2. I think if a magistrate command me to do any thing which by a small accident is evil (as to spend an hour in vain, to give a penny in vain, to speak a word which, antecedently, was vain) that I must do it; and that then it is not vain because it manifesteth my obedience (otherwise obedience would be greatly straitened). Therefore my own contract may make it my duty; because I am able to oblige myself as well as a magistrate is. 3. Because covenant-breaking (and perjury) is really a greater sin than speaking a vain word; and my error doth not make it no sin, but only entangles me in a necessity of sinning which way soever I take.
Quest. XX. If a man make a contract to promote the sin of another for a reward, (as a corrupt judge or lawyer, officer or clerk, to promote injustice; or a resetter, to help a thief; or a bawd or whore, for the price of fornication,) may he take the reward, when the sin is committed (suppose it repented of)?
Answ. The offender that promised the reward, hath parted with his title to the money; therefore you may receive it of him (and ought, except he will rightly dispose of it himself); but withal to confess the sin and persuade him also to repent: but you may not take any of that money as your own (for no man can purchase true propriety by iniquity); but either give it to the party injured, (to whom you are bound to make satisfaction,) or to the magistrate or the poor, according as the case particularly requireth.
Quest. XXI. If I contract, or bargain, or promise to another, between us two, without any legal form or witness, doth it bind me to the performance?
Answ. Yes, in foro conscientiæ, supposing the thing lawful; but if the thing be unlawful in foro Dei, and such as the law of the land only would lay hold of you about, or force you to, if it had been witnessed, then the law of the land may well be avoided, by the want of legal forms and witnesses.
Quest. XXII. May I buy an office for money in a court of justice?
Answ. Some offices you may buy (where the law alloweth it, and it tendeth not to injustice); but other offices you may not: the difference the lawyers may tell you better than I, and it would be tedious to pursue instances.
Quest. XXIII. May one buy a place of magistracy or judicature for money?
Answ. Not when your own honour or commodity is your end: because the common good is the end of government; and to a faithful governor, it is a place of great labour and suffering, and requireth much self-denial and patience. Therefore they that purchase it as a place of honour, gain, or pleasure, either know not what they undertake, or have carnal ends; else they would rather purchase their liberty and avoid it. But if a king, or a judge, or other magistrate, see that a bad man (more unfit to govern) is like to be put in, if he be put by, it is lawful for him to purchase the people's deliverance at a very dear rate (even by a lawful war, which is more than money, when the sovereign's power is in such danger): but the heart must be watched, that it pretend not the common good, and intend your own commodity and honour; and the probable consequents must be weighed; and the laws of the land must be consulted also; for if they absolutely prohibit the buying of a place of judicature, they must be obeyed.156 And ill effects may make it sinful.
Quest. XXIV. May one sell a church benefice, or rectory, or orders?
Answ. If the benefice be originally of your own gift, it is at first in your power to give part or all, to take some deductions out of it or not: but if it be really given to the church, and you have but the patronage or choice of the incumbent, it is sacrilege to sell it for any commodity of your own: but whether you may take somewhat out of a greater benefice, to give to another church which is poorer, dependeth partly on the law of the land, and partly upon the probable consequents. If the law absolutely forbid it, (supposing that unlawful contracts cannot be avoided unless some lawful ones be restrained,) it must be obeyed for the common good; and if the consequent of a lawful contract be like to be the more hurtful encouragement of unlawful ones, such examples must be forborne, though the law were not against them. But to sell orders is undoubted simony; (that is, the office of the ministry, or the act of ordination;) though scribes may be paid for writing instruments.
Quest. XXV. May a man give money for orders or benefices, when they cannot otherwise be had?
Answ. This is answered in quest. xxii. 1. If the law absolutely forbid it, for the common safety, you may not. 2. If your end be chiefly your own commodity, ease, or honour, you may not. But in case you were clear from all such evils, and the case were only this, whether you might not give money to get in yourself, to keep out a heretic, a wolf, or insufficient man, who might destroy the people's souls, I see not but it might well be done.
Quest. XXVI. May I give money to officers, servants, or assistants for their furtherance?
Answ. For writings or other servile acts about the circumstantials you may; but not (directly or indirectly) to promote the simoniacal contract. What you may not give to the principal agent, you may not give his instruments or others for the same end.
Quest. XXVII. May I give or do any thing afterward by way of gratitude, to the patron, bishop, or any others, their relations or retainers?
Answ. Not when the expectation of that gratitude was a (secret or open) condition of the presentation or orders; and you believe that you should not else have received them: therefore promised gratitude is but a kind of contracting. Nor may you show gratitude by any scandalous way, which seemeth simony. Otherwise, no doubt but you may be prudently grateful for that or any other kindness.
Quest. XXVIII. May not a bishop or pastor take money for sermons, sacraments, or other offices?
Answ. Not for the things themselves; he must not sell God's word and sacraments, or any other holy thing. But they that serve at the altar may live on the altar, and the elders that rule well are worthy of double honour; and the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn should not be muzzled. They may receive due maintenance while they perform God's service, that they may be vacant to attend their proper work.
Quest. XXIX. May one person disoblige another of a promise made to him?
Answ. Yes, if it be no more than a promise to that person; because a man may give away his right; but if it be moreover a vow to God, or you intend to oblige yourself in point of veracity under the guilt of a lie if you do otherwise, these alter the case, and no person can herein disoblige you.
Quest. XXX. But what if the contract be bound by an oath, may another then release me?
Answ. Yes, if that oath did only tie you to perform your promise; and were no vow to God, which made him a party by dedicating any thing to him; for then the oath being but subservient to the promise, he that dischargeth you from the promise, dischargeth you also from the oath which bound you honestly to keep it.
Quest. XXXI. Am I bound by a promise when the cause or reason of it proveth a mistake?
Answ. If by the cause you mean only the extrinsical reasons which moved you to it, you may be obliged nevertheless for finding your mistake; only so far as the other was the culpable cause, (as is aforesaid,) he is bound to satisfy you; but if by the cause you mean the formal reason, which constituteth the contract, then the mistake may in some cases nullify it (of which enough before).
Quest. XXXII. What if a following accident make it more to my hurt than could be foreseen?
Answ. In some contracts it is supposed or expressed, that men do undertake to run the hazard; and then they must stand obliged. But in some contracts, it is rationally supposed that the parties intend to be free, if so great an alteration should fall out. But to give instances of both these cases would be too long a work.
Quest. XXXIII. What if something unexpectedly fall out, which maketh it injurious to a third person? I cannot sure be obliged to injure another.
Answ. If the case be the latter mentioned in the foregoing answer, you may be thus free; but if it be the former, (you being supposed to run the hazard, and secure the other party against all others,) then either you were indeed authorized to make this bargain, or not; if not, the third person may secure his right against the other; but if you were, then you must make satisfaction as you can to the third person. Yea, if you made a covenant without authority, you are obliged to save the other harmless, unless he knew your power to be doubtful, and did resolve to run the hazard.
Quest. XXXIV. What if something fall out which maketh the performance to be a sin?
Answ. You must not do it; but you must make the other satisfaction for all the loss which you were the cause of, unless he undertook to stand to the hazard of this also (explicitly or implicitly).
Quest. XXXV. Am I obliged if the other break covenant with me?
Answ. There are covenants which make relations (as between husband and wife, pastor and flock, rulers and subjects); and covenants which convey title to commodities, of which only I am here to speak. And in these there are some conditions which are essential to the covenant; if the other first break these conditions, you are disobliged. But there are other conditions which are not essential, but only necessary to some following benefit, whose non-performance will only forfeit that particular benefit; and there are conditions which are only undertaken subsequent duties, trusted on the honesty of the performer; and in these a failing doth not disoblige you. These latter are but improperly called conditions.
Quest. XXXVI. May I contract to perform a thing which I foresee is like to become impossible or sinful, before the time of performance come, though it be not so at present.
Answ. With all persons you must deal truly; and with just contractors openly; but with thieves, and murderers, and persecutors, you are not always bound to deal openly. This being premised, either your covenant is absolutely, This I will do, be it lawful or not, possible or impossible; and such a covenant is sin and folly: or it is conditional, This I will do, if it continue lawful, or possible: this condition (or rather exception) is still implied where it is not expressed, unless the contrary be expressed: therefore such a covenant is lawful with a robber with whom you are not bound to deal openly; because it is but the concealing from him the event which you foresee. As e. g. you have intelligence that a ship is lost at sea, or is like to be taken by pirates, which the robber expecteth shortly to come safe into the harbour: you may promise him to deliver up yourself his prisoner, when that ship cometh home. Or you know a person to be mortally sick, and will die before the next week; you may oblige yourself to marry or serve that person two months hence; for it is implied, if he or she be then alive. But with equal contractors, this is unlawful, with whom you are obliged not only to verity but to justice; as in the following cases will be further manifested.
Tit. 3. Special Cases about Justice in Buying and Selling
Quest. I. Am I bound to endeavour that he whom I deal with may be a gainer by the bargain as well as I?
Answ. Yes, if you be equally in want, or in the like condition; but if he be very poor, and you be rich, charity must be so mixed with justice, that you must endeavour that it be more to his commodity than yours (if he be one indeed that you owe charity to). And if you be poor, and he be rich, you may be willing to be the only gainer yourself, so be it you covet not another's, nor desire that he be wronged; for when he hath power to deal charitably, you may be willing of his charity or kindness.
Quest. II. May I desire or take more than my labour or goods are worth, if I can get it?
Answ. 1. Not by deceit, persuading another that they are worth more than they are. 2. Not by extortion, working upon men's ignorance, error, or necessity (of which more anon). 3. Not of any one that is poorer than yourself, or of any one that intendeth but an equal bargain. 4. But if you deal with the rich, who in generosity stick not at a small matter, and are willing another should be a gainer by them, and understand what they do, it is lawful to take as much as they will give you.
Quest. III. May I ask in the market more than my goods are truly worth?
Answ. In the case last mentioned you may; when you are selling to the rich, who are willing to show their generosity, and to make you gainers. But then the honest way is to say, it is worth but so much; but if you will give so much more because I need it, I will take it thankfully. Some think also where the common custom is to ask more than the worth, and people will not buy unless you come down from your first demand, that then you may lawfully ask more, because else there is no trading with such people. My judgment in this case is this, 1. That ordinarily it is better to ask no more at all but a just gain; and that the inconveniences of doing otherwise are greater than any on the other side; for he that heareth you ask unjustly may well think that you would take unjustly if you could get it, and consequently that you are unjust. 2. But this just gain lieth not always just in an indivisible quantity, or determinate price. A man that hath a family to maintain by his trade, may lawfully take a proportionable, moderate gain; though if he take less he may get something too. To be always just at a word is not convenient; for he that may lawfully get two or three shillings or more in the pound of the rich, may see cause to let a poorer person have it for less; but never ask above what it is reasonable to take. 3. And if you once peremptorily said, I will take no less, then it is not fit to go from your word. 4. And if you do meet with such fools or proud gallants, who will not deal with you unless you ask dear, it is just that when they have given you more than it is worth, you tell them so, and offer them the overplus again. And for them that expect that you abate much of your asking, it is an inconvenience to be borne, which will be ever to your advantage when you are once better known.
Quest. IV. How shall the worth of a commodity be judged of?
Answ. 1. When the law setteth a rate upon any thing (as on bread and drink with us) it must be observed. 2. If you go to the market, the market price is much to be observed. 3. If it be in an equal contract, with one that is not in want, you may estimate your goods as they cost you, or are worth to you, though it be above the common price; seeing the buyer is free to take or leave them. 4. But if that which you have to sell be extraordinarily desirable, or worth to some one person more than to you or another man, you must not make too great an advantage of his convenience or desire; but be glad that you can pleasure him, upon equal, fair, and honest terms. 5. If there be a secret worth in your commodity which the market will take no notice of, (as it is usual in a horse,) it is lawful for you to take according to that true worth if you can get it. But it is a false rule of them that think their commodity is worth as much as any one will give.
Quest. V. Is it lawful to make a thing seem better than it is, by trimming, adorning, or setting the best side outward or in sight; or to conceal the faults of what I am to sell?
Answ. It is lawful to dress, polish, adorn, or set out your commodity, to make it seem as it is indeed, but not to make it seem better than it is: except in some very few unusual cases; as if you deal with some fantastical fool, who will not buy it, nor give you the true worth, except it be so set out, and made in some respects to seem better than it is. It is lawful so far to serve their curiosity or humour, as to get the worth of your commodity. But if you do it to get more than the worth by deceiving, it is a sin. And such glossing hath so notable an appearance of deceit, that for that scandal it should be avoided.
2. And as for concealing the fault, the case is the same; you ought not to deceive your neighbour, but to do as you would be done by; and therefore must not conceal any fault which he desireth or is concerned to know. Except it be when you deal with one who maketh a far greater matter of that fault than there is cause, and would wrong you in the price if it were known: yea, and that exception will not hold neither, except in a case when you must needs sell, and they must buy it: because, 1. You may not have another man's money against his will, though it be no more than the thing is worth. 2. Because it will be scandalous when the fault is known by him that buyeth it.
Quest. VI. What if the fault was concealed from me when I bought it, or if I were deceived or over-reached by him that sold it me, and gave more than the worth, may I not repair my loss by doing as I was done by?
Answ. No: no more than you may cut another's purse, because yours was cut; you must do as you would be done by, and not as you are done by. What you may do with the man that deceived you, is a harder question; but doubtless you may not wrong an honest man, because you were wronged by a knave.
Object. But it is taken for granted in the market, that every man will get as much as he can have, and that caveat emptor is the only security; and therefore every man trusteth to his own wit, and not to the seller's honesty, and so resolveth to run the hazard.
Answ. It is not so among christians, nor infidels who profess either truth or common honesty. If you come among a company of cut-purses, where the match is made thus, Look thou to thy purse, and I will look to mine, and he that can get most let him take it! then indeed you have no reason to trust another. But there are no tradesmen or buyers who will profess that they look not to be trusted, or say, I will lie or deceive you if I can. Among thieves and pirates such total distrust may be allowed; but among sober persons in civil societies and converse, we must in reason and charity expect some truth and honesty, and not presume them to be all liars and deceivers, that we may seem to have allowance to be such ourselves. Indeed we trust them, not absolutely as saints, but with a mixture of distrust, as fallible and faulty men: and so as to trust our own circumspection above their words, when we know not the persons to be very just. But we have no cause to make a market a place of mere deceit, where every one saith, Trust not me, and I will not trust thee; but let us all take one another for cheats and liars, and get what we can! Such censures savour not of charity, or of just intentions.
Quest. VII. What if I foresee a plenty and cheapness in a time of dearth, which the buyer foreseeth not, (as if I know that there are ships coming in with store of that commodity which will make it cheap,) am I bound to tell the buyer of it, and hinder my own gain?
Answ. There may be some instances in trading with enemies, or with rich men, that regard not such matters, or with men that are supposed to know it as well as you, in which you are not bound to tell them. But in your ordinary equal trading, when you have reason to think that the buyer knoweth it not, and would not give so dear if he knew it, you are bound to tell him; because you must love your neighbour as yourself, and do as you would be done by, and not take advantage of his ignorance.
Quest. VIII. If I foresee a dearth, may I not keep my commodity till then?
Answ. Yes, unless it be to the hurt of the commonwealth; as if your keeping it in be the cause of the dearth, and your bringing it forth would help to prevent it.
Quest. IX. May one use many words in buying and selling?
Answ. You must use no more than are true, and just, and useful: but there are more words needful with some persons who are talkative and unsatisfied than with others.
Quest. X. May I buy as cheap as I can get it, or give less than the thing is worth?
Answ. If it be worth more to you than the market price, (through your necessity,) you are not bound to give above the market price. If it be worth less to you than the market price, you are not bound to give more than it is worth to you, as suited to your use. But you must not desire nor seek to get another's goods or labour for less than it is worth in both these respects (in common estimate, and to you).
Quest. XI. May I take advantage of another's necessity to buy for less than the worth, or sell for more: as e. g. a poor man must needs have money suddenly for his goods, though he sell them but for half the worth; and I have no need of them: am I bound to give him the worth when I have no need? and when it is a great kindness to him to give him any thing in that strait? So also when I have no desire to sell my horse, and another's necessity maketh him willing to give more than he is worth, may I not take it?
Answ. To the first case: you must distinguish between an act of justice and of charity; and between your need of the thing and the worth of it to you. Though you have no need of the poor man's goods, yet if you buy them, both justice and charity require that you give him as much as they are worth to you, though not so much as they are worth in the market: yea, and that you buy them of him in his necessity; for if you give him but what they are worth to you, you are no loser by it; and you should do another good, when it is not to your own hurt or loss. By what they are worth to you, I mean so much as that you be no loser. As, if it be meat or drink, though you have no present need, perhaps you will shortly have need, and if you buy not that, you must buy as much of somewhat else. In strict justice you may be a saver, but not a gainer, by buying of the poor in their necessity. 2. But if you buy a durable commodity for less than it is worth, you should take it but as a pledge, and allow the seller liberty to redeem it if he can, that he may get more after of another. 3. And to the poor in such necessity, charity must be exercised as well as justice. Therefore if you are able to lend them money to save them the loss of underselling, you should do it. (I account that man only able who hath money which no greater service of God requireth.) And if you are not able yourself, you should endeavour to get some others to relieve him, if you can without a greater inconvenience.
And for the second case, it is answered before: you may not take more than it is worth, ever the more for another's necessity; nor in any other case than you might have done it in, if there had been no such necessity of his.
Quest. XII. May I not make advantage of another's ignorance or error in bargaining?
Answ. Not to get more than your commodity is worth, nor to get his goods for less than the worth; no, nor to get the true worth against his will, or with scandal: but if it be only to get a true worth of your own commodity when he is willing, but would be offended if his ignorance in some point were cured, you may so far make use of his ignorance to a lawful end, as is said before in the case of concealing faults.
Quest. XIII. May I strive to get before another, to get a good bargain which he desireth?
Answ. Yes, if you do it not out of a greedy mind, nor to the injury of one that is poorer than yourself: you should rather further the supply of your neighbour's greater needs; otherwise speed and industry in your calling is no fault, nor yet the crossing of a covetous man's desires: you are not bound to let every man have what he would have.
Quest. XIV. May I buy a thing out of another's hand, or hire a servant which another is about or is treating with? Or may I call a chapman from another to buy of me?
Answ. There are some cases in which you may not do it, and some in which you may. You may not do it out of a greedy covetousness; nor to the injury of the poor: nor when the other hath gone so far in the bargain that it cannot be honestly broken; for then you injure the third person, and tempt the other to a sin: nor may you do it so as to disturb the due and civil order, which should be among moderate men in trading. And it is a great matter how the thing is accounted of by the custom of the country or market where you bargain; for where it is of ill report, and accounted as unjust, the scandal should make you avoid such a course. But yet in some cases it is lawful, and in some a needful duty. It is lawful when none of the foresaid reasons (or any such other) are against it: it is a duty when charity to the poor or oppressed doth require it. As e. g. a poor man must needs sell his land, his horse, his corn, or goods: a covetous oppressor offereth him less than it is worth. The poor man must take his offer if he can get no more: the oppressor saith that it is injustice for any one to take his bargain out of his hand, or offer money till he have done: in this case it may be a duty, to offer the poor man the worth of his commodity, and save him from the oppressor. A covetous man offereth a servant or labourer less than their service or labour is worth; and will accuse you, if you interrupt his bargain and would offer his servant more: in this case it may be your duty to help the servant to a better master. A chapman is ready to be cheated by an unconscionable tradesman, to give much more for a commodity than its worth: charity may oblige you in such a case to offer it him cheaper. In a word, if you do it for your own gain, in a greedy manner, it is a sin; but if you do it when it is not scandalous or injurious, or do it in charity for another's good, it is lawful, and sometimes a duty.
Quest. XV. May I dispraise another's commodity to draw the buyer to my own?
Answ. This case is sufficiently answered in the former: 1. You may not use any false dispraise: 2. Nor a true one out of covetousness, nor in a scandalous manner. 3. But you may help to save another from a cheater, by opening the deceit in charity to him.
Quest. XVI. What should I do in doubtful cases, where I am uncertain whether the thing be just or not?
Answ. Causeless, perplexing, melancholy scruples, which would stop a man in the course of his duty, are not to be indulged: but in rational doubts, first use your utmost diligence (as much as the nature of the cause requireth) to be resolved; and if yet you doubt, be sure to go the safer way, and to avoid sin rather than loss, and to keep your consciences in peace.
Quest. XVII. If the buyer lose the commodity between the bargain and the payment, (as if he buy your horse, and he die before payment, or presently after,) what should the seller do to his relief?
Answ. If it were by the seller's fault, or by any fault in the horse which he concealed, he is to make the buyer full satisfaction. If it were casually only, rigorous justice will allow him nothing; and therefore if it be either to a man that is rich enough to bear it without any great sense of the loss, or in a case where in common custom the buyer always standeth to the loss, mere justice will make him no amends. But if it be where custom makes some abatement judged a duty, or where the person is so poor as to be pinched by the loss, that common humanity, which all good men use in bargaining, which tempereth justice with charity, will teach men to bear their part of the loss; because they must do as they would be done by.
Quest. XVIII. If the thing bought and sold prove afterward of much more worth than was by either party understood, (as in buying of ambergris and jewels it oft falleth out,) is the buyer bound to give the seller more than was bargained for?
Answ. Yes, if it were the seller's mere ignorance and insufficiency in that business which caused him so to undersell it (as if an ignorant countryman sell a jewel or ambergris, who knoweth not what it is, a moderate satisfaction should be made him). But if it were the seller's trade, in which he is to be supposed to be sufficient, and if it be taken for granted beforehand, that both buyer and seller will stand to the bargain whatever it prove, and that the seller would have abated nothing if it had proved less worse than the price, then the buyer may enjoy his gain; much more if he run any notable hazard for it, as merchants use to do.
Quest. XIX. What if the title of the thing sold prove bad, which was before unknown?
Answ. If the seller either knew it was bad, or through his notable negligence was ignorant of it, and did not acquaint the buyer with so much of the uncertainty and danger as he knew, or if it was any way his fault that the buyer was deceived, and not the buyer's fault, he is bound to make him proportionable satisfaction. As also in case that by law or bargain he be bound to warrant the title to the buyer. But not in case that it be their explicit or implicit agreement that the buyer stand to the hazard, and the seller hath done his duty to make him know what is doubtful.
Quest. XX. What if a change of powers or laws do overthrow the title, almost as soon as it is sold, (as it oft falls out about offices and lands,) who must bear the loss?
Answ. The case is near the same with that in quest. xvii. It is supposed that the seller should have lost it himself if he had kept it but a little longer; and that neither of them foresaw the change; and therefore that the seller hath all his money, rather for his good hap, than for his lands or office (which the buyer hath not). Therefore except it be to a rich man that feeleth not the loss, or one that expressly undertook to stand to all hazards, foreseeing a possibility of them, charity and humanity will teach the seller to divide the loss.
The same is the case of London now consumed by fire; where thousands of suits are like to rise between the landlords and the tenants. Where the providence of God (permitting the burning zeal of some papists) hath deprived men of the houses which they had hired or taken leases of, humanity and charity requireth the rich to bear most of the loss, and not to exact their rents or rebuilding from the poor, whatever the law saith, which could not be supposed to foresee such accidents. Love your neighbours as yourselves; do as you would be done by; and oppress not your poor brethren; and then by these three rules you will yourselves decide a multitude of such doubts and difficulties, which the uncharitable only cannot understand.