilt before the spring opens. It is old, and will not be safe for the passage of trains over it, if the ice or freshet should take away the temporary trestles, which now in a great measure support the truss."
A year later than that, in 1878, a public protest was made against the further use of that bridge, as the lower chords were rotten, broken, pulled apart, and the only thing that held it up was a trestle, liable at any time to be knocked out by the ice; and yet, after all this, in reply to the protest, the commissioners replied that they had just "tested" the bridge by running an engine over it, and pronounced it "safe for the present," whatever that may mean. Now, just how it was that this bridge, which was old, rotten, and worn out, which the commissioners themselves had condemned for four successive years, which they had said two years before must be rebuilt the coming spring, and which relied entirely upon a trestle liable at any time to be carried away, had suddenly become "safe for the present," is not plain to see.
Evidently such inspection as this is of no value. It is exactly this utterly incompetent and dishonest inspection, this guessing that a bridge will stand until it falls, that lies at the bottom of half the disasters in the country. It is under exactly such inspection that those wretched traps, the Ashtabula and Tariffville bridges, fell, and killed over one hundred people. No wonder that railroad officials have an undisguised contempt for State inspection. While in a few States the inspection is not quite so bad as that referred to, as a general thing it is no better; and we have no right to expect any thing better under the present system. The State inspection which we have had throughout this country has not prevented the breaking down of one hundred bridges in the past ten years. Twenty-five States have railroad commissions; but in nine of them the commission consists of only a single man, who, in some cases, is paid only $500 a year. A State can pay $500 a year for having its bridges inspected, and it will get such service as never did and never will prevent a disaster; or it can pay a good price for competent inspection, which will be worth ten times the money to the State. The money which the Lake Shore Railroad paid in damages for the Ashtabula disaster alone, would have employed permanently six men at $5,000 a year each, and a hundred lives would have been saved besides.
With regard to highway bridges, we are, if possible, even worse off than in regard to railway bridges; for in the case of such structures, neither the owners nor the State make any pretence at inspection. It is impossible to say how many highway bridges have broken down during the past ten years, but it is estimated by bridge-builders that the number cannot be less than two hundred. This is, no doubt, far within the truth; and by far the larger part of these structures are not old wooden bridges, but are new bridges of iron.
If we knew positively that in just six months a terrible disaster would occur under the present system of bridge inspection, and knew also, that, by a better system, such disaster would certainly be prevented, it is possible that a change might be made. We know that a proper method of building and inspecting bridges would certainly have prevented the disasters at Ashtabula, Tariffville, and Dixon. We know that the inspection which those bridges received, did not prevent three of the most fearful disasters the country has ever seen. Admitting, now, that structures so important to the public safety as bridges, both upon roads and railroads, ought to be kept under rigid inspection and control, and that no system at present existing has been able to prevent the most fearful catastrophes, what shall we do? Directly after the Ashtabula disaster, the Ohio legislative committee, appointed to investigate that affair, presented to the Legislature a bill, "To secure greater safety for public travel over bridges," in which was plainly specified the loads for which all bridges should be proportioned, the maximum strains to which the iron should be subjected, and a method for inspecting the plans of all bridges before building, and the bridges themselves during and after construction. The governor, with the consent of the Senate, was to appoint the inspector for a term of five years at a salary not exceeding $3,000 a year, such inspector to pass a satisfactory examination before a committee of the American Society of Civil Engineers, themselves practical experts in bridge construction, and he was also to take a suitable oath for the faithful performance of his duty. This bill never became a law. An appropriation was made for a short time to pay for certain examinations, and there the matter stopped.
The committee of the American Society of Engineers were not agreed upon this matter. Messrs. James B. Eads and Charles Shaler Smith suggested the appointment in each State of an expert, to whom all plans should be submitted, and by whom all work should be inspected,—such expert to have been examined and approved by the American Society of Civil Engineers. The inspector was also to visit the scene of every accident, so called, and to ascertain, as far as possible, the cause. Messrs. T. C. Clarke and Julius W. Adams believed, that, in the present state of public opinion, the above method would be impracticable, and feared, that, if inspectors were appointed, it would be by political influence, and that the result would be worse than at present, as the inspectors would be inefficient, and yet, to a great extent, would relieve the owners of bad bridges from legal responsibility. They held that the best that could be done would be to provide means, in case of disaster, to fix plainly the responsibility, and recommended, First, that the standard for strength fixed by the Society should be the legal standard; and, in case it should be found that any bridge was of less strength than this, it should be taken as prima facie evidence of neglect on the part of the owners. Second, that no bridge should be opened to the public until a plan giving all dimensions, strains, and loads, sworn to by the designers and makers, and attested by the corporation having control of it, had been deposited with the American Society; and further, that the principal pieces of iron in the bridge should be stamped with the name of the maker, place of manufacture, and date. Messrs. A. P. Boller and Charles Macdonald looked rather toward effecting the desired result by so directing public sentiment by keeping the correct standard for bridges before it, that it would eventually compel the passage of the necessary laws.
Whether it is possible, in this country, to make an appointment dependent purely upon honesty and capacity, and free from political influence, may well be doubted. No competent engineer would be willing to accept a position which would place upon him so great a responsibility, except under a very carefully devised plan. A very considerable force of inspectors would be required to carry out a system which should produce the desired result. The amount of work to be done at the commencement would be very great, as no proper inspection has ever been made of the greater part of the bridges in the country, of which the number is very large. If any such plan as above suggested should be found feasible, the inspectors should have in their possession a complete set of plans of every bridge of importance in the State, with all the computations of its strength, and as complete a history of each structure from its commencement as can be made up, all this to be supplemented by periodic examinations. If, from such records, we find that a bridge was made of ordinary green timber twenty-five years ago, and that it has been getting rotten ever since; that it has rods of common merchant iron that were bought by some person, not specially acquainted with the business, from an unknown firm,—we had better pull it down before it falls. If, from such records, we find an iron bridge built twenty-five years ago by an unknown company, with iron, at best, of a doubtful quality, and having a factor of three or four for the rolling-stock and speeds of twenty years ago, instead of a factor of six for the rolling-stock and speeds of to-day, we had better remove that bridge before it removes itself.