Direct. I. See that your hearts have the two great principles of justice deeply and habitually innaturalized or radicated in them, viz. The true love of your neighbour, and the denial of yourself; which in one precept are called, The loving of your neighbour as yourself. For then you will be freed from the inclination to injuries and fraud, and from the power of those temptations which carry men to these sins. They will be contrary to your habitual will or inclination; and you will be more studious to help your neighbour, than to get from him.

Direct. II. Yet do not content yourself with these habits, but be sure to call them up to act, whenever you have any bargaining with others; and let a faithful conscience be to you as a cryer to proclaim God's law, and say to you, Now remember love and self-denial, and do as you would be done by. If Alexander Severus so highly valued this saying, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris, as to make it his motto, and write and engrave it on his doors and buildings (having learned it of some christians or Jews, saith Lampridius); what a crime and shame is it for Christ's own professed disciples neither to learn nor love it! Put home the question when you have any bargaining with others, How would I be dealt with myself, if my case were the same with his?

Direct. III. When the tempter draweth you to think only of your own commodity and gain, remember how much more you will lose by sin, than your gain can any way amount to. If Achan, Gehazi, Ahab, Judas, &c. had foreseen the end, and the greatness of their loss, it would have curbed their covetous desires. Believe God's word from the bottom of your heart, that you shall lose things eternal if you sinfully get things temporal, and then you will not make haste to such a bargain, to win the world and lose your souls.

Direct. IV. Understand your neighbour's case aright, and meditate on his wants and interest. You think what you want yourself; but you think not whether his wants with whom you deal, may not be as great as yours: consider what his commodity costeth him; or what the toil of the workman's labour is; what house rent he hath to pay, and what a family to maintain; and whether all this can be well done upon the rates that you desire to trade with him. And do not believe every common report of his riches, or of the price of his commodity; for fame in such cases is frequently false.

Direct. V. Regard the public good above your own commodity. It is not lawful to take up or keep up any oppressing monopoly or trade, which tendeth to enrich you by the loss of the commonwealth or of many.

Direct. VI. Therefore have a special regard to the laws of the country where you live; both as to your trade itself, and as to the price of what you sell or buy. For the law is made for the public benefit, which is to be preferred before any private man's. And when the law doth directly or indirectly set rates upon labours or commodities, ordinarily they must be observed; or else you will commit two sins at once, injury and disobedience.

Direct. VII. Also have special respect to the common estimate, and to the market price. Though it be not always to be our rule, yet ordinarily it must be a considerable part of it, and of great regard.

Direct. VIII. Let not imprudent thinking make you seem more covetous than you are. Some imprudent persons cannot tell how to make their markets without so many words, even about a penny or a trifle, that it maketh others think them covetous, when it is rather want of wit. The appearance of evil must be avoided. I know some that are ready to give a pound to a charitable use at a word, who will yet use so many words for a penny in their bargaining as maketh them deeply censured and misunderstood. If you see cause to break for a penny or a small matter, do it more handsomely in fewer words, and be gone: and do not tempt the seller to multiply words, because you do so.

Direct. IX. Have no more to do in bargaining with others, especially with censorious persons, than you needs must; for in much dealing usually there will be much misunderstanding, offence, censure, and complaint.

Direct. X. In doubtful cases, when you are uncertain what is lawful, choose that side which is safest to the peace of your consciences hereafter; though it be against your commodity, and may prove the losing of your right.

Tit. 2. Cases of Conscience about Justice in Contracts

Quest. I. Must I always do as I would be done by? Or hath this rule any exceptions?

Answ. The rule intendeth no more but that your just self-denial and love to others, be duly exercised in your dealings with all. And, 1. It supposeth that your own will or desires be honest and just, and that God's law be their rule. For a sinful will may not be made the rule of your own actions or of other men's. He that would have another make him drunk, may not therefore make another drunk: and he that would abuse another man's wife, may not therefore desire that another man would lust after or abuse his wife. He that would not be instructed, reproved, or reformed, may not therefore forbear the instructing or reproving others. And he that would kill himself, may not therefore kill another. But he that would have no hurt done to himself injuriously, should do none to others: and he that would have others do him good, should be as willing to do good to them.

2. It supposeth that the matter be to be varied according to your various conditions. A parent that justly desireth his child to obey him, is not bound therefore to obey his child; nor the prince to obey his subjects; nor the master to do all the work for his servants, which he would have his servants do for him. But you must deal by another as you would (regularly) have them deal by you, if you were in their case, and they in yours. And on these terms it is a rule of righteousness.

Quest. II. Is a son bound by the contract which his parents or guardians made for him in his infancy?

Answ. To some things he is bound, and to some things not. The infant is capable of being obliged by another upon four accounts: 1. As he is the parents' own (or a master's to whom he is in absolute servitude). 2. As he is to be ruled by the parents. 3. As he is a debtor to his parents for benefits received. 4. As he is an expectant, or capable of future benefits to be enjoyed upon conditions to be performed by him. 1. No parents or lord have an absolute propriety in any rational creature; but they have a propriety secundum quid, et ad hoc: and a parent's propriety doth in part expire or abate, as the son groweth up to the full use of reason, and so hath a greater propriety in himself. Therefore he may oblige his son only so far as his propriety extendeth, and to such acts, and to no other; for in those his will is reputatively his son's will. As if a parent sell his son to servitude, he is bound to such service as beseemeth one man to put another to. 2. As he is rector to his child, he may by contract with a third person promise that his child shall do such acts, as he hath power to command and cause him to do: as to read, to hear God's word, to labour as he is able; but this no longer than while he is under his parent's government: and so long obedience requireth him to perform their contracts, in performing their commands. 3. The child having received his being and maintenance from them, remains obliged to them as his benefactors in the debt of gratitude as long as he liveth: and that so deeply that some have questioned whether ever he can requite them (which quoad valorem beneficii he can do only by furthering their salvation; as many a child hath been the cause of the parent's conversion). And so far as the son is thus a debtor to his parents, he is obliged to do that which the parents by contract with a third person shall impose upon him. As if the parents could not be delivered out of captivity, but by obliging the son to pay a great sum of money, or to live in servitude for their release: though they never gave him any money, yet is he bound to pay the sum, if he can get it, or to perform the servitude; because he hath received more from them, even his being. 4. As the parents are both owners, (secundum quid,) and rulers, and benefactors to their child, in all three respects conjunct, they may oblige him to a third person who is willing to be his benefactor, by a conditional obligation to perform such conditions that he may possess such or such benefits: and thus a guardian or any friend who is fit to interpose for him, may oblige him. As to take a lease in his name, in which he shall be bound to pay such a rent, or do such a service, that he may receive such a commodity which is greater. Thus parents oblige their children under civil governments to the laws of the society or kingdom, that they may have the protection and benefits of subjects. In these cases the child can complain of no injury; for it is for his benefit that he is obliged: and the parent (in this respect) cannot oblige him to his hurt: for if he will quit the benefit, he may be freed when he will from his obligation, and may refuse to stand to the covenant if he dislike it. If he will give up his lease, he may be disobliged from the rent and service.

In all this you may see that no man can oblige another against God or his salvation: and therefore a parent cannot oblige a child to sin, nor to forbear hearing or reading the word of God, or praying, or any thing necessary to his salvation: nor can he oblige him to hear an heretical pastor; nor to marry an infidel or wicked wife, &c.

And here also you may perceive on what grounds it is that God hath appointed parents to oblige their children in the covenant of baptism, to be the servants of God and to live in holiness all their days.

And hence it is apparent, that no parents can oblige their children to be miserable, or to any such condition which is worse than to have no being.

Also that when parents do (as commonly they do) profess to oblige their children as benefactors for their good, the obligation is then to be interpreted accordingly: and the child is then obliged to nothing which is really his hurt.

Yea, all the propriety and government of parents, cannot authorize them to oblige the child to his hurt, but in order to some greater good, either to the parents themselves, or to the commonwealth, or others; at least that which the parents apprehend to be a greater good: but if they err through ignorance or partiality, and bind the child to a greater hurt for their lesser good, (as to pay two hundred pounds to save them from paying one hundred pounds,) whether their injury and sin do excuse the child from being obliged to any more than the proportion of the benefit required, I leave undetermined.

Quest. III. But what if the parents disagree, and one of them will oblige the child, and the other will not?

Answ. 1. If it be an act of the parents as mere proprietors for their own good, either of them may oblige him in a just degree; because they have severally a propriety. 2. If it be an act of government, (as if they oblige him to do this or that act of service at their command in his minority,) the father may oblige him against the mother's consent, because he is the chief ruler; but not the mother against the father's will, though she may without it.

Quest. IV. Is a man obliged by a contract which he made in ignorance or mistake of the matter?

Answ. I have answered this before in the case of marriage, part iii. chap. i.: I add here,

1. We must distinguish between culpable and inculpable error. 2. Between an error about the principal matter, and about some smaller accidents or circumstances. 3. Between a case where the law of the land or the common good interposeth, and where it doth not.

1. If it be your own fault that you are mistaken you are not wholly freed from the obligation; but if it was your gross fault, by negligence or vice, you are not at all freed; but if it were but such a frailty as almost all men are liable to, so that none but a person of extraordinary virtue or diligence could have avoided the mistake, then equity will proportionably make you an abatement or free you from the obligation. So far as you were obliged to understand the matter, so far you are obliged by the contract; especially when another is a loser by your error.

2. An inculpable error about the circumstances, or smaller parts, will not free you from an obligation in the principal matter; but an inculpable error in the essentials will.

3. Except when the law of the land or the common good, doth otherwise overrule the case; for then you may be obliged by that accident. In divers cases the rulers may judge it necessary, that the effect of the contract shall depend upon the bare words, or writings, or actions; lest false pretences of misunderstanding should exempt deceitful persons from their obligations, and nothing should be a security to contractors. And then men's private commodity must give place to the law and to the public good.

4. Natural infirmities must be numbered with faults, though they be not moral vices, as to the contracting of an obligation, if they be in a person capable of contracting. As if you have some special defect of memory or ignorance of the matter which you are about. Another who is no way faulty by over-reaching you, must not be a loser by your weakness. For he that cometh to the market, or contracteth with another that knoweth not his infirmity, is to be supposed to understand what he doth, unless the contrary be manifest: you should not meddle with matters which you understand not; or if you do, you must he content to be a loser by your weakness.

5. Yet in such cases, another that hath gained by the bargain, may be obliged by the laws of equity and charity, to remit the gain, and not to take advantage of your weakness; but he may so far hold you to it, as to secure himself from loss; except in cases where you become the object of his charity, and not of commutative justice only.

Quest. V. Is a drunken man, or a man in a transporting passion, or a melancholy person, obliged by a contract made in such a case?

Answ. Remember still, that we are speaking only of contracts about matters of profits or worldly interest; and not of marriage or any of another nature. And the question as it concerneth a man in drunkenness or passion, is answered as the former about culpable error; and as it concerneth a melancholy man, it is to be answered as the former question, in the case of natural infirmity. But if the melancholy be so great as to make him uncapable of bargaining, he is to be esteemed in the same condition as an idiot, or one in deliration or distraction.

Quest. VI. But may another hold a man to it, who in drunkenness or passion maketh an ill bargain, or giveth or playeth away his money; and repenteth when he is sober?

Answ. He may (ordinarily) take the money from the loser, or him that casteth it thus away; but he may not keep it for himself: but if the loser be poor, he should give it to his wife or children whom he robbeth by his sin: if not, he should either give it to the magistrate or overseer for the poor, or give it to the poor himself. The reason of this determination is, because the loser hath parted with his propriety, and can lay no further claim to the thing; but yet the gainer can have no right from another's crime: if it were from an injury, he might, so far as is necessary to reparations; but from a crime he cannot; for his loss is to be estimated as a mulct or penalty, and to be disposed of as such mulcts as are laid on swearers and drunkards are. Only the person by his voluntary bargain, hath made the other party instead of the magistrate, and authorized him (in ordinary cases) to dispose of the gain, for the poor or public good.

Quest. VII. Am I obliged by the words or writings which usually express a covenant, without any covenanting or self-obliging intention in me, when I speak or write them?

Answ. Either you utter or write those words with a purpose to make another believe that you intend a covenant; or at least by culpable negligence, in such a manner as he is bound so to understand you, or justified for so understanding you: or else you so use the words, as in the manner sufficiently to signify that you intend no covenant or self-obligation. In the former case you bind yourself (as above said); because another man is not to be a loser, nor you a gainer or a saver, by your own fraud or gross negligence. But in the latter case you are not bound, because an intent of self-obliging is the internal efficient of the obligation; and a signification of such an intent, is the external efficient, without which it cannot be. If you read over the words of a bond, or repeat them only in a narrative, or ludicrously; or if a scrivener write a form of obligation of himself, to a boy for a copy, or to a scholar for a precedent, these do not induce any obligation in conscience, nor make you a debtor to another. Thus also the case of the intent of the baptizer or baptized (or parent) is to be determined.

Quest. VIII. May a true man promise a robber money, for the saving of his life, or of a greater sum, or more precious commodity?

Answ. Yes, in case of necessity, when his life or estate cannot better be preserved; and so taxes may be paid to an enemy in arms, or to a plundering soldier (supposing that it do no other hurt, which is greater than the good). Any man may part with a lesser good to preserve a greater; and it is no more voluntary or imputable to our wills, than the casting of our goods into the sea to save the vessel and our lives.

Quest. IX. May I give money to a judge, or justice, or court officer, to hire him to do me justice, or to keep him from doing me wrong; or to avoid persecution?

Answ. You may not, in case your cause be bad, give any thing to procure injustice against another; no nor speak a word for it nor desire it: this I take as presupposed. You may not give money to procure justice, when the law of the land forbiddeth it, and when it will do more hurt accidentally to the others than good to you: when it will harden men in the sin of bribery, and cause them to expect the like from others. But except it be when some such accidental greater hurt doth make it evil, it is as lawful as to hire a thief not to kill me: when you cannot have your right by other means, you may part with a smaller matter for a greater.

Quest. X. But if I make such a contract, may the other lawfully take it of me?

Answ. No: for it is now supposed that it is unlawful on his part.

Quest. XI. But if under necessity of force I promise money to a robber, or a judge, or officer, am I bound to perform it when my necessity is over?

Answ. You have lost your own propriety by your covenant, and therefore must not retain it; but he can acquire no right by his sin: and therefore some say that in point of justice you are not bound to give it him, but to give it to the magistrate for the poor; but yet prudence may tell you of other reasons a fine to give it the man himself, though justice bind you not to it; as in case that else he may be revenged and do you some greater hurt; or some greater hurt is any other way like to be the consequent; which it is lawful by money to prevent. But many think that you are bound to deliver the money to the thief or officer himself; because it is a lawful thing to do it, though he have no just title to it; and because it was your meaning, or the signification of your words in your covenant with him; and if it were not lawful to do it, it could not be lawful to promise to do it, otherwise your promise is a lie. To this, those of the other opinion say, that as a man who is discharged of his promise by him that it was made to, is not to be accounted false if he perform it not; so is it as to the thief or officer in question; because he having no right, is to you as the other that hath quit his right. And this answer indeed will prove, that it is not strict injustice not to pay the money promised; but it will not prove that it is not a lie to make such a promise with an intent of not performing it, or that it is not a lie to make it with an intent of performing it, and not to do it when you may. Though here a Jesuit will tell you that you may say the words of a promise, with an equivocation or mental reservation to a thief or persecuting magistrate (of which see more in the chapters of lying, vows, and perjury). I am therefore of opinion that your promise must be sincerely made, and according to the true intent of it you must offer the money to the thief or officer; except in case the magistrate forbid you, or some greater reason lie against it, which you foresaw not when you made the promise. But the offender is undoubtedly obliged not to take the money.

The same determination holdeth as to all contracts and promises made to such persons, who by injurious force constrained us to make them. There is on us an obligation to veracity, though none to them in point of justice, because they have no proper right; nor may they lawfully take our payment or service promised them. And in case that the public good unexpectedly cross our performance, we must not perform it: such like is the case of conquerors, and those that upon conquest become their vassals or subjects upon unrighteous terms. But still remember, that if it be not only a covenant with man, but a vow to God, which maketh him a party, the case is altered, and we remain obliged.

Quest. XII. But may I promise the thief or bribe-taker to conceal his fault? And am I obliged to the performance of such a promise?

Answ. This is a promise of omitting that which else would be a duty. It is ordinarily a duty to reveal a thief and bribe-taker that he may be punished. But affirmatives bind not ad semper; no act (especially external) is a duty at all times, therefore not this, of revealing an offender's fault. And if it be not always a duty, then it must be none when it is inconsistent with some greater benefit or duty; for when two goods come together, the greater is to be preferred: therefore in case that you see in just probability, that the concealment of the sinner will do more hurt to the commonwealth or the souls of men, than the saving of your life is like to do good, you may not promise to conceal him, or if you sinfully promise it, you may not perform it; but in case that your life is like to be a greater good than the not promising to conceal him, then such a promise is no fault, because the disclosing him is no duty. But to judge rightly of this is a matter of great difficulty. If it be less than life which you save by such a promise, it oft falls out that it is a lesser good than the detecting of the offence.

But it will here be said, If I promise not to conceal a robber, I must conceal him nevertheless; for when he hath killed me, I cannot reveal him: and I must conceal the bribe-taker; for till I have promised secrecy, I cannot prove him guilty. And he that promiseth to forbear a particular good action whilst he liveth, doth yet reserve his life for all other good works; whereas if he die, he will neither do that nor any other. But this case is not so easily determined: if Daniel die, he can neither pray nor do any good on earth. And if he live he may do much other good, though he never pray; and yet he might not promise to give over praying to save his life. I conceive that we must distinguish of duties essential to the outward part of christianity, or of constant, indispensable necessity; and duties which are alterable, and belong only to some persons, times, and places; also between the various consequents of omissions. And I conceive that ordinarily a man may promise for the saving of his life, that he will forbear a particular, alterable duty or relation; as to read such a commentary, to speak with such a minister, to be a magistrate or a minister, &c. in case we have not before bound ourselves never to give over our calling till death; and in case that the good which will follow our forbearance, is likely (to a judicious person) to be greater than the evil. But no man may promise to omit such a duty as God hath made necessary during life; as not to love God, or fear, or trust him; not to worship him, and call upon him, and praise him; not to do good to men's souls or bodies in the general; or not to preach or pray while I am a minister of Christ; or not at all to govern while you are a governor; for all these contradict some former and greater promises or duties. Nor may you omit the smallest duty to save your life, at such a time when your death is like to do more good, than your life would do without that one duty. Apply this to the present case.

Quest. XIII. If another man deceive me into a promise or covenant against my good, am I bound to perform it when I have discovered the deceit?

Answ. Yes, 1. In case that the law of the land, or other reasons for the public good, require it. 2. Or in case that you were faulty by negligence, heedlessness, or otherwise guilty of your own deceit, in any considerable and avoidable degree. Otherwise, in that measure that he deceived you, and in those respects, you are not obliged.

Quest. XIV. If the contracting parties do neither of them understand the other, is it a covenant? Or if it be, whose sense must carry it?

Answ. If they understand not each other in the essentials of the contract, it is no contract in point of conscience; except where the laws for the public safety do annex the obligation to bare external act. But if they understand not one another in some circumstances, and be equally culpable or innocent, they must come to a new agreement in those particulars; but if one party only be guilty of the misunderstanding, he must bear the loss, if the other insist on it.

Quest. XV. Am I bound to stand to the bargains which my friend, or trustee, or servant maketh for me, when it proveth much to my injury or loss?

Answ. Yes, 1. If they exceed not the bounds of that commission or trust which they received from you. 2. Or if they do, yet if by your former trusting and using them, or by any other sign, you have given the other party sufficient cause to suppose them intrusted by you to do what they do, so that he is deceived by your fault, you are bound at least to see that he be no loser by you; though you are not bound to make him a gainer, unless you truly signified that you authorized them to make the contract. For if it be merely your friend's or servant's error, without your fault, it doth not bind you to a third person. But how far you may be bound to pardon that error to your friend or servant, is another question; and how far you are bound to save them harmless. And that must be determined by laying together all other obligations between them and you.

Quest. XVI. If I say I will give such or such a one this or that, am I bound thereby to do it?

Answ. It is one thing to express your present mind and resolution, without giving away the liberty of changing it; and it is another thing to intend the obliging of yourself to do the thing mentioned. And that obligation is either intended to man, or to God only; and that is either in point of rendition and use, or in point of veracity, or the performance of that moral duty of speaking truth. If you meant no more in saying, I will do it, or I will give it, but that this is your present will, and purpose, and resolution, yea, though it add the confident persuasion that your will shall not change; yet this no further obligeth you than you are obliged to continue in that will; and a man's confident resolutions may be lawfully changed upon sufficient cause. But if you intended to alienate the title to another, or to give him present right, or to oblige yourself for the future to him by that promise; or to oblige yourself to God to do it by way of peremptory assertion, as one that will be guilty of a lie if you perform it not; or if you dedicate the thing to God by those words as a vow; then you are obliged to do accordingly (supposing nothing else to prohibit it).

Quest. XVII. Doth an inward promise of the mind not expressed, oblige?

Answ. In a vow to God it doth; and if you intend it as an assertion obliging you in point of veracity, it doth so oblige you that you must lie. But it is no contract, nor giveth any man a title to what you tacitly thought of.

Quest. XVIII. May I promise an unlawful thing (simply so) without an intention of performing it, to save my life from a thief or persecutor?

Answ. No: because it is a lie, when the tongue agreeth not with the heart. Indeed those that think a lie is no sin when it hurteth not another, may justify this, if that would hold good; but I have before confuted it, part i. in the chapter against lying.

Quest. XIX. May any thing otherwise unlawful become a duty upon a promise to do it?

Answ. This is answered before, part i. chapter of perjury and vows: a thing unlawful will be so still, notwithstanding a vow or promise; and some so of that also which is unlawful antecedently but by accident; as e. g. It is not simply unlawful to cast away a cup of wine or a piece of silver (for it is lawful upon a sufficient cause); but it is unlawful to do it without any sufficient cause. Now suppose I should contract with another that I will do it; am I bound by such a contract? Many say no, because the matter is unlawful though but by accident; and the contract cannot make it lawful. I rather think that I am bound in such a case; but yet that my obligation doth not exclude me wholly from sin; it was a sin before I promised it (or vowed it) to cast away a farthing causelessly. And if I causelessly promised it, I sinned in that promise; but yet there may be cause for the performance: and if I have entangled myself in a necessity of sinning whether I do it or not, I must choose the lesser sin; for that is then my duty. (Though I should have chosen neither as long as I could avoid it.) In a great and hurtful sin I may be obliged rather to break my covenant than to commit it, yet it is hard to say so of every accidental evil: my reasons are, 1. Because the promise or covenant is now an accident to be put into the balance; and may weigh down a lighter accident on the other side (but I know that the great difficulty is to discern which is indeed the preponderating accident).