Loe raamatut: «The Story of Wellington», lehekülg 11

“A loud cheering was heard in our rear—the brigade turned half round, supposing themselves about to be attacked by the French cavalry. A few seconds passed—the trampling of horse was heard—the smoke cleared away, and the heavy brigade of Le Marchant was seen coming forward in a line at a canter. ‘Open right and left,’ was an order quickly obeyed; the line opened, the cavalry passed through the intervals, and forming rapidly in our front prepared for their work.

“The French column, which a moment before held so imposing an attitude, became startled at this unexpected sight. A victorious and highly excited infantry pressed closely upon them; a splendid brigade of three regiments of cavalry, ready to burst through their ill-arranged and beaten column, while no appearance of succour was at hand to protect them, was enough to appal the boldest intrepidity. The plain was filled with the vast multitude; retreat was impossible, and the troopers came still pouring in, to join their comrades already prepared for the attack. It was too much for their nerves, and they sank under its influence, although they bravely made an effort to face the danger.

“Hastily, yet with much regularity, all things considered, they attempted to get into the square; but Le Marchant’s brigade galloped forward before the evolution was half completed.

“The column hesitated, wavered, tottered, and then stood still! The motion of the countless bayonets, as they clashed together, might be likened to a forest about to be assailed by a tempest, whose first warnings announce the ravage it is about to inflict. Foy’s division vomited forth a dreadful volley of fire as the horsemen thundered across the flat; Le Marchant was killed,⁷⁴ and fell downright in the midst of the French bayonets; but his brigade pierced through the vast mass, killing or trampling down all before them. The conflict was severe, and the troopers fell thick and fast, but their long, heavy swords, cut through bone as well as flesh....

“Such as got away from the sabres of the horsemen, sought safety among the ranks of our infantry, and scrambling under the horses, ran to us for protection, like men who, having escaped the first shock of a wreck, will cling to any broken spar, no matter how little to be depended on. Hundreds of beings frightfully disfigured, in whom the human face and form were almost obliterated—black with dust, worn down with fatigue, and covered with sabre cuts and blood—threw themselves among us for safety. Not a man was bayoneted—not even molested or plundered.”

The battle still raged with unabated fury; “immediately in front of the 5th Division, Leith fell wounded as he led on his men, but his division carried the point in dispute, and drove the enemy before them up the hill.

“While these events were taking place on the right, the 4th Division, which formed the centre of the army, met with a serious opposition. The more distant Aripeles, occupied by the French 122nd, whose numbers did not count more than 400, supported by a few pieces of cannon, was left to the Portuguese brigade of General Pack, amounting to 2000 bayonets. Falsely, though with well-founded reliance—their former conduct taken into the scale—Cole’s division advanced into the plain, confident that all was right with Pack’s troops, and a terrible struggle between them and Bonnet’s corps took place. It was, however, but of short duration. Bonnet’s troops were driven back in confusion, and up to this moment all had gone on well.

“The three British Divisions engaged, overthrew all obstacles, and the battle might be said to be won, had Pack’s formidable brigade (formidable in numbers, at least) fulfilled their part—but these men totally failed in their effort to take the height occupied only by a few hundred Frenchmen, and thus gave the park of artillery that was posted with them, full liberty to turn its efforts against the rear and flank of Cole’s soldiers. Nothing could be worse than the state in which the 4th Division was now placed, and the battle, which ought to have been and had been in a manner won, was still in doubt.

“Bonnet, seeing the turn which Pack’s failure had wrought in his favour, re-formed his men, and advanced against Cole, while the fire from the battery and small arms on the Aripeles height completed the confusion. Cole fell wounded; half of his division were cut off; the remainder in full retreat, and Bonnet’s troops pressing on in a compact body, made it manifest that a material change had taken place in the battle, and that ere it was gained some ugly up-hill work was yet to be done.

“Marshal Beresford, who arrived at this moment, galloped up to the head of a brigade of the 5th Division, which he took out of the second line, and for a moment covered the retreat of Cole’s troops; but this force—composed of Portuguese—was insufficient to arrest the progress of the enemy, who advanced in the full confidence of an assured victory, and at this moment Beresford was carried off the field wounded. Bonnet’s troops advanced, uttering loud cheers, while the entire of Cole’s division and Spry’s brigade of Portuguese were routed. Our centre was thus endangered. Boyer’s dragoons, after the overthrow of the French left, countermarched, and moved rapidly to the support of Bonnet; they were also close in the track of his infantry; and the fate of this momentous battle might be said to hang by a hair. The fugitives of the 7th and 4th French Divisions ran to the succour of Bonnet, and by the time they had joined him, his force had, indeed, assumed a formidable aspect, and thus reinforced it stood in an attitude far different from what it would have done, had Pack’s brigade succeeded in its attack.

“Lord Wellington, who saw what had taken place by the failure of Pack’s troops, ordered up the 6th Division to the support of the 4th, and the battle, although it was half-past 8 o’clock at night, recommenced with the same fury as at the outset.

“Clinton’s division, consisting of 6000 bayonets, rapidly advanced to occupy its place in the combat, and relieve the 4th from the awkward predicament in which it was placed, and essayed to gain what was lost by the failure of Pack’s troops, in their feeble effort to wrest the Aripeles height from a few brave Frenchmen; but they were received by Bonnet’s troops at the point of the bayonet, and the fire opened against them seemed to be three-fold more heavy than that sustained by the 3rd and 5th Divisions. It was nearly dark, and the great glare of light caused by the thunder of the artillery, the continued blaze of musketry, and the burning grass, gave to the face of the hill a novel and terrific appearance—it was one vast sheet of flame, and Clinton’s men looked as if they were attacking a burning mountain, the crater of which was defended by a barrier of shining steel. But nothing could stop the intrepid valour of the 6th Division, as they advanced with desperate resolution to carry the hill.

“The troops posted on the face of it to arrest their advance were trampled down and destroyed at the first charge, and each reserve sent forward to extricate them met with the same fate.

“Still Bonnet’s reserves having attained their place in the fight, and the fugitives from Foy’s division joining them at the moment, prolonged the battle until dark.

“These men, besmeared with blood, dust, and clay, half naked, and some carrying only broken weapons, fought with a fury not to be surpassed; but their impetuosity was at length calmed by the bayonets of Clinton’s troops, and they no longer fought for victory, but for safety. After a desperate struggle they were driven from their last hold in confusion, and a general and overwhelming charge, which the nature of the ground enabled Clinton’s troops to make, carried this ill-formed mass of desperate soldiers before them, as a shattered wreck borne along by the force of some mighty current. The mingled mass of fugitives fled to the woods and to the river for safety, and under cover of the night, succeeded in gaining the pass of Alba, over the Tormes. It was 10 o’clock at night—the battle was ended.”

Marmont, who was wounded in the early part of the fight, lost 15,000 men, of whom 7000 surrendered to the British. The victors had nearly 700 officers and men killed, and over 4500 returned as wounded and missing. Six British Generals, including Wellington, whose thigh was grazed by a musket ball which had fortunately passed through his holster before it hit him, received injuries, and Le Marchant, as already mentioned, was shot. Of the enemy four Generals were wounded and three killed, sufficient proof of the sanguinary nature of the long-continued contest. The victory would have been even more complete had the Spanish garrison at Alba de Tormes remained at their post instead of withdrawing without informing the Commander-in-Chief of their intention. As a consequence the enemy were enabled to use the bridge there and make good their escape.

CHAPTER XVI
The Closing Battles of the Peninsular War
(1812–14)

“In the whole of my experience I never saw an army so strongly posted as the French at the battle of Toulouse. There ought to have been an accurate plan and description made of the whole affair as a matter of professional science.”

Wellington.

Marmont’s army was not the only one in retreat. King Joseph, with 15,000 troops, had left Madrid with the set purpose of joining the Marshal, but when he received news of the battle of Salamanca he retreated on Valencia, where Suchet’s army was posted, and peremptorily ordered Soult to evacuate Andalusia. This would enable him to bring 90,000 men to bear on his victorious enemy. His withdrawal from Madrid enabled Wellington to enter the capital on the 12th August 1812, Marmont, or rather Clausel, who had temporarily succeeded him, being driven back upon Burgos. The evacuation of the southern province was doubtless very gratifying to the Spaniards, but the threatened concentration of such a vast array of troops placed the Anglo-Portuguese army in an extremely unhappy position. The force at Wellington’s disposal numbered 60,000 men, and although an additional 6000 had just landed at Alicante, in Valencia, it was evident that they would be of little service at the moment. When he became aware that Soult was about to abandon Andalusia he left part of his army to occupy Madrid, and with the remainder set out in the hope of being able to crush Clausel, who was at Valladolid. This he was unable to do, for the enemy retired from position to position. He followed him to Burgos, which Wellington entered, the French General meanwhile encamping on the banks of the Ebro, where he shortly afterwards received substantial reinforcements under Caffarelli and Souham the latter of whom arrived as Marmont’s successor. Wellington was also joined by some 11,000 Spanish troops of the army of Galicia. He at once laid siege to the castle above the town, which was strongly defended, and although the troops worked with praiseworthy ardour and four attempts were made to take it by assault, he was eventually forced to abandon the idea, and for a very important reason. Soult had joined King Joseph, and the combined army was on its way to Madrid. He had wasted a precious month, time which the French had used to full advantage.

It is related that one of the Irish regiments incurred his displeasure during the siege, and some of its members asked permission for it to lead one of the assaults. Their wish was granted, with the result that nearly all the men laid down their lives in the desperate undertaking. When Wellington passed a little later, a soldier who had lost both his legs saluted and cried, “Arrah, maybe ye’r satisfied now, you hooky-nosed vagabond!” The Commander could not restrain a smile, and promptly sent assistance. The Irishman ended his days in Chelsea Hospital.

Sending word to Hill to abandon Madrid and meet him on the Tormes, Wellington skilfully withdrew his men from Burgos, and although his rear-guard was much harassed by Souham’s troops, he formed a junction with his lieutenant near the battlefield of Salamanca. On arrival on the Tormes they were almost face to face with the united army, but divided counsels reigned, and he skilfully eluded the French, although they turned his position. Aided by a dense fog, Wellington managed to slip away unperceived. After a sharp engagement at a ford of the Huebra, the pursuers abandoned the attempt to secure the roads to Ciudad Rodrigo, which place was reached by Wellington on the 18th November. Soult retired to Toledo, Souham to Valladolid, and Joseph to Segovia.

A pen-sketch of the men during this terrible retreat tells us that “such a set of scare-crows never was seen. It was difficult to say what they were, as the men’s coats were patched with grey, some had blankets over them, and most were barefooted; every step they took was up to the knees in mud; women and sick men were actually sticking in it.... A brigade of cavalry, however, which was covering the rear, had left Lisbon but a short time before, and was in high order. The clothing of the men scarcely soiled, and the horses sleek and fat, made a strange contrast with the others, especially the company of artillery that had served in the batteries before Burgos. We at first took the latter for prisoners, as they were mostly in French clothing, many of them riding in the carriages with the sick and wounded, drawn, some by oxen, and some by mules and horses. I never saw British soldiers in such a state.”

Wellington and his men then went into cantonments, the former making his headquarters at Freneda. Much was done to improve the morale of the troops, who had got into a very insubordinate state. Reinforcements came to hand, and Wellington worked hard to reorganize the Spanish army, of which he had been appointed Generalissimo after the battle of Salamanca. He had also been raised to the rank of Marquis, thanked by both Houses of Parliament, and presented with £100,000. He paid a visit to the Cortes, made a speech, and wrote a long letter to one of the Deputies in which he criticized “the powers that be” in no uncertain way, adding, however, a number of measures which would “give your Government some chance of standing, and your country some chance of avoiding farther revolutions.” The whole communication must be studied to be fully appreciated.⁷⁵ “The Government and the Assembly,” he says in one passage, “instead of drawing together, are like two independent powers, jealous and afraid of each other; and the consequence is, that the machine of Government is at a stand. To this add that the whole system is governed by little local views, as propounded by the daily press of Cadiz, of all others the least enlightened and the most licentious.” “I will fight for Spain as long as she is the enemy of France, whatever may be her system of government,” he adds, “but I cannot avoid seeing and lamenting the evils which await the country if you do not retrace your steps, let what will be the result of the military operations of the war....”

He advised the establishment of a permanent Regency, “with all the powers allotted by the constitution to the King, in the hands of one person.” He, or she, should be aided by a Council, whose five members should superintend the Department de Estado, the Interior and Ultramar, Gracia y Justicia, Hacienda, and of War and of Marine respectively, each being responsible for the department under his superintendence. He suggested either turning “the Council of State into a House of Lords,” or making “a House of Lords of the Grandees, giving then concurrent powers of legislation with the Cortes; and you should leave the patronage now in the hands of the Council of State in the hands of the Crown.”

In these days of Socialism the following remarks, which occur in the same letter, are of more than passing interest. “The theory of all legislation,” he says, “is founded in justice; and, if we could be certain that legislative assemblies would on all occasions act according to the principles of justice, there would be no occasion for those checks and guards which we have seen established under the best systems. Unfortunately, however, we have seen that legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals; when unchecked, they are tyrannical and unjust; nay, more: it unfortunately happens too frequently that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties under the pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme powers.”

In summing up the result of his operations in the field during 1812, Wellington tells the Earl of Liverpool on the 23rd November, that notwithstanding adverse criticism in the newspapers, “it is in fact the most successful campaign in all its circumstances, and has produced for the cause more important results than any campaign in which a British army has been engaged for the last century. We have taken by siege Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and Salamanca; and the Retiro surrendered. In the meantime the Allies have taken Astorga, Guadalaxara, and Consuegra, besides other places taken by Duran and Sir H. Popham. In the months elapsed since January this army has sent to England little short of 20,000 prisoners, and they have taken and destroyed or have themselves the use of the enemy’s arsenals in Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Valladolid, Madrid, Astorga, Seville, the line before Cadiz, etc.; and upon the whole we have taken and destroyed, or we now possess, little short of 3000 pieces of artillery. The siege of Cadiz has been raised, and all the countries south of the Tagus have been cleared of the enemy.

“We should have retained still greater advantages, I think, and should have remained in possession of Castile and Madrid during the winter, if I could have taken Burgos, as I ought early in October, or if Ballasteros had moved upon Alcarez as he was ordered, instead of intriguing for his own aggrandizement.

“The fault of which I was guilty in the expedition to Burgos was, not that I undertook the operation with inadequate means, but that I took there the most inexperienced instead of the best troops.... I see that a disposition already exists to blame the Government for the failure of the siege of Burgos. The Government had nothing to say to the siege. It was entirely my own act. In regard to means, there were ample means both at Madrid and at Santander for the siege of the strongest fortress. That which was wanting at both places was means of transporting ordnance and military stores to the place where it was desirable to use them.

“The people of England, so happy as they are in every respect, so rich in resources of every description, having the use of such excellent roads, etc., will not readily believe that important results here frequently depend upon 50 or 60 mules more or less, or a few bundles of straw to feed them; but the fact is so, notwithstanding their incredulity....”

When Wellington was ready for his 1813 campaign he had 75,000 British and Portuguese at his disposal, and some 60,000 Spaniards, in addition to the irregular bands which were the bane of the enemy. The different French armies totalled some 200,000 troops, but it was deemed necessary to send 40,000 of these, under Clausel and Foy, to exterminate the guerilleros, which was to Wellington’s advantage, especially as it was impossible for Napoleon, now deeply involved owing to the disastrous Russian campaign, to send further reinforcements. Soult was withdrawn, with 20,000 men, to oppose the Russian advance. By way of further encouragement, Andalusia, Estremadura, Galacia, and the Asturias no longer sheltered the enemy. The British left was under Graham, the right under Hill, and the centre under the Commander-in-Chief. The first marched upon Valladolid, the French retreating before him, and was joined near Zamora on the 1st June 1813 by Wellington, followed two days later by Hill. The French were deceived by these movements, for they expected the main attack to be made from Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida with the object of occupying Madrid. This was far from Wellington’s purpose, which was to carry on the war in the northern provinces, sever the French communications with the homeland, and force them to withdraw to the Pyrenees. King Joseph hastily retired from Valladolid and reached Burgos. On the approach of Wellington to that town, the fortifications were blown up and the enemy fell back beyond the Ebro.

“When I heard and saw this explosion (for I was within a few miles, and the effect was tremendous),” Wellington remarks, “I made a sudden resolution forthwith—instanter to cross the Ebro, and endeavour to push the French to the Pyrenees. We had heard of the battles of Lützen and Bautzen and of the armistice,⁷⁶ and the affairs of the Allies looked very ill. Some of my officers remonstrated with me about the impudence of crossing the Ebro, and advised me to take up the line of the Ebro, etc. I asked them what they meant by taking up the line of the Ebro, a river 300 miles long, and what good I was to do along that line? In short, I would not listen to the advice; and that very evening (or the very next morning) I crossed the river and pushed the French till I afterwards beat them at Vittoria.”

“We continued to advance,” writes a soldier of the 71st Regiment who fought in the battle, “until the 20th of June; when reaching the neighbourhood of Vittoria, we encamped upon the face of a hill. Provisions were very scarce. We had not a bit of tobacco, and were smoking leaves and herbs. Colonel Cadogan rode away, and got us half a pound of tobacco a man, which was most welcome.

“Next morning we got up as usual. The first pipes played for parade; the second did not play at the usual time. We began to suspect all was not right. We remained thus until eleven o’clock; then received orders to fall in, and follow the line of march. During our march we fell to one side, to allow a brigade of guns to pass us at full speed. ‘Now,’ said my comrades, ‘we will have work to do before night.’ We crossed a river, and, as we passed through a village, we saw, on the other side of the road, the French camp, and their fires still burning, just as they had left them. Not a shot had been fired at this time. We observed a large Spanish column moving along the heights on our right. We halted, and drew up in column. Orders were given to brush out our locks, oil them, and examine our flints. We being in the rear, these were soon followed by orders to open out from the centre, to allow the 71st to advance. Forward we moved up the hill. The firing was now very heavy. Our rear had not engaged, before word came for the doctor to assist Colonel Cadogan, who was wounded. Immediately we charged up the hill, the piper playing, ‘Hey Johnny Cope.’ The French had possession of the top, but we soon forced them back, and drew up in column on the height; sending out four companies to our left to skirmish. The remainder moved on to the opposite height. As we advanced driving them before us, a French officer, a pretty fellow, was pricking and forcing his men to stand. They heeded him not—he was very harsh. ‘Down with him!’ cried one near me; and down he fell, pierced by more than one ball.

“Scarce were we upon the height, when a heavy column, dressed in great-coats, with white covers on their hats, exactly resembling the Spanish, gave us a volley, which put us to the right about at double-quick time down the hill, the French close behind, through the whins. The four companies got the word the French were on them. They likewise thought them Spaniards, until they got a volley that killed or wounded almost every one of them. We retired to the height, covered by the 50th, who gave the pursuing column a volley which checked their speed. We moved up the remains of our shattered regiment to the height. Being in great want of ammunition, we were again served with sixty rounds a man, and kept up our fire for some time, until the bugle sounded to cease firing....

“At this time the Major had the command, our second Colonel being wounded. There were not 300 of us on the height able to do duty, out of above 1000 who drew rations in the morning. The cries of the wounded were most heart-rending.

“The French, on the opposite height, were getting under arms; we could give no assistance, as the enemy appeared to be six to one of us. Our orders were to maintain the height while there was a man of us. The word was given to shoulder arms. The French, at the same moment, got under arms. The engagement began in the plains. The French were amazed, and soon put to the right about, through Vittoria. We followed, as quick as our weary limbs could carry us. Our legs were full of thorns, and our feet bruised upon the roots of the trees. Coming to a bean field at the bottom of the heights, immediately the column was broke, and every man filled his haversack. We continued to advance until it was dark, and then encamped on a height above Vittoria.... I had fired 108 rounds this day.”

According to the official figures the British lost 740 men by death and 4174 were wounded, out of a total strength of 80,000. The captures included 151 guns, 415 caissons, 14,249 rounds of ammunition, nearly 2,000,000 musket ball cartridges, 40,668 lbs. of gunpowder, fifty-six forage waggons, forty-four forge waggons, treasure to the amount of £1,000,000, pictures by Velasquez and other masters, jewellery, public and private baggage. King Joseph’s carriage, and Jourdan’s bâton. The last-mentioned was given by Wellington to the Prince Regent, who with becoming fitness sent the donor a Field-Marshal’s bâton. The French had 65,000 men engaged in the battle of Vittoria, of whom some 6000 were killed and wounded, and 1000 taken prisoners.

The defeated army crossed the Pyrenees and marched to Bayonne, where it was joined by the troops under Foy and Clausel, who had been pursued by the Allies. “To hustle the French out of Spain before they were reinforced,” had been Wellington’s object, and he had carried it out completely. As the garrisons of the fortresses of Pampeluna and San Sebastian had been strengthened, the former by Joseph and the latter by Foy, during their retreat, Wellington now turned his attention to them. Although the army under Suchet was the only one now left in the Peninsula, it occupied Catalonia and part of Valencia, and might therefore attack Wellington’s right flank.

Napoleon was at Dresden when he heard of his brother’s disaster at Vittoria, and he was in no mood for soft words. He recalled both Joseph and Jourdan, and gave the command to Soult. “It is hard to imagine anything so inconceivable as what is now going on in Spain,” the Emperor writes to Savary on the 3rd July 1813. “The King could have collected 100,000 picked men: they might have beaten the whole of England.” He blamed himself for the “mistaken consideration” he had shown his brother, “who not only does not know how to command, but does not even know his own value enough to leave the military command alone.”

Soult reached Bayonne on the 12th July, and thirteen days later had marched on Pampeluna with 73,000 troops, bent on relieving one or other of the fortresses, perhaps both. He attacked the British right at Roncesvalles and turned the position; Hill was attacked at the head of the valley of Baztan and was obliged to withdraw. Wellington at once raised the siege of San Sebastian, which had been carried on by Sir Thomas Graham, and contented himself by blockading the fortress. He immediately concentrated his right and centre at Sorauren, near Pampeluna. The series of fights which took place at this time is known as the battles of the Pyrenees. On the 27th Wellington arrived, and a rousing cheer greeted him, which it is said deterred the French from making anything but a partial attack. Probably the truth of the matter is that Soult hesitated because he was expecting additional forces with d’Erlon, for the Marshal was scarcely likely to be overawed by a greeting. A corporal, unable to restrain his enthusiasm as the Commander-in-Chief rode along the line, shouted out to the intense amusement of all, “There goes the little blackguard what whops the French!”⁷⁷

Soult was pointed out to the General by a spy. “Yonder,” Wellington is reported to have said, “is a great but cautious general; he will delay his attack to know the reason of those cheers; that will give time for my reinforcements to come up, and I shall beat him.” As a matter of fact, the 6th Division of infantry, to which Wellington had referred, did arrive, and “bludgeon work,” to use his expression, took place on the 28th, the anniversary of Talavera. The reinforcements had scarcely secured their position, their right resting on Orcain and their left on the heights overlooking the valley of the Lanz, than a very determined attack was made by the enemy. They were driven back, and made an attempt on the hill occupied by the 7th caçadores and Ross’s brigade of the 4th Division. They obtained possession of it for a short time until driven down. When the battle became general the 10th Portuguese regiment was overpowered, necessitating the withdrawal of Ross. Wellington then ordered two regiments to charge the enemy on the heights and those on the left, with the result that the French were “driven down with immense loss.” “Every regiment,” says Wellington, “charged with the bayonet, and the 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23rd, four different times.” Of Wellington’s 16,000 troops he lost 2600 killed and wounded, the French 1800 out of 20,000. The Portuguese behaved “admirably,” and the Commander-in-Chief “had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Spanish regiments El Principe and Pravia.”