The Life of Thomas, Lord Cochrane, Tenth Earl of Dundonald, Vol. II

On the same New Year's Day Lord Cochrane wrote, explaining his resolution, to Dr. Gosse, who, of all the Philhellenes in Greece, had rendered him most efficient service in his thankless task, and most zealously encouraged him, throughout a long series of failures for which he was in no way answerable, to persevere in struggling for success. "My dear friend and fellow-sufferer," he said, "in conformity with your wish and opinion, I have tolerated my mental load of grievances until the new year; but as it is essential to commence it well in order that measures may prosper to the end, I have resolved to put my intention in execution, regardless of the officious tongues of those of microscopic views who may deem that my time might be well employed in balancing the rivalships of barbarous seamen or protecting the movable stores of the immovable Hellas. In my present state of official insignificance I could render no other service. I have stated a few of my reasons in a letter to Capodistrias, for his private information, when he shall assume the office of president. I hope these will suffice, and that he will communicate his desire, which shall be duly attended to."

In accordance with his new resolution, Lord Cochrane transferred the command of the Hellas, and such control of the whole navy as was possible, to Admiral Miaoulis. He left Poros in the little schooner Unicorn, on the 10th of January, and arrived at Portsmouth on the 11th of February. "The anxiety and disappointment," he said, writing to M. Eynard from Portsmouth on the following day, "which I experienced in regard to the steam-vessels and other means that were to have been placed at my disposal are trifling, when compared to the distress I have felt at finding my only remaining hope of rendering effectual service to Greece destroyed by the impossibility of inducing the Greek seamen to submit to the slightest restraint on their inclinations, or to render the most trifling service without being paid in advance, or to perform such service after being so paid, if it suited their interest or convenience to evade the fulfilment of their engagement. More than six crews have passed under my review on board the Hellas in the course of as many months, exclusive of those in other vessels, and, notwithstanding all that has been written to praise the courage of the Greek seamen, they are collectively the greatest cowards I have ever met with. No service of any difficulty or danger can be undertaken with such men without the greatest risk of being compromised by the confusion they create, and the impossibility of causing orders to be obeyed. Indeed, though styled Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Naval Forces, I have, since the 12th of April last, when I hoisted my flag, been, in truth, under the control of wild and frantic savages, whose acts are guided by momentary impulses or heedless avidity to grasp some immediate pecuniary or petty advantage, regardless of any prospect of future benefit, however great, to their country or to themselves. To give you an idea of the character of men suddenly emancipated from a state of the most degrading and abject slavery, in which state cunning, deception, and fraud, if not absolutely requisite, were convenient and profitable, of their present arrogancy, ignorance, despotism, and cruelty, when safe opportunity offers for revenge, would require that a diary should be laid before you of events which have actually occurred. The confidence you were pleased to repose in me, and the friendly offices for which I am indebted to you would have imposed upon me the task of transmitting to you such detail, had the state of my mind, harassed by constant contrarieties, permitted.

"Leaving to a future period, then, minute recital of distressing occurrences, permit me to make a few observations as to the course that appears to be necessary to be pursued in order to save Greece from impending ruin: – 1st. The chief leaders of the different factions should be removed from Greece, – those who have education, on missions to different states, as envoys, consuls, etc., and the others, as circumstances will permit. Else Greece will be a theatre of plunder and discord whilst they hold authority or have means to interfere in public affairs. 2ndly. Troops to the amount of four thousand, at least, are required to enforce obedience to salutary laws and regulations. 3rdly. Five hundred seamen from the northern nations of Europe or North America are indispensable for the suppression of piracy and to prevent the plunder of the islands. 4thly. Young Greek seamen should be employed by the civilized nations in their vessels of war and commerce. 5thly. The settlement of persons from all quarters of Europe, in numbers affording mutual protection, should be encouraged. Of course education at home, but more especially abroad, will improve the rising generation. For all those people now at the age of maturity in Greece there is no hope of amelioration. In regard to myself, I am ready, according to my engagement, to render any service in my power to Greece, and I shall feel great satisfaction if I am enabled to do so; but it is no part of my contract to place myself under the control of lawless savages. What might we not have done had the steam-vessels and five hundred good seamen been employed in Greece, when, with these barbarians, we have doubled the number of Greek national vessels of war, and destroyed twice as many of the enemy's squadron? I hope the President Capodistrias will not put his foot on shore in Greece, unless accompanied by a military force. If he does, he will afford corroborative proof of the impossibility of establishing a new order of things by the instrumentality of men who feel interested in the continuance of ancient habits and abuses."¹²

CHAPTER XXII

LORD COCHRANE'S OCCUPATIONS ON BEHALF OF GREECE IN LONDON AND PARIS. – HIS SECOND LETTER TO CAPODISTRIAS. – HIS DEFENCE OF HIMSELF WITH REFERENCE TO HIS VISIT TO WESTERN EUROPE. – HIS RETURN TO GREECE. – CAPODISTRIAS'S PRESIDENCY AND THE PROGRESS OF GREECE. – LORD COCHRANE'S RECEPTION BY THE GOVERNMENT. – THE SETTLEMENT OF HIS ACCOUNTS. – HIS LETTER OF RESIGNATION. – THE FINAL INDIGNITIES TO WHICH HE WAS SUBJECTED. – THE CORRESPONDENCE THEREUPON BETWEEN ADMIRAL HEYDEN AND DR. GOSSE. – LORD COCHRANE'S DEPARTURE FROM GREECE. – HIS OPINIONS REGARDING HER. – THE CHARACTER AND ISSUES OF HIS SERVICES TO THE GREEKS.

[1828-1829.]

Lord Cochrane's absence from Greece was longer and less advantageous than he anticipated. Arriving in London on the 19th of February, 1828, he found that the English Philhellenes were tired out by the bad faith and the unpatriotic conduct of the Greeks, and that the English Government, which he had hoped to influence so far as to obtain an alteration in the Foreign Enlistment Act which would enable him to secure the services of a well-trained force of British seamen, was determined to give no help in the matter. He found, too, that the steam-vessels yet to be furnished in accordance with the old contract with Mr. Galloway were still unfinished, and that there would be no little trouble and delay, added to all that had already been endured, before their completion could be hoped for. Not disheartened, however, he went almost immediately to Paris, there to see what could be expected from the Philhellenes of the Continent.

"I have taken steps," he wrote to M. Eynard from Paris on the 2nd of March, "to cause one of our small steam-vessels to be fitted with proper engines, the expense of which I shall find means to defray. I hope the President will favour me with a communication at an early date, at least, to say whether he has means to pay and victual a few hundreds of foreign seamen, and thus put my mind at rest. For he must depend on foreign aid to support him in his government, protect commerce, and enable a revenue to be derived from the latent resources of Greece. The Greeks themselves will do nothing towards these objects; though there will not be wanting individuals who will endeavour, for their personal views, to persuade them to the contrary of this. My mind is not yet sufficiently tranquil to give detailed reasons for my opinion that things will not succeed in Greece without troops and other foreign aid; but such time will prove to be the case."

"Were the three great powers," he said in another letter to M. Eynard, dated the 17th of March, "pleased to aid the President with funds to a small amount, they would accomplish more for their own benefit and that of Greece, than by great fleets and armies. Four thousand troops, under the Greek Government, and five hundred seamen, would terminate the affair; but never will anarchy cease or piracy be put down, nor will Capodistrias be secure, unless he has, under his own authority, the means of enforcing obedience to the laws and regulations for the public good by sea and land. I have told you that the Greek seamen cannot be used to suppress piracy, and I may truly add that no Greeks of age to bear arms can become soldiers, though they learn readily enough to perform the military exercises. There neither is nor has yet been, since my arrival in Greece, one single company – not even the marines, with which so much pains was taken – that deserves the name of regular. Their ideas are quite repugnant to everything that constitutes the military character."

Lord Cochrane, who, it will be remembered, was chiefly instrumental in the election of Count John Capodistrias as President of Greece in April, 1827, had hoped much from his government. His confidence was not a little shaken by the long delay which the President had shown in entering on his office, and when Capodistrias arrived, in Greece, only a few days after Lord Cochrane's departure, his first acts were calculated to shake that confidence yet more. He introduced many solid reforms; but in other respects clung to the old and bad traditions of the people, and, which was yet worse, allowed himself to be guided by some of the worst placehunters and most skilful abusers of national power, whom he ought to have most carefully avoided. Lord Cochrane began to perceive this before he had been six weeks out of Greece. He yet hoped, however, that wise counsels and good government would prevail, and he tendered his advice, while he reported his own movements, in a second letter which he addressed to Capodistrias.

"The information which your excellency must have acquired since your arrival in Greece," he wrote to him on the 22nd of March, "may have convinced you of the facts briefly touched on in the letter which I had the honour to address to you on the 1st of January, and may also have proved to you the impossibility, under existing circumstances, of my rendering service to Greece, otherwise than by the course I have pursued. Although, on my arrival in England, I was disappointed at finding other ministers than those I expected in the counsels of his Britannic Majesty, yet I had an opportunity of making facts known to influential individuals in proof that the interests of England would be best promoted by a liberal policy towards Greece, and by placing that country, without loss of time, in the rank of an independent state, having boundaries the most extensive that could be conceded. Since then, I have had several conversations here with the gentlemen of the Paris Greek Committee, and I have advised them to assure the ministers that large naval and military armaments are not required for the expulsion of the Turkish and Egyptian forces from Greece, or to protect that country from farther attempts at invasion by the before-mentioned powers; that for the speedy regulation of the internal affairs of Greece, and the support of your authority, it would be far preferable and infinitely less costly for the mediating powers to place in your hands the means of maintaining four or five thousand troops, together with five hundred seamen, and apply a portion of the vast sums they will save to the education of the rising generation of Greeks abroad and at home, and to the encouragement of whatever will tend to direct the talent and genius of the young people most speedily into the course which will entitle Greece to rank amongst the civilized nations of Europe. Whether this advice shall be listened to or not, I am satisfied that my opinion is correct, and that a multitude of foreign troops, in the pay of rival foreign nations, would contribute less to the objects these nations profess to have in view than a much smaller force under your own authority, more especially when it is considered that these troops could in no way interfere with the internal arrangement and police of the country, unless by usurping, or at least superseding the authority which ought to be exclusively vested in your excellency as chief of the Greek Government. Besides, knowing, as I do, the jealous character of your countrymen, the facility with which they listen to surmises and reports, the diversity of interests amongst the rival chiefs, and the intrigues practised by base and worthless individuals, I have little doubt but that such mixture of troops of different nations would give rise to a state of anarchy more injurious to Greece than that which at present exists. Whether such anarchy might be prevented by one nation alone taking upon itself the internal arrangement of Greece seems doubtful; for, to enforce laws, however just and necessary, by troops in foreign pay, against the opinion and habits of a people who have no just notion of the reciprocal duties of civilized society, would be in their estimation to erect a military despotism, and would call forth resistance on their part even to the most salutary changes. I have also recommended, as an additional security against a multitude of evils, an immediate demarkation of the boundaries of Greece, or, at least, an acknowledgment of your excellency as President. The outfit of two or three steam-vessels still unfinished is going on, and I shall find means to accomplish this object in a way that will render them equal if not superior in velocity to most of the steamboats in general use. But, as no pecuniary means could be obtained in England to procure seamen and purchase provisions, coals, and other necessaries, I came to Paris, in the hope that the Greek Committee might enable me to give orders regarding these arrangements, so indispensable to the navigating of these vessels to Greece. The Paris Committee, however, intimate that they have no funds; and the Chevalier Eynard assures me that the moneys collected by him are exhausted. I therefore await with anxiety your answer to the letter which I had the honour to address to you previous to my departure from Greece."

No answer came from Capodistrias. He sent a message to Lord Cochrane asking him to sell him the little Unicorn, which had conveyed him to England, but said nothing about his own return. Believing that the allied powers would do for him all that was necessary in naval resistance of Turkey, he was not sorry to be deprived of an associate in the actual service of Greece as powerful as Lord Cochrane.

This Lord Cochrane began to suspect. "Everything is arranged regarding the engines for the two steamboats," he said in a letter to M. Eynard, on the 24th of March; "but circumstances do not enable me to accomplish more, especially without the sanction of the President, from whom I shall no doubt shortly hear on the subject; – unless, indeed, he shall be persuaded by the primates of the islands that he can do better without a regular naval force, or, at least, without me, which I know is the opinion of Konduriottes, and also of Mavromichales, the great licenser and patron of pirates, so loudly and justly complained of. I am very low, and do not feel at all well. I cannot free myself from the oppression of spirits occasioned by seeing everything in the lamentable state in which all must continue in Greece, unless some effectual steps are taken to put an end to the intrigues and rivalships headed by unprincipled chiefs and backed by their savage followers. Believe me, that there is nothing I will leave undone to serve the cause. But it is essential that more time shall not be wasted in endeavouring to accomplish objects of vital importance by inadequate means."

While Lord Cochrane was endeavouring to hasten the arrangements for his return to Greece, he was annoyed by a letter forwarded to him by Sir Francis Burdett. The letter was from Andreas Luriottis, one of the two Greek deputies who had requested Lord Cochrane, two years and a half before, to enter the service of Greece, and who now claimed a restitution of the 37,000l. paid to him, on the plea that by leaving Greece he had broken his contract.

"Before writing to Sir Francis," said Lord Cochrane in the indignant letter which he addressed to this person on the 20th of April, "you ought to have informed yourself of facts and circumstances. You might have learnt that I continued to serve until the Greek Government had assumed to themselves the powers vested in me, as naval commander-in-chief, to regulate the distribution of armed vessels, and until they had covered the seas with piratical craft. You might have informed yourself that I remained at my post until the neutral admirals refused to hold communication with a Government which had so misconducted itself, and with which they considered it would have been disgraceful to correspond, even on subjects of a public nature. You might have informed yourself that I remained on board the Hellas until the temporary Government had sold and applied to other purposes the revenues of the islands allotted for the maintenance of the regular naval service, and deprived me of the means to satisfy the claims of the officers and seamen; that I continued until the seamen had abandoned the frigate, plundered the fireships, and fitted out pirate vessels before my eyes – all which I had no power to punish or means to prevent. If you or others infer that my endeavours in the cause of Greece are to be judged by naval operations carried on against the enemy by open force, you are mistaken. It is essential that you hold in mind that there are no naval officers in Greece who are acquainted with the discipline of regular ships of war, that the seamen would submit to no restraint, that they would not enlist for more than one month, that they would do nothing without being paid in advance, nor continue to serve after the expiration of the short period for which they were so paid, that by this determination of the seamen the Hellas was detained for months in port or occupied in collecting amongst the islands paltry means to satisfy their demands, and that at last, when money was found, half the period of the seamen's engagement was consumed in proceeding even to the nearest point at which hostile operations could be carried on, whence it became necessary to return almost at the moment of our arrival. It is not for me to speak, except when I am attacked, of the services I have rendered both in my professional capacity and otherwise. Those who were in Greece knew my exertions to reconcile the National Assemblies in April, 1827, to suppress the animosity amongst the chiefs and save the country from civil discord. They know that I doubled the national marine by captures from the enemy. They know that by desultory operations I paralysed the efforts of fleets we could not oppose. They know that the attack on Vasiladi and Lepanto, in September last, induced the Turkish and Egyptian fleets to follow to that quarter, in violation of the armistice, and that this act produced their rencontre and dispute with the British admiral, and ultimately led to the destruction of those fleets in the port of Navarino."

A few days after writing that letter, Lord Cochrane returned to London from Paris, where he had been staying for nearly two months, in frequent communication with the members of the Philhellenic Committees of that city and of other parts of the Continent. The growing dissatisfaction which the bad conduct of the Greeks had awakened in many of their best friends, and still more the silence of Capodistrias, prevented his doing all that he had hoped to do. He succeeded, however, in exciting some fresh interest, and found that one of the steamboats, at any rate, the Mercury, was at length in a fair way of completion, though this and its subsequent equipment were only effected by an advance of two thousand pounds, which he himself made. This was the business which took him to London, where he was busily employed during May and the first few days of June. He then went back to Paris for nearly three months more, and made further efforts, though in vain, to procure the substantial assistance for Greece on which his heart was set. As soon as the Mercury was ready for sea, he directed that she should proceed to Marseilles, where she arrived on the 13th of September: on the 18th, determined to make the best use of her in his power, he again set sail for Greece.

He reached Poros on or near the last day of September. He found that the internal arrangements of Greece had wonderfully improved. Capodistrias during the last eight months had been ruling with an iron hand over all those districts which the previous conquests of the Turks and Egyptians had not taken out of his control, and all those conquests were just then being finally abrogated. The full effects of the battle of Navarino were now appearing. Ibrahim Pasha, having deported many of his troops to Alexandria, chiefly because there was not food enough to be found for them in the Morea, had refused to surrender his authority or to abandon any of the numerous fortresses of which he was master. The President, with Sir Richard Church and the worn-out refuse of the so-called army for his only support, could do nothing to expel him; but he gladly accepted the proffered aid of France. In compliance with a protocol signed on the 19th of July, fourteen thousand soldiers, under General Maison, had landed at Petilidi, on the 30th of August, and within a week Ibrahim had been forced to sign a convention pledging himself to prompt evacuation of the peninsula. Half of the residue of his army quitted Navarino on the 16th of September; the rest was preparing to depart at the time of Lord Cochrane's arrival, and actually started on the 5th of October. The ensuing weeks were worthily employed by the French army in clearing out the pestilential garrisons and making it possible for wholesome rule to succeed to the seven weary years of strife.

Thus the primary work which Lord Cochrane had been engaged to do, and which he vainly strove to do under the miserable circumstances of his position, had been effected by others. The Ottoman fleets had been dispersed and destroyed, and, as far as they were concerned, Greece was free at last. There was work yet to be done, troublesome but most important work, in converting the disorderly and piratical vessels and crews which constituted the navy of Greece into an efficient agent for protecting the State and extending its boundaries. This, in spite of all his previous annoyances, Lord Cochrane was prepared to do, if the Greeks were willing. But they did not will it. Capodistrias had laid his plans for governing Greece, and for their performance he had no need of a foreigner as wise and honest as Lord Cochrane. The plans were not altogether reprehensible. At starting they were perhaps the best that could be adopted. The new President – the President whom Lord Cochrane had nominated as the likeliest man to beat down the factions and override the jealousies that had hitherto wrought such grievous mischief to Greece – began by acting up to the anticipations which had induced his selection. Schooled in Italy and Russia, he practised both tortuous diplomacy and straightforward tyranny in attempting to turn divided Greece into a united nation, in which a hundred rival claimants for power should be made humble instruments of the authority of their one master. Thereby the State was enabled to assert its existence, and it was made possible for good government to be introduced. When, however, the time came for inaugurating that good government, Capodistrias sought to continue the method of rule which, if allowable at first, was no longer right or likely to succeed. Young Greece was to be kept in subjection for his own aggrandisement and for the aggrandisement of his few favourites and advisers. These favourites and advisers were the leaders of the old Phanariot party, Prince Mavrocordatos and his brother-in-law Mr. Trikoupes; men whose policy Lord Cochrane had opposed on his first arrival in Greece, and who accordingly became even more inimical to himself than he was to their purposes and plans.

Therefore it was that, when Lord Cochrane returned to Greece in the autumn of 1828, he was coldly received and his offers of further service, though not openly rejected, were not accepted. Throughout ten weeks he was treated with contemptuous indifference, or formal compliments, the hollowness of which was transparent. On his arrival, the President found it difficult to grant him an interview. When that interview was granted, the only subject allowed to be discussed was the accuracy of the accounts that had been drawn up by Dr. Gosse as Commissary-General of the Fleet, during the nine months of the previous year in which Lord Cochrane had been in active service. Nearly two months were spent in tedious and vexatious examination of these accounts, and correspondence thereupon, ending, however, in the partial satisfaction which Lord Cochrane derived from the knowledge that, after the most searching investigation, they were admitted to be correct in every particular.

More than once, during this waiting time, Lord Cochrane threatened to leave Greece immediately, without waiting for the settlement of the accounts. He was only induced to remain, and submit to the insults offered to him, by the consideration that his hasty departure might cause an indefinite postponement of this settlement, and so prove injurious to his subordinates if not to himself. This being done, however, he lost no time in resigning his office as First Admiral of Greece; and that measure was accompanied by a rare exhibition of generosity. "The direct and active interference of the great European powers having decided the glorious contest for the freedom of Greece," he said in a letter to Count Capodistrias, written at Poros, on the 26th of November, "and its independence being formally acknowledged by accredited agents from these powers, no means now present themselves to me whereby I can professionally promote the interests of this hitherto oppressed people. I beg, therefore, that I may be permitted as an individual to alleviate their burdens by presenting the State with my share as Admiral of the corvette Hydra, and schooner-of-war Athenian, captured from the enemy; and further by absolving the State from any and every obligation whereby the sum of 20,000l. was to be paid to me on the acknowledgment of the independence of this country. If your excellency shall be pleased, conjointly with the National Assembly, to appropriate any part of the said amount to the relief of the seamen wounded, and of the families of those who have fallen during the contest, it will be a high gratification to my feelings, and I hope will be admitted as a testimony of my satisfaction at the introduction of useful institutions, and of the pleasure I experience at the rapid advancement towards order which has taken place even during the short period of your excellency's presidency. I have only to add that, if at any future time your excellency shall deem my services useful, I shall be delighted at an opportunity to prove my zeal for the welfare of Greece, more fully than circumstances have heretofore permitted."

The President's reply, dated the 4th of December, was complimentary: "The Government of Greece," he said, "thanks you, my lord, for the services you have rendered, and for the new proof of your interest and your benevolence which you have shown in your letter of the 26th of November. As you observe, Greece having been taken under the protection of the great Powers of Europe, the Provisional Government can engage in no warlike operation worthy of your talents and your station. It regrets, therefore, that it cannot offer you an opportunity of giving further proof of the noble and generous sentiments which animate you in favour of Greece. The Government will make it its duty to convey to the National Congress your offer to cede your rights in the corvette Hydra and the schooner Athenian, and in the 20,000l. which Greece was to pay you on the acknowledgment of her independence. It doubts not that the Congress will value at its true worth all the nation's debt to you, and that it will adopt the measures which you propose for succouring the families of the Greek seamen who have fallen in the war. The future of Greece is in the hands of God and of the Allied Powers. You have taken part in her restoration, and she will reckon you, with sentiments of profound gratitude, among her first and generous defenders."

A day had not passed, however, before Lord Cochrane had fresh proof of the worthlessness of that pretended gratitude. Information having reached Messrs. J. and S. Ricardo, the contractors for the Greek loan of 1825, that the new Government contemplated repudiating the debt, they had written to Lord Cochrane, begging him to bring the matter before Capodistrias, and represent to him the injustice to the stock-holders and the discredit to Greece that would result from such an act. Lord Cochrane, accordingly, had an interview with the President and his two chief advisers on the 5th of December, when this subject was discussed, and, though the repudiation was only threatened, attempts were made to justify it on the plea that the 2,000,000l. forming the loan had nearly all been squandered in England and America, much having disappeared in unexplained ways, the rest having been absorbed in ship-building and engine-making, from which Greece had derived no benefit. Both in the personal interview and in a long letter which he addressed to the President on the following day, Lord Cochrane indignantly resented the proposed repudiation. He admitted that there had been gross mismanagement, but showed that the chief blame for this attached to the Greek deputies, Orlando and Luriottis, who had been sent to England to raise the money and to see that it was properly expended, but who, as was well known, had sought only their own advantage and enjoyment, and, pilfering themselves, had allowed others to pilfer without restraint. He urged that the innocent holders of the Greek stock ought not to suffer on this account, and showed also, that, if there had been great abuse of the loan, it had enabled the Greeks to tide over their worst time of trouble. "Your excellency must be aware," he wrote, "that there was no war-ship belonging to the State which was not bought, taken, or obtained by the aid of this loan, and that all the guns, mortars, powder, and other military stores which served to maintain the liberties of Greece during these later years were chiefly procured by help of this same fund. It enabled you to carry on the war until independence was secured by the intervention of the Allied Powers."