The Life of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, Tenth Earl of Dundonald, Vol. II

Unexpected boldness was forced upon them on the 25th of April. "I am now in a position," wrote Lord Cochrane to General Church at eight o'clock in the morning from the Piræus, "to carry you all over to the rear of the enemy, if Karaïskakes's army have the courage to walk to this point, which is in their own possession, in order to land on the opposite shore at two hundred yards distance, and whereon is not a living soul. I can make such a diversion by means of the seamen at night as would enable Karaïskakes's army to move on by land towards the Phalerum, whilst those on the Phalerum, with the exception of a few, might take up a position near Athens or in the town. I can embark you and yours, and leave Karaïskakes's men without food, taking all the provisions to the advanced post, leaving him to starve or come on."

That desperate expedient was averted. Two or three hours after suggesting it, Lord Cochrane was superintending the debarkation of some thirty soldiers, under cover of two gunboats. A party of Ottomans, seeing the operation, hurried down with the intention of harassing the new comers. Lord Cochrane's Hydriots, however, rushed to the rescue. Other Turkish troops came up, to be met by other Greeks, and the battle became general. Lord Cochrane, with nothing but his telescope in his hand, gathered the Christian troops round him, and, with encouraging words, led them on in an orderly attack upon the entrenchments about the monastery of Saint Spiridion. Within an hour, nine entrenchments were in the hands of the Greeks, who lost only eight men. Sixty Turks were slain, and then their comrades fled, most of them hurrying up to the camp of Athens, a few betaking themselves to the convent.

"The Greeks," wrote Lord Cochrane to the Government, "have this day done as their forefathers were wont to do. Henceforth commences a new era in the system of modern Grecian warfare. If every one behaves to-morrow as all, without exception, have behaved to-day, the siege of the Acropolis will be raised and the liberty of Greece secured."

By this success the Turks, with exception of the garrison in the convent, were driven back to the neighbourhood of Athens, and Karaïskakes was encouraged to remove his camp from Keratsina to the Piræus. At a council of war held the same evening Lord Cochrane urged a sudden and united attack upon the Turkish camp on the morrow. Karaïskakes, however, declined to move a step further until the monastery was captured, and, as General Church agreed with this view, Lord Cochrane assented to it.

Early next morning the bombardment of the monastery was begun. The Hellas, commanded by Miaoulis, discharged her heavy guns upon it during several hours, with such effect that it seemed to be only a mass of ruins. It was feebly invested by Karaïskakes on land. But its garrison held out with excellent bravery. Thrice the Greeks tried to storm it; but thrice they were driven back.

In the evening the Turks solicited an armistice, and offered to capitulate on condition that they should be allowed to retire with all their arms and properties: and this proposal Karaïskakes was inclined to accept. Lord Cochrane, however, contended that they should have nothing but bare life. While this was being discussed, the Turks perfidiously assassinated a Greek messenger sent to treat with them, and fired upon a boat in which Lord Cochrane's secretary, Mr. Edward Masson, was carrying the flag of truce. Thereupon, the Chief Admiral refused to hear any more of a compromise. Returning to his ship, he ordered the bombardment of the convent to be resumed, and besought Karaïskakes to continue storming it by land.

This was done throughout the 27th, but unsuccessfully, because unwillingly. The Greeks asserted that the Turkish garrison was utterly without provisions and water. Lord Cochrane urged that, if it was so, a small detachment of the Greek army and the ships of war would suffice for its investment, while the main force marched boldly on to Athens before the terror inspired by its recent achievements had died out. He reproached them with cowardice, and threatened to leave them unless they took prompt measures for completing their triumph. "The services of the navy," he wrote to Karaïskakes, "are immediately required for other purposes than those of attending upon an inactive army. My duty I am determined to execute in all possible ways in which my services can benefit Greece. I shall therefore be gratified if, in reply to this letter, you will inform me if it is in your power to make the army advance, and if that advance will take place before to-morrow night. It will give me the greatest pleasure to co-operate with you in all manner of ways, but my desire to that effect is rendered null if those under your orders will not conform to your wishes or obey your commands."

To the same effect Lord Cochrane wrote, on the following morning, to General Church. "The convent and its walls," he said, "have been levelled to the ground. The rubbish alone remains on the southern side towards the shipping; and it appears that not more than one hundred of those it contained, or who fled within its walls for safety, now remain to oppose, or assault, or threaten, the rear of the Greek army, should you be able to prevail on its leaders to advance. I should remind those leaders that, independently of the army, I have full fifteen hundred men under my command, a thousand of whom, being on shore now at this port, are more than sufficient to blockade these ruins or destroy all within; which last event might have taken place yesterday had it not been that the seamen were removed from the positions which they had stormed and taken, in the neighbourhood of the convent, and soldiers placed in their stead – a circumstance which seems to have given them offence, so that they leave the storming of the ruins of the convent to those thus placed, as they say, in the post of honour. These feelings, in such minds – however proper the proceedings may have been in a military point of view – I cannot prevent or remove. Time, provisions, and money, are wasting in inaction. The enemy is concentrating troops and fortifying positions around Athens, each of which positions will be a pretext for delay; even were I not aware that abundant excuses of other kinds will not be wanting – such as the arrival of a few hundred cavalry from Negropont or the like; so that I really begin to despair of one step being made in advance for the relief of the Acropolis. I know the difficulties of your situation, and I fear that they are more than even your energy can surmount. When you shall have done your utmost towards the end we have in view, I shall make one effort for the safety of the unfortunate women and children who are threatened with immediate destruction or perpetual slavery. Pray let me have a decisive reply as to what is to be done, and when."

General Church's reply is instructive. "I have read your letter with great attention," he wrote, "and fully enter into your view of affairs. The Hydriots are unquestionably the best to storm, if anybody will storm. The soldiers that they say have taken their post were placed to co-operate in a general assault, and I had made an arrangement with a chief who certainly displayed considerable courage the other day. I gave him directions to collect a band, or forlorn hope, of volunteers to lead with, and he is to have five hundred dollars for himself and five hundred for his band. Had it not rained – however ridiculous it may seem to say so – I am sure that a storming party would have advanced yesterday evening, and I hope it will do so to-day. In fact, the rain yesterday almost dispersed the whole camp, and many of our outposts were quite abandoned. If the Hydriots will advance, I will order the others away immediately. You have no idea of my anxiety to move on, and I cannot express it. Karaïskakes is at this moment going round his outposts. As soon as he returns, I shall send for him and combine with him, bon gré mal gré, an advance for to-night or to-morrow. I will let you know as soon as we have had our conference. I think, my lord, that if the weather clears up, we shall be able still to storm, and perhaps a little firing again would have the effect of rousing the fellows."

Soldiers who could only fight in fine weather were hardly fit to rescue Greece in the heaviest pressure of her misfortunes. On the previous night something like a mutiny had been occasioned by Lord Cochrane's complaints at their inactivity. Even Karaïskakes sympathised with his captains. "We shall not go well with these English," he said; "I fear they will ruin us by their impatience. They cannot restrain themselves. But we must make the best we can of them." Sir Richard Church, fired with Lord Cochrane's ardour, would not be made the best of, according to the views of Karaïskakes and his followers. The letter from him last quoted was followed within an hour by a brief one: – "My lord, I have the honour to inform you that I have given over the command to General Karaïskakes."

Karaïskakes and the Greek officers were thus left, at about ten o'clock in the morning of the 28th, to work out their own devices. At eleven, Lord Cochrane received orders to cease the firing which he had reopened from the guns of the Hellas. The movements which, through his telescope, he saw in process within the convent walls and at its gate induced him to send strict orders to Major Urquhart to withdraw his Hydriot marines from their post near the convent, and station them on the summit of Munychia.

The Turks had again sent offers of capitulation, and Karaïskakes, now uncontrolled by Lord Cochrane or General Church, and in contempt of his positive assertion, made two days before, that the garrison had not a ration of provisions left and could easily be starved into utter submission, had acceded to their terms. It was agreed that they were to be allowed to surrender with all the honours of war. Bearing their arms and all their property, they were to pass unmolested into the Turkish camp on the hills. Karaïskakes must be blamed for this excess of generosity; but, to his credit be it stated, that, having agreed to the capitulation, he took all reasonable care to have it honourably observed. Along the road leading from the gate of the convent to the fortifications on the hills he ranged soldiers on either side, in order that the Turks might be protected from the crowd of less disciplined soldiers. All looked well as the two hundred and seventy men, women, and children who had been locked within the shattered building passed out of it and began their march. But no sooner was the convent evacuated than a swarm of Greeks rushed into it, each hoping to seize the largest share of the booty which they expected to find. They found nothing, and then angrily rushed out again to inform their comrades of their disappointment.

Lord Cochrane watched their proceedings from the deck of the Unicorn, General Gordon and Mr. Finlay, who was then serving as a volunteer on Gordon's staff, being by his side. "All those men will be murdered!" exclaimed Mr. Finlay, pointing to the retreating Turks. Lord Cochrane, not yet initiated in all the depths of Greek treachery, turned in horror to General Gordon and said, "Do you hear what he says?" "My lord," answered Gordon, "I fear it is too true."⁵

And so it proved. A Greek soldier, pushing through the guard, snatched at the sword of one of the Turks passing along the line. The Turk resisted, and a scuffle followed. Two or three other Turks raised their muskets and fired. A score of Greeks at once retaliated. A shadow of an excuse was thus afforded to the Christians for wreaking vengeance for all the ills they had endured from the enemy, and for giving vent to their anger at finding no prizes in the deserted convent. A horrible massacre ensued. Two hundred or more Turks were murdered. Less than seventy escaped. "Forgive me, as I forgive you," shouted Karaïskakes to the Moslems, after vainly trying to stay the slaughter; "I can do nothing more for you."

"Islanders," wrote Lord Cochrane, in a proclamation to his Hydriot force, "I was no party to the capitulation this day. Fearing that some outrage might be committed, I sent you an order to retire; and I glory in the consciousness that I have saved you as well as myself from being inculpated in the most horrid scene I ever beheld, – a scene which freezes my blood, and which cannot be palliated by any barbarities which the Turks have committed on you. I send you the thousand dollars which I promised should be distributed, as a reward for your valour and for your obedience to my directions, which you will ever find lead to the path of honour and humanity and the duty we owe to your country."

Utter confusion among the Greeks resulted, for a time, from the barbarous massacre of Saint Spiridion. The soldiers quarrelled and fought over the blood-stained spoil. The officers were occupied with mutual recriminations and excuses regarding their several shares in the atrocity. Karaïskakes found himself unable to establish order, and had to entreat Sir Richard Church to take back his surrendered authority.

To this General Church assented on the promise that, if he did so, he should be aided in bringing the chief wrong-doers to justice. Indeed, both he and Lord Cochrane hoped, for a little while, that their very misconduct, filling the Greeks with shame and penitence, would incline them to listen to the counsels in which they both saw the only chance of safety to the garrison of the Acropolis. "The destinies of Greece," wrote Lord Cochrane to Karaïskakes, on the 29th of April, "the fate of your army, and the character of its chiefs, are now wholly in the hands of your excellency. You and you alone will be held responsible for all that shall happen. The hour of clemency for Greece is past; the sword alone can decide the contest. Courage is a characteristic of men who deserve to be free. Let then the conduct of a few atrocious individuals yesterday be effaced by a march direct to Athens, at least to relieve the women and children now doomed to destruction, if prompt exertions be not made to save them. Your excellency has hitherto treated my friendly advice in a manner which I did not anticipate; but the world will judge between the course you have taken and that which I wished you, for the benefit of your country, to pursue. I shall wait three days for your excellency's reply, when it will be my duty, if the fortress be not relieved, to attend exclusively to naval affairs. I hope you will reflect on the glory you may yet attain by saving your country, and on the ruinous consequences of persevering in inaction until the last resources of war shall be exhausted."

Karaïskakes's only answer was that the army was in urgent need of spades and shovels, with which he hoped that Lord Cochrane would supply him, as without those means of making fresh tambourias he could not move from his encampment. Lord Cochrane was reasonably indignant. "I confess," he wrote in reply, "that I am now in despair of your making any movement for the relief of the Acropolis, because I have now ascertained that, all the obstacles which first presented themselves to your excellency being overcome, others successively present themselves, to put off the day of your march to the Acropolis. I have made a diversion here this day in favour of your excellency, which, by all the rules of military tactics, must increase the relative strength of your army and facilitate its march. My time and attention must now be devoted to naval matters, and unless you advance this evening, I shall have deeply and bitterly to regret, for the sake of Greece, that I ever put faith in anything being accomplished by individuals to whom so many difficulties, which my experience has taught me to be imaginary, present themselves. I recall to your excellency's recollection your promises and assurances, and I call upon you to make some effort to save your country from inevitable ruin. I solemnly declare that it is my opinion that a thousand men who would obey orders and do their duty are more than are necessary to perform the task at which your excellency hesitates. I shall be oppressed with grief if, after the scene of yesterday, I am compelled to return, first, to the seat of Government, and next to Europe, without having witnessed any deed that can tend to obliterate the stain thereby affixed on the Grecian people."

"I am making my last effort," wrote Lord Cochrane to Dr. Gosse, "to get Karaïskakes to advance. The monastery is taken, its defenders are destroyed, and now the sheepfold on the other side of the Phalerum is the obstacle. We want mortars, shells, and fuses, shoes for the seamen, and food for the mob denominated falsely the army of Greece."

The letter to Karaïskakes had some effect. On the 30th of April, General Church wrote to say that he had persuaded the Greek captains to agree unanimously to an immediate movement against Athens. Two thousand men were to go, during the following night, by water to the neighbourhood of Cape Colias, and thence march stealthily to a hill about a mile south of Athens, which they hoped to seize and secure under cover of the darkness. During the next evening, a force about twice as large was to join them by the same route, and all were to do their best to drive the Turks from their encampments round the Acropolis. This was Lord Cochrane's plan; and there can be no doubt that it would have been successful had the Greeks acted upon it and done their duty.

Unfortunately they did neither. Having promised overnight, they found reasons in the morning for breaking their promises. Nothing was done on the 1st of May, and Lord Cochrane, tired of their excuses for procrastination, paid a brief visit to the authorities at Poros. The result was, that he thought of going without the Greek leaders. "I have seen the Government," he wrote to Sir Richard Church on the 2nd, "and prepared them for the worst, should things go on as they have hitherto done. They are incapable of applying any remedy. Therefore, the more credit will be due to you if you shall be enabled to save the garrison of the Acropolis; in which endeavour count on my utmost exertions and most unlimited co-operation. I hope now you will be able to act without Karaïskakes. In addition to your own people, I can provide two thousand marines, seamen, and volunteers. With these, if you land at night to the eastward, you may be in the neighbourhood of Athens in two hours; and then there is the garrison of fifteen hundred in addition to co-operate, making in the whole a force of nearly five thousand, without taking a soldier from Karaïskakes's tambourias. If, however, you judge well to have volunteers from Karaïskakes's camp, I shall offer 200,000 piastres amongst all who will accompany you or meet you at Athens; by which means I have little doubt you will find Karaïskakes deserted, and the whole mob at the gates of Athens. All the vessels are at your service."

Sir Richard Church feared to undertake the exploit without the co-operation of Karaïskakes, and, on again consulting him, he was informed that a fresh supply of entrenching tools was necessary. Lord Cochrane immediately sent messengers to procure them, but was none the less annoyed at what seemed to him an unnecessary excuse, and again threatened to take his ships where they could do good work for Greece. "You have done everything in your power," wrote Sir Richard to him on the 3rd of May, "and so have I. The soldiers will not embark without the entrenching tools. All we could collect do not amount to two hundred and fifty. I would have gone without one, but no one will follow me. I cannot say more; but to-morrow we may be more fortunate. I cannot say to you stay or otherwise. If you go, I cannot deplore it more than yourself."

Lord Cochrane consented to wait till the morrow, and on the morrow an incident occurred which caused a little further delay. On the 4th of May a small body of Greeks, chiefly Hydriots, went on a skirmishing expedition. At first they were successful, and they had nearly won a redoubt, when a large force of Turks suddenly assailed them on the flank, and drove them back to Phalerum with a loss of nearly a hundred men. Karaïskakes, hearing of this reverse, hurried to the rescue, and with the bravery which was never wanting to him when in actual battle, sought to rally the fugitives. He was on the point of leading them back, when a ball from a pistol struck him in the belly. He was conveyed, in a dying state, to General Church's schooner. Regret at his previous vacillations seems to have filled his mind. "Where is Cochrane? Bring Cochrane to me!" he exclaimed over and over again. Lord Cochrane soon arrived. Karaïskakes, on seeing him, murmured repeated thanks to him for his forbearance towards himself and his devotion to the cause of the Greeks. In his eagerness, he seized the interpreter, Mr. Masson, by the beard, and, pointing towards Cape Colias, said, with all the strength he could muster, "Tell them to be sure to land the division over there to-morrow." Then, not doubting that the expedition would be successful, he uttered solemn thanks to Heaven that he was dying in the moment of victory. Then he made his will – a soldier's will. "I leave my sword and my gun to my son. Tell him to remember they belonged to Karaïskakes." He had little else to leave, having always been free from the avarice by which many of his countrymen were disgraced. He died in the night, and in him Greece lost the worthiest of her native warriors. His faults were the faults of his nation. Many of his virtues were his own. Had his followers been as brave and honest as he was in his best moments, he might have led them on to easy victory. But they wavered and procrastinated, and, in listening to their excuses, he lost his chance of triumph and subjected himself to blame, for which his brave death only half atoned.

On the evening of the 4th, Lord Cochrane assembled the Greek captains at Munychia, and telling them of their leader's dying message, asked whether they were ready to obey it. For some time they made no answer. At length, on the question being repeated, they replied that they thought they had only been brought thither to hear from the Admiral words of consolation for the loss they had sustained in the death of the brave and wise Karaïskakes. Being asked a third time whether they would obey the dying injunction of the leader for whom they now mourned so much, they answered that they were not ready, that the army was in disorder, that some of them were occupied in burying the slain, that some were tending the wounded, and that all desired to stay near their chief as long as the soul was in his body, and to have at any rate the opportunity of kissing his body before its burial.

With some bitterness, Lord Cochrane replied that such an excess of grief was inopportune, and that their love for Karaïskakes would be best shown in obeying his last command. He added that, if they really refused to go to the rescue of the Acropolis, they would not need his presence on the coast and could not complain of his going to serve Greece elsewhere. Having said that, he returned to his ship.

He had not been long on board, however, when a messenger followed him with intelligence that the army would adopt his plan and be ready, without fail, to proceed to the Acropolis on the following evening. There was no further procrastination, and throughout the next day preparations were being made for what one historian of the Greek Revolution calls "a whim,"⁶ and another "an insane scheme."⁷

"The scheme," says one who was in close attendance on Lord Cochrane all through this time, Mr. Edward Masson, "was anything but insane. It was one of the most sober, safe, and practicable plans ever formed. The first and fundamental condition on which Lord Cochrane consented to co-operate in any plan of landing troops at Cape Colias was, that the troops landed should not expose themselves to an attack of cavalry in the plains, but should, on being landed, proceed by a night march, in compact order, and without halting, to a specified rocky height beyond the temple of Jupiter Olympus, a position which, it was admitted by all, they could hold with perfect safety during the day. From this position, the leaders were to try to communicate, by signals or otherwise, with the garrison, and in concert with it, act as circumstances might dictate. Should the garrison resolve to make a sortie, the main body of the Greek army advancing simultaneously from the Phalerum, it was confidently hoped that the combined attack on the enemy would prove victorious; or, at least, would be so far successful, as to enable the Greeks to save the garrison and bring away the families. The great characteristic of the plan was, that nothing should be risked in reference to the enemy's cavalry, and that if the detachment should find they could accomplish nothing, they should, on the following night, return as they went, in safety, and be embarked for the Phalerum."

Unfortunately, the two main points on which Lord Cochrane had insisted were neglected, and thereby what must otherwise have been a brilliant victory was turned into a miserable defeat. He had insisted upon the movement from Cape Colias being aided by the march of the main body of the army direct from the Piræus to the hills, thus diverting the attention of many of the Turks while the advancing party and the garrison were uniting; but Zavella, to whom this part of the work had been entrusted, never moved at all. He had urged yet more strongly that the preparations for the advance should be so hastened as that all the ground should be travelled over during the night-time, while the Turks were in ignorance of it; but instead of that, the Greeks, though they were embarked at Phalerum by midnight, and landed at Cape Colias before two o'clock in the morning, loitered near the shore till daylight, so that their whole enterprise was exposed to the enemy. The critics who have laid the blame of the disaster on Lord Cochrane have neglected to show how these circumstances caused the failure of the enterprise.

The story of the disaster of the 6th of May will be best told in the words of an eye-witness. "About three thousand soldiers," said Dr. Gosse, in a letter written to M. Eynard on the 23rd, "were embarked in the night between the 5th and the 6th of May, in a clear moonlight, and in the most perfect order, and promptly landed on the other shore. Up to that time everything favoured our enterprise; but the treason and negligence of the chiefs, and the indolence of some of the soldiers, altogether destroyed it. Instead of marching directly to Athens during the night, they employed themselves in constructing redoubt after redoubt, as bad as they were useless, of the sort called by them tambourias. We counted a dozen. Only the Suliots, the Candiots, commanded by Demetrius Kalerdji, two hundred regular troops, under the orders of Inglesi and D'aujourd'hui, and twenty-two Philhellenes, went in advance. Without any hindrance, they reached within cannon-shot of the Acropolis, towards Philippapus, so that, as I have heard, they could even speak with the besieged; but, having received no orders to enter, they waited until the day rendered their position hazardous. The enemy thus had time to ascertain their weakness and to send against them eight hundred horsemen. Thrice these troops were repulsed. Vasso and Notaras, however, who covered the right flank, abandoned their posts, as they had done in the affair of the unfortunate Bourbakes, and thereby they caused confusion among the troops in the centre. The latter defended themselves with renewed valour, but yielded at last to the sabres of the Dehli cavalry. Then was exhibited such a panic as cannot be described. The soldiers who occupied the redoubts in the rear, and near to the place of debarkation, began to flee almost at the same time as those of Vasso, and threw themselves into the sea at the risk of being drowned. I was at this time with Lord Cochrane, who did not wish to mix himself up with the affair, when the sudden flight forced us at once to rejoin our boat, and even this was not done without great difficulty. General Church was also on the shore, and he too was only saved by the sloop which was waiting for him. The Turkish cavalry, after having killed or captured all the advanced party, rushed into the plain and made terrible havoc among the Greeks. Seven hundred of them were killed; and two hundred and forty were taken prisoners. The rest, numbering about two thousand, rushed down towards the sea, and would soon have been all destroyed by the Turkish guns placed on the hills if the fire from the vessels off the coast had not kept the enemy at a respectful distance. They passed the day in a terrible uncertainty, but were sustained by the courage of certain chiefs, especially of Nicolo Serva, a Suliot captain; and in the following night they were embarked and carried back to Phalerum. While this portion of the army was being thus troubled, the Greeks, under the orders of Kisso Zavella, remained inactive. That chief quietly smoked his pipe, and when implored to march, was content to answer coldly, 'When they pay me I will go.' The troops of Kolokotrones the younger, and of Sessinis, deserted in the direction of Livonia. The Turks, taking advantage of the disorganized condition of the Greeks, attacked the Phalerum on the night of the 6th, but were repulsed."

Lord Cochrane's account of the battle sent to the Government on the 7th of May, though more general, supplies some other details. "The plan concocted previous to the death of General Karaïskakes," he said, "was carried into effect on the 6th, by his excellency General Church, with this difference in the execution of the service, that his excellency and myself were anxious that a rapid march should be made from the place of debarkation direct to Athens, by a body of four thousand men, in order to return with the women and children and the wounded, whereas the officers of the army insisted upon entrenchments being made in the line of their progress – an operation which required so much time as to preclude the possibility of effecting the object surprised and unopposed. The redoubts were in progress of construction, and the work continued with unremitting labour until about nine o'clock in the morning, when the enemy's cavalry, having collected from all quarters, broke in upon the unfinished redoubts and vigorously attacked those who had advanced the furthest, and who, from the number of subdivisions left, according to the custom of the country, in these redoubts during their progress, had become so weakened as to be incapable of making effectual resistance. The loss on our side has been very considerable. I had to lament this day that the Greeks still continue their aversion to that regularity of movement and honesty of action which constitute the strength of armies, and I grieve to see great bravery rendered useless to their country and dangerous to themselves, and wasted in desultory and unsupported personal efforts. The use of the bayonet and very slight military instruction would have saved most of those who fell on this occasion, and would have rendered unnecessary those redoubts which delay the progress of your arms, and destroy more men in insignificant enterprises which tend to no result, than would be required for the deliverance of your country. The affairs of Greece require energy, and that remedy be at once applied to whatever impedes the progress of affairs."