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Dio's Rome, Volume 3

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[-37-] Antony, therefore, seeing that Decimus was not inclined to yield, left him to the charge of his brother Lucius, and himself proceeded against Caesar and Hirtius. The two armies faced each other for a number of days and a few insignificant cavalry battles occurred, with honors even. Finally the Celtic cavalry, of whom Caesar had gained possession along with the elephants, withdrew to Antony's side again. They had started from the camp with the rest and had gone on ahead as if intending to engage separately those of the enemy who came to meet them; but after a little they turned about and unexpectedly attacked those following behind (who did not stand their ground), killing many of them. After this some foraging parties on both sides fell to blows and when the remainder of each party came to the rescue a sharp battle ensued between the two forces, in which Antony was victorious. Elated by his success and in the knowledge that Vibius was approaching he assailed the antagonists' fortification, thinking possibly to destroy it beforehand and make the rest of the conflict easier. They, in consideration of their disaster and the hope which Vibius inspired, kept guard but would not come out for battle. Hence Antony left behind there a certain portion of his army with orders to come to close quarters with them and so make it appear as much as possible that he himself was there and at the same time to take good care that no one should fall upon his rear. After issuing these injunctions he set out secretly by night against Vibius, who was approaching from Bononia. By an ambush he succeeded in wounding the latter severely, in killing the majority of his soldiers and confining the rest within their ramparts. He would have annihilated them, had he proceeded to besiege them for any time at all. As it was, after accomplishing nothing at the first assault he began to be alarmed lest while he was delaying he should receive some setback from Caesar and the rest; so he again turned against them. Wearied by the journey both ways and by the battle he was also in doubt whether he should find that his opponents had conquered the force hostile to them; and in this condition he was confronted by Hirtius and suffered a decisive defeat. For when Hirtius and Caesar perceived what was going on, the latter remained to keep watch over the camp while the former set out against Antony. [-38-] Upon the latter's defeat not only Hirtius was saluted as imperator by the soldiers and by the senate, but likewise Vibius, though he had fared badly, and Caesar who had done no fighting even. To those who had participated in the conflict and had perished there was voted a public burial, and it was resolved that the prizes of war which they had taken while alive should be restored to their fathers and sons.

Following this official action Pontius Aquila, one of the assassins and a lieutenant of Decimus, conquered in battle Titus Munatius Plancus, who opposed him; and Decimus, when a certain senator deserted to Antony, so far from displaying anger toward him sent back all his baggage and whatever else he had left behind in Mutina, the result being that the affection of many of Antony's soldiers grew cool, and some of the nations which had previously sympathized with him proceeded to rebel: Caesar and Hirtius, however, were elated at this, and approaching the fortifications of Antony challenged him to combat; he for a time was alarmed and remained quiet, but later when some reinforcements sent by Lepidus came to him he took courage. Lepidus himself did not make it clear to which of the two sides he sent the army: he thought well of Antony, who was a relative, but had been summoned against him by the senate; and for these reasons he made plans to have a refuge in store with both parties, by not giving to Marcus Silanus, the commander, orders that were in the least clear. But he, doubtless knowing well his master's frame of mind, went on his own responsibility to Antony. [-39-] So when the latter had been thus assisted he became bold and made a sudden sally from the gates: there was great slaughter on both sides, but at last he turned and fled.

Up to this time Caesar was being strengthened by the people and the senate, and because of this expected that among other honors to be bestowed he would be forthwith appointed consul. It happened that Hirtius perished in the occupation of Antony's camp and Vibius died of his wounds not long after, so that Caesar was charged with having caused their death that he might succeed to the office. But the senate had previously, while it was still uncertain which of the two would prevail, done away with all the privileges which formerly, granted to any person beyond the customs of the forefathers, had paved the way to sovereignty: they voted that this edict should apply to both parties, intending by it to anticipate the victor, while laying the blame upon the other, who should be defeated. First they forbade any one to hold office more than a year, and second that any superintendent of grain supplies or commissioner of food should be chosen. When they ascertained the outcome, they rejoiced at Antony's defeat, changed their raiment once more, and celebrated a solemn thanksgiving for sixty21 days. All those arrayed on his side they held in the light of enemies, and took possession of their property as they did of the leader's. [-40-] Nor did they propose that Caesar any longer should receive any great reward, but even undertook to overthrow him, by allowing Decimus to secure all the prizes for which he was hoping. They voted Decimus not only the right of sacrifice but a triumph and gave him charge of the rest of the war and of the legions,—those of Vibius and others. Upon the soldiers that had been besieged with him they resolved that eulogies should be bestowed and all the other rewards which had formerly been offered to Caesar's men, although these troops had contributed nothing to the victory, but had merely beheld it from the walls. Aquila, who had died in the battle, they honored with an image, and restored to his heirs the money which he had expended from his own purse for the equipment of Decimus's soldiers. In a word, practically every advantage that had been given Caesar against Antony was voted to others against the man himself. And to the end that no matter how much he might wish it he should not be able to do any harm, they armed all his enemies against him. To Sextus Pompey they entrusted the fleet, to Marcus Brutus Macedonia, and to Cassius Syria together with the war against Dolabella. They would certainly have further deprived him of the forces that he had, but they were afraid to vote this openly, owing to their knowledge that his soldiers were devoted to him. Still, even so, they strove to set his followers at variance with one another and with him. They did not wish to approve and honor all of them, for fear they should fill them with too great conceit, nor again to dishonor and neglect all, for fear they should alienate them the more and as a consequence force them to agree together. Hence they adopted a middle course, and by approving some of them and others not, by allowing some to wear an olive garland at the festivals and others not, and furthermore by voting to some money to the extent of twenty-five hundred denarii and to others not a farthing, they hoped to bring about between them and by that means weaken them. [-41-] Those charged with these commissions also they sent not to Caesar but to the men in the field. He became enraged at this, but nominally allowed the envoys to mix with the army without his presence, though he sent word beforehand that no answer should be given and that he himself should be at once sent for. So when he came into the camp and joined them in listening to the despatches, he succeeded in conciliating them much more by that very action. Those who had been preferred in honor were not so delighted at this precedence as they were suspicious of the affair, particularly as a result of Caesar's influence. And those who had been slighted were not at all angry at their comrades, but added their doubts of the sincerity of the decrees, imputing their dishonor to all and sharing their anger with them. The people in the City, on learning this, though frightened did not even so appoint him consul, for which he was most anxious, but granted him the distinction of consular honors, so that he might now record his vote along with the ex-consuls. When he took no account of this, they voted that he should be made a praetor of the first rank and subsequently also consul. In this way did they think they had handled Caesar cleverly as if he were in reality a mere youth and child, as they were always repeating. He, however, was exceedingly vexed at their general behavior and especially at this very fact that he was called child, and so made no further delay, but turned against their camps and powers. With Antony he secretly arranged a truce, and he assembled the men who had escaped from the battle, whom he himself had conquered and the senate had voted to be enemies, and in their presence made many accusations against both the senate and the people.

 

[-42-] The people in the City on hearing this for a time held him in contempt, but when they heard that Antony and Lepidus had become of one mind they began again to court his favor,—for they were in ignorance of the propositions he had made to Antony,—and assigned to him charge of the war against the two. Caesar was accordingly ready to accept even this if he could be made consul for it. He was working in every way to be elected, through Cicero among others, and so earnestly that he promised to make him his colleague. When he was not even then chosen, he made preparations, to be sure, to carry on war, as had been decreed, but meanwhile arranged that his own soldiers (of their own motion, of course) should suddenly take an oath not to fight against any legion that had been Caesar's. This had a bearing on Lepidus and Antony, since the majority of their adherents were of that class. So he waited and sent as envoys to the senate on this business four hundred of the soldiers themselves.

[-43-] This was the excuse that they had for an embassy, but in addition they demanded the money that had been voted them and urged that Caesar be appointed consul. While the senators were postponing their reply, which required deliberation, as they said, they asked (naturally on the instructions from Caesar) that amnesty be granted to some one who had embraced Antony's cause. They were not really anxious to obtain it, but wanted to test the senators and see if they would grant the request, or, if such were not the issue, whether to pretend to be displeased about it would serve as a starting point for indignation. They failed to gain their petition, for while no one spoke against it there were many preferring the same request on behalf of others and thus among a mass of similar representations their demand also was rejected on some plausible excuse. Then they openly showed their anger, and one of them issued from the senate-chamber and grasping a sword (they had gone in unarmed) said: "If you do not grant the consulship to Caesar, this shall grant it." And Cicero interrupting him answered: "If you exhort in this way, he will get it." Now for Cicero this instrument had destruction in readiness. Caesar did not censure the soldier's act, but made a complaint because they had been obliged to lay aside their arms on entering the senate and because one of them was asked whether they had been sent by the legions or by Caesar. He summoned in haste Antony and Lepidus (whom he had attached to him through friendship for Antony), and he himself, pretending to have been forced to such measures by his soldiers, set out with all of them against Rome. [-44-] Some22 of the knights and others who were present they suspected were acting as spies and they consequently slew them, besides injuring the lands of such as were not in accord with them and doing much other damage with this excuse. The senators on ascertaining their approach sent them their money before they came near, hoping that when the invaders received that they might retire, and when they still pressed on they appointed Caesar consul. Nothing, however, was gained by this step. The soldiers were not at all grateful to them for what they had done not willingly but under compulsion, but were even more emboldened, in the idea that they had thoroughly frightened them. Learning of this the senate altered its policy and bade the host not approach the city but remain over one hundred and fifty stadia from it. They themselves also changed their garb again and committed to the praetors the care of the city, as had been the custom. And besides garrisoning other points they occupied Janiculum in advance with the soldiers that were at hand and with others from Africa.

[-45-] While Caesar was still on the march this was the condition of things; and all the people who were at that time in Rome with one accord sought a share in the proceedings, as the majority of men are wont to be bold until they come in sight and have a taste of dangers. When, however, he arrived in the suburbs, they were alarmed, and first some of the senators, later many of the people, went over to his side. Thereupon the praetors also came down from Janiculum and surrendered to him their soldiers and themselves. Thus Caesar took possession of the city without a blow and was appointed consul also by the people, though two proconsuls were chosen to hold the elections; it was impossible, according to precedent, for an interrex to be created for so short a period merely to superintend the comitia, because many men who held the curule offices were absent from the city. They endured having the two proconsuls named by the praetor urbanus rather than to have the consuls elected under his direction, because now these proconsular officials would limit their activities to the elections and consequently would appear to have been invested with no powers outlasting them.23 This was of course done under pressure of arms. Caesar, that he might appear to not to have used any force upon them, did not enter the assembly,—as if it was his presence that any one feared instead of his power.

[-46-] Thus he was chosen consul, and there was given him as a fellow-official—perhaps one ought to say under-official—Quintus Pedius. He was very proud of this fact that he was to be consul at an earlier age than it had ever been the lot of any one else, and further that on the first day of the elections, when he had entered the Campus Martius, he saw six vultures, and later while haranguing the soldier twelve others. For, comparing it with Romulus and the omen that had befallen the latter, he began to expect that he should obtain his sovereignty. He did not, however, simply on the ground that he had already been given the distinction of the consular honors, assume distinction as being consul for the second time. This custom was since then observed in all similar cases to our own day. The emperor Severus was the first to change it; for he honored Plautianus with the consular honors and afterward introduced him to the senate and appointed him consul, proclaiming that he was entering the consulship the second time. In imitation of him the same thing was done in other instances. Caesar, accordingly, arranged affairs in general in the city to suit his taste, and gave money to the soldiers, to some what had been voted from the funds prescribed, and to the rest individually from his private funds, as the story went, but in reality from the public store.

In this way and for the reasons mentioned did the soldiers receive the money on that occasion. But some of them got a wrong idea of the matter and thought it was compulsory for absolutely all the citizen forces at all times to be given the twenty-five hundred denarii, if they went to Rome under arms. For this reason the followers of Severus who had come to the city to overthrow Julianus behaved most terrifyingly both to their leader himself and to us, while demanding it. And they were won over by Severus with two hundred and fifty denarii, while people in general were ignorant what claim was being set up.

[-47-] Caesar while giving the soldiers the money also expressed to them his fullest and sincerest thanks. He did not even venture to enter the senate-chamber without a guard of them. To the senate he showed gratitude, but it was all fictitious and pretended. For he was accepting as if it were a favor received from willing hands what he had attained by violence. And they actually took great credit to themselves for their behavior, as if they had given him the office voluntarily; and moreover they granted to him whom previously they had not even wished to choose consul the right after his term expired to be honored, as often as he should be in camp, above all those who were consuls at one time or another. To him on whom they had threatened to inflict penalties, because he had gathered forces on his own responsibility without the passing of any vote, they assigned the duty of collecting others: and to the man for whose disenfranchisement and overthrow they had ordered Decimus to fight with Antony they added Decimus's legions. Finally he obtained the guardianship of the city, so that he was able to do everything that he wished according to law, and he was adopted into Caesar's family in the regular way, as a consequence changing his name. He had, as some think, been even before this accustomed to call himself Caesar, as soon as this name was bequeathed to him together with the inheritance. He was not, however, exact about his title, nor did he use the same one in dealing with everybody until at this time he had ratified it in accordance with ancestral custom, and was thus named, after his famous predecessor, Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus. For it is the custom when a person is adopted for him to take most of his appellation from his adopter but to keep one of his previous names slightly altered in form. This is the status of the matter, but I shall call him not Octavianus but Caesar, because this name has prevailed among all such as secure dominion over the Romans. He took another one in addition, namely Augustus, and therefore the subsequent emperors assume it. That one will be given when it comes up in the history, but until then the title Caesar will be sufficient to show that Octavianus is indicated.

[-48-] This Caesar, then, as soon as he had conciliated the soldiers and enslaved the senate, turned himself to avenging his father's murder. As he was afraid of somehow causing an upheaval among the populace in the pursuit of this business he did not make known his intention until he had seen to the payment of the bequests made to them. When they had been made docile by means of the money, although it belonged to the public funds and had been collected on the pretext of war, then at length he began to follow up the assassins. In order that this procedure of his might not appear to be characterized by violence but by justice, he proposed a law about their trial and tried the cases in their absence. The majority of them were out of town and some even held governorships over provinces. Those who were present also did not come forward, by reason of fear, and withdrew unobserved. Consequently they were convicted by default, and not only those who had been the actual murderers of Caesar and their fellow-conspirators, but many others who so far from plotting against Caesar, had not even been in the city at the time. This action was directed chiefly against Sextus Pompey. The latter though he had had no share whatever in the attack was nevertheless condemned because he had been an enemy. Those adjudged guilty were debarred from fire and water and their property was confiscated. The provinces,—not only those which some of them were governing, but all the rest,—were committed to the friends of Caesar.

[-49-] Among those held liable was also Publius Servilius Casca, the tribune. He had suspected Caesar's purpose in advance, before he entered the city, and had quietly slipped away. For this act he was at once removed from his office, on the charge of having left the city contrary to precedent, by the populace convened by his colleague Publius Titius; and in this way he was condemned. When Titius not long after died, the proverbial fate that had been observed from of old was once more in evidence. No one up to that time who had expelled a colleague had lived the year out: but first Brutus after the expulsion of Collatinus died in his turn, then Gracchus was stabbed after expelling Octavius, and Cinna who put Marullus and Flavus out of the way not long after perished. This has been the general experience.

Now the assassins of Caesar had many accusers who were anxious to ingratiate themselves with his son, and many who were persuaded so to act by the rewards offered. They received money from the estate of the convicted man and the latter's honors and office, if he had any, and exemption from further service in the army, applicable to themselves and their children and grandchildren. Of the jurors the majority voted against the accused out of fear of Caesar and a wish to please him, generally hinting that they were justified in doing this. Some cast their votes in consideration of the law enacted about punishing the culprits, and others in consideration of the arms of Caesar. And one, Silicius Corona, a senator, voted outright to acquit Marcus Brutus. He made a great boast of this at the time and secretly received approval from the rest: that he was not immediately put to death gained for Caesar a great reputation for toleration, but later he was executed as the result of a proscription.

 

[-50-] After accomplishing this Caesar's next step was naturally a campaign against Lepidus and Antony. Antony on fleeing from the battle described had not been pursued by Caesar on account of the war being entrusted to Decimus; and the latter had not pursued because he did not wish a rival to Caesar to be removed from the field. Hence the fugitive collected as many as he could of the survivors of the battle and came to Lepidus, who had made preparations to march himself into Italy in accordance with the decree, but had again been ordered to remain where he was. For the senators, when they ascertained that Silanus had embraced Antony's cause, were afraid that Lepidus and Lucius Plancus might also coöperate with him, and sent to them to say that they had no further need of them. To prevent their suspecting anything ulterior and consequently causing trouble they ordered them to help in building homes for the men once driven out of Vienna (in Gallia Narbonensis) by the Allobroges and then located between the Rhone and the Arar, at their confluence. Therefore they submitted, and founded the so-called Lugudunum, now known as Lugdunum. They might have entered Italy with their arms, had they wished, for the decrees by this time exerted a very weak influence upon such as had troops, but, with an eye to the outcome of the war Antony was conducting, they wished to appear to have yielded obedience to the senate and incidentally to strengthen their position. [-51-] Indeed, Lepidus censured Silanus severely for making an alliance with Antony, and when the latter himself came would not hold conversation with him immediately, but sent a despatch to the senate containing an accusation of his own against him, and for this stand he received praise and command of the war against Antony. Hence the first part of the time he neither admitted Antony nor repelled him, but allowed him to be near and to associate with his followers; he would not, however, hold a conference with him. But when he ascertained Antony's agreement with Caesar, he then came to terms with both of them himself. Marcus Juventius,24 his lieutenant, learned what was being done and at first tried to alter his purpose; then, when he did not succeed in persuading him, he made away with himself in the sight of the soldiers. For this the senate voted eulogies and a statue to Juventius and a public funeral, but Lepidus they deprived of his image which stood upon the rostra and made him an enemy. They also set a certain day for his comrades and threatened them with war if they should not abandon him before that day. Furthermore they changed their clothing again,—they had resumed citizen's apparel in honor of Caesar's consulship,—and summoned Marcus Brutus and Cassius and Sextus to proceed against them. When the latter seemed likely to be too slow in responding, they committed the war to Caesar, being ignorant of the conspiracy existing. [-52-] He nominally received it, in spite of having made his soldiers give voice to a sentiment previously mentioned,25 but accomplished no corresponding results. This was not because he had formed a compact with Antony and through him with Lepidus,—little he cared for that fact,—but because he saw they were powerful and knew their purposes were linked by the bands of kinship, and he could not use force with them; and besides he cherished hopes of bringing about through them the downfall of Cassius and Brutus, who were already very influential, and subsequently of wearing them out one against the other. Accordingly, even against his will he kept his covenant with them and directed his efforts to effecting a reconciliation for them with the senate and with the people. He did not himself propose the matter, lest some suspicion of what had really taken place should arise, but he set out as if to make war on them, while Quintus urged, as if it were his own idea, that amnesty and restoration be granted them. He did not secure this, however, until the senate had communicated it to the supposedly ignorant Caesar and he had unwillingly agreed to it, compelled, as he alleged, by the soldiers.

[-53-] While this was being done Decimus at first set forth in the intention of making war upon the pair, and associated with him Lucius Planeus, since the latter had been appointed in advance as his colleague for the following year. Learning, however, of his own condemnation and of their reconciliation he wished to lead a campaign against Caesar, but was abandoned by Plancus who favored the cause of Lepidus and Antony. Then he decided to leave Gaul and hasten into Macedonia on land through Illyricum to Marcus Brutus, and sent ahead some of the soldiers while he was engaged in finishing some business he had in hand. But they embraced Caesar's cause, and the rest were pursued by Lepidus and Antony and then were won over through the agency of others. So, being deserted, he was seized by a personal foe. When he was about to be executed he complained and lamented so loudly that one Helvius Blasio, who was kindly disposed to him from association on campaigns, in his sight voluntarily slew himself first.

[-54-] So Decimus afterward died also. Antony and Lepidus left lieutenants in Gaul and themselves proceeded to join Caesar in Italy, taking with them the larger and the better part of their armies. They did not trust him very far and wished not to owe him any favor, but to seem to have obtained amnesty and restoration on their own merits and by their own strength, and not through him. They also hoped to become masters of whatever they desired, of Caesar and the rest in the City, by the size of their armies. With such a feeling they marched through the country, according it friendly treatment. Still, it was damaged by their numbers and audacity no less than if there had been a war. They were met near Bononia by Caesar with many soldiers: he was exceedingly well prepared to defend himself against them, if they should offer any violence. Yet at this time he found no need of arms to oppose them. They really hated one another bitterly, but because they had just about equal forces and desired one another's assistance to take vengeance first on the rest of their enemies, they entered upon a simulated agreement. [-55-] They came together to confer, not alone but bringing an equal number of soldiers, on a little island in the river that flows past Bononia, with the understanding that no one else should be present on either side. First they withdrew to a distance from the various followers and searched one another carefully to make sure that no one had a dagger hidden under his arm. Then they considered at leisure different points and in general made a solemn compact for securing sovereignty and overthrowing enemies. But to prevent its appearing that they were headed straight toward an oligarchy and so envy and opposition arise on the part of the people at large, the three were to be chosen in common as a kind of commissioners and correctors for the administration and settlement of affairs. This office was not to be perpetual, but for five years, under the general proviso that they should manage all questions, whether they made any communication about them to the people and the senate or not, and give the offices and other honors to whomsoever they pleased. The private arrangement, however, in order that they should not be thought to be appropriating the entire sovereignty, was that both Libyas, Sardinia, and Sicily should be given to Caesar, all of Spain and Gallia Narbonensis to Lepidus, and the rest of Gaul south and north of the Alps to Antony to rule. The former was called Gallia Togata, as I have said, because it seemed to be more peaceful than the other divisions, and because the dwellers there already employed Roman citizen-garb: the other was termed Gallia Comata because the Gauls there mostly let their hair grow long, and were in this way distinguished from the others. [-56-] So they made these allotments, for the purpose of securing the strongest provinces themselves and giving others the impression that they were not striving for the whole. A further agreement was that they should cause assassinations of their enemies, that Lepidus after being appointed consul in Decimus's stead should keep guard over Rome and the remainder of Italy, and that the others should make an expedition against Brutus and Cassius. They also pledged themselves to this course by oath. After this, in order to let the soldiers hear and be witnesses of the terms they had made, they called them together and made known to them in advance all that it was proper and safe to tell them. Meanwhile the soldiers of Antony, of course at the latter's direction, committed to Caesar's charge the daughter of Fulvia (Antony's wife), whom she had by Clodius,—and this in spite of Caesar's being already betrothed to another. He, however, did not refuse her; for he did not think this inter-marriage would hinder him at all in the designs which he had against Antony. Among other points for his reflection was his knowledge that his father Caesar had not failed to carry out all of his plans against Pompey, in spite of the relationship between the two.

21Sturz changes this reading of sixty days to fifty, comparing Appian, Civil Wars, Book Three, chapter 74. Between the two authorities it is difficult to decide, and the only consideration that would incline one to favor Appian is the fact that he says this period of fifty days was unusually long ("more than the Romans had ever voted upon vanquishing the Celtae or winning any war"). Boissevain remarks that Dio is not very careful about such details.
22Adopting Reiske's reading, [Greek: tinas].
23Compare here Mommsen (Staatsrecht, 23, 644, 2 or 23, 663, 3), who says that since the only objection to be found with this arrangement was that since the praetor urbanus could not himself conduct the comitia, he ought not properly to have empowered others to do so.
24M. Juventius Laterensis.
25This refers to the latter half of chapter 42, where Caesar binds his soldiers by oath never to fight against any of their former comrades.