NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND COMMUNICATION
By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the operations of the Fleet. Such operations must always have for their object "passage and communication"; that is, the Fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those of the enemy.
PROOF I.—Deductive.—We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. What does this mean? It is something quite different from the Military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. Admiral Colomb's theory of "conquest of water territory," therefore, involves a false analogy, and is not safe as the basis of a strategical system. What then is the value of the sea in the political system of the world? Its value is as a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned.
COROLLARY.—The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular operations.
PROOF II.—Inductive, from history or past experience.—History shows that the actual functions of the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been threefold.
1. The prevention or securing of alliances (i.e., deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the war).
EXAMPLES.—The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.
In the first case there came a crisis when it was more important to demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis XIV than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.
2. The protection or destruction of commerce.
3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.
NOTE.—The above is the best working "Definition of Naval Strategy," as emphasising its intimate connection with diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of major strategy.
These functions may be discharged in two ways:—
(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed (bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c).
(2) By getting command of the sea, i.e., establishing ourselves in such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against their territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.
NOTE.—The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of all proportion to the first—direct attack. Indeed, the first can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a question of communications.
But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the Fleet must discharge part of its function by direct action before there is time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and military considerations may deflect normal operation of Naval Strategy.)
EXAMPLE.—Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet. Japanese invasion of Manchuria.
COMMAND OF THE SEA
Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have (a) adequate Naval positions; (b) an adequate Fleet to secure the command when war breaks out.
VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF COMMAND
1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.
(a) General command is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.
This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send squadrons to sea.
NOTE.—Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing, but that he cannot seriously interfere with the undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war, or to force our will upon him.
(b) Local command implies a state of things in which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in one or more theatres of operation.
2. Both local and general command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent.
(a) Temporary command is when we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining the object in view (i.e., the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign). This condition existed after Togo's first action.
(b) Permanent command is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the situation, i.e., when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This condition existed after Tsushima.
3. Command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in three different states:—
(a) With us.
(b) With the enemy.
(c) In dispute.
If in dispute, it may be that:—
(1) We have preponderance.
(2) Our enemy has preponderance.
(3) Neither side preponderates.
COMMAND IN DISPUTE
The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.
The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, i.e., till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.
It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with England.
The truth of this appears from the fact that general command of the sea is not essential to all oversea operations.
In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. The weaker Power may take advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere.
Rule 1. So long as a state of dispute can force the preponderating Power to concentrate, operating by evasion is possibly open to the weaker.
Rule 2. In a state of dispute although the weaker Power may not be able to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own.
EXAMPLES.—This condition of dispute existed during the first three years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a decision by defeating Conflans and De la Cloue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar.
SHOULD COMMAND OF THE SEA ALWAYS BE THE PRIMARY OBJECT?
When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (i.e., leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.
Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it, because general command may be in dispute while local command may be with us, and political or military considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have obtained a complete decision.
From the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too loose an expression for strategical discussion. For practical purposes should be substituted "control of passage and communication."
The question then in the consideration of any proposed operation or line of operations will be, not "Have we the command of the sea?" but "Can we secure the necessary lines of communication from obstruction by the enemy?"
METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL
1. Permanent general control can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions.
2. Local and temporary control may be secured by:—
(a) A defensive action not necessarily entirely successful (containing).
(b) Forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).
(c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing).
BLOCKADE
Blockades are of two natures, according to the object review. The object may be:—
(d) Blockade.
i. Close blockade to prevent the enemy putting to sea. The object being usually to secure local or temporary control.
ii. Observation blockade, to force the enemy to put to sea by occupying the common lines of communications (see below). In this case you are seeking a decision as a step towards general control.
Both natures are operations upon the lines of passage and communication, but in case (1) the primary intention is defensive, to secure our own line; in case (2) the primary intention is offensive, to seize the enemy's line and compel him to expose himself in an attempt to recover it.
GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING BLOCKADES
In case (1) (defensive intention) blockade should be as close as is compatible with security from torpedo attack.
In case (2) (offensive intention) it should be as distant as is compatible with bringing enemy to action if he comes out.
Examples:—Case (1): First stage of Togo's blockade of Port Arthur.
Case (2): Nelson off Toulon.
Confusion of the two: Sampson's attempt to close Santiago simultaneously with an attempt to force Cervera to sea.
THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS
Since the whole idea of command of the sea and the whole theory of blockade rest on the control of communications, neither can be fully apprehended without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications.
Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point.
At sea the reverse is the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of communications of either belligerent tend to run approximately parallel, if, indeed, they are not identical.
Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines of communication would be identical.
This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France.
This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare. Nearly all our current maxims of Naval strategy can be traced to the pressure it exerts on Naval thought.
It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and confusion, which has arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the communications and operations against them in each case.
On land the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications at once is that as a rule we cannot do so without exposing our own.
At sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's.
Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded.
EXAMPLE.—This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our getting a fleet off Brest before the French could sail.
Hence the maxim "that the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like.
But these maxims are not universally true, witness Togo's strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.
Take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it.
Here again Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.
The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them unsafe it must be put out of action."
The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.
EXAMPLE.—Opening of War of Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. 1703.—Chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and particularly of Portugal, and with same object in view, Rooke's official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened our communications.
RESULT.—By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from which France could not eject us, and she abandoned struggle for sea communications.
But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable:—
(a) Because for us general permanent command is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the enemy's fleet.
(b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt to control the common communications.
(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex (i.e., the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a blow which solve all the difficulties; e.g., Sir Palmes Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703 (England in the Mediterranean, Vol. II., p. 234).
Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (i.e., forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign.
This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, but by the operation of inevitable strategical law).
Compare Togo's strategy and that of the Americans in 1898.
Practically all great Naval actions have been brought about in this way, that is they have been the outcome on an effort to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet, e.g., Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.
Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.
FINAL NOTE
In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne in mind:—
(1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost.
(2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the offensive, it is prima facie better strategy to make the enemy come to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground.
WAR COURSE
NOTES ON STRATEGY
PART ONE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS
INTRODUCTORY
Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.
The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.
War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.
MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY
We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or primary.
Primary objects are the special objects of particular operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the campaign. Consequently it must be remembered that every particular operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.
Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two kinds—Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.
Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately directed.
Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province the plan of the war and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces. Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war. But it also has to keep in constant touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versâ. For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versâ. To decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.
Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with—
(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation.
(2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.
Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:—
(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only.
(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only.
(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together.
It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.
Example.—For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders were to prevent the troops and warlike stores which De la Motte was taking out from reaching Canada. It was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels; thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount of harm with the least possible good.
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
Nature of Object
Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between offensive and defensive, upon which all strategical calculation must be based. Consequently, the solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view.
All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative.
A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for ourselves.
A negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent his gaining something.
Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.
Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.
This is the only certain test by which we can decide whether any particular operation is offensive or defensive.
Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the primary or secondary objects which lead up to them; e.g., ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the primary objects may be defensive, and vice versâ. For example, in the Russo-Japanese War the ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive). The ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive).
Relation of Offensive to Defensive
The Offensive, being positive in its aim, is naturally the more effective form of war and, as a rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power. The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is the more lasting form of war, since it requires less force to keep what one has than to take what is another's, and, as a rule, is adopted by the weaker Power. In most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy.
The advantages of the Offensive are well known.
Its disadvantages are:—
That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its communications, and that it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground.
The advantages of the Defensive are chiefly:—
Proximity to the base of supply and repair stations, familiar ground, facility for arranging surprise by counter attack, and power of organising in advance.
The disadvantages of the Defensive are mainly moral. They become, however, real and practical when the enemy's objective or line of operations cannot be ascertained, for then we have to spread or attenuate our force to cover all probable objectives, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position.
Functions and Characteristics of the Defensive
True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.
To assume the defensive does not necessarily mean that we do not feel strong enough to attack. It may mean that we see our way by using the defensive to force certain movements on the enemy which will enable us to hit harder.
A well-designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. Unless it does this it will not deflect the enemy's strategy in our favour. Thus, in 1756, the French, by assuming the defensive in the Channel, threatened an attack on our coasts, and concealed their attack on Minorca.
This power inherent in the defensive is peculiarly strong in naval warfare, since the mobility of fleets enables them to pass instantaneously from the defensive to the offensive without any warning. When we assume the defensive because we are too weak for the offensive, we still do not lay aside attack. The whole strength and essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke. Its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to attack us in a position where he will expose himself to a counter-stroke.
The stock instance upon which naval defensive is usually condemned is the burning of our ships at Chatham by the Dutch. But in that case we were not acting on the defensive at all. We had laid up our battle fleet and were doing nothing. We were purely passive, in expectation of peace. It is really an instance of the successful use of defensive by the Dutch. Being no longer strong enough for a general offensive, they assumed the defensive, and induced us to lay up our ships and so expose ourselves to a counter-stroke. It was a counterstroke by the worsted belligerent to get better terms of peace.
So far is the defensive from excluding the idea of attack, that it may consist entirely of a series of minor offensive operations. Clausewitz calls it "a shield of blows." It is often called offensive-defensive, or active defence. Neither term is really necessary. For a defensive which excludes the idea of offence or action is not war at all-at least at sea. The old Elizabethan term Preventive most closely expresses the idea.
The most important function of the defensive is that of covering, buttressing, and intensifying the main attack. No plan of campaign, however strong the offensive intention, is perfect which does not contemplate the use of the defensive. Without some use of the defensive the cardinal principle of concentration can rarely be fully developed. To develop the highest possible degree of concentration upon the main object or objective, the defensive must be assumed everywhere else. Because it is only by using the defensive in the minor or less important theatres of operation that the forces in those theatres can be reduced to the minimum of security, and the maximum of concentration can thereby be obtained in the main theatre.
In considering the defensive as a general plan of campaign the maxim is: If not relatively strong enough to assume the offensive, assume the defensive till you become so—
(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise;
(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or securing allies.
It must always be remembered that, except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action, the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the continued use of the defensive alone nothing can be acquired, though the enemy may be prevented from acquiring anything. But where we are too weak to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pass to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation. At sea we have had little occasion for the defensive as a general plan. But that is no reason for neglecting its study. In despising the defensive ourselves we have consistently ignored the strength it gives our enemies. The bulk of our naval history is the story of how we have been baffled and thwarted by our enemies assuming the defensive at sea in support of their offensive on land. We have seldom succeeded in treating this attitude with success, and it is only by studying the defensive we can hope to do so.
Offensive Operations used with a Defensive Intention
(A) Counter attacks
(B) Diversions
Counter attacks are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of defence."
Diversions are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive operations.
Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less likely they are to divert a force greater than their own.
Diversions involve a breach of the law of concentration, and it is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that justifies their use.
This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities are most highly developed in combined expeditions.
Diversions must be carefully distinguished from eccentric attacks. Eccentric attacks are true offensive movements. They have a positive object, i.e., they aim to acquire something from the enemy; whereas diversions have a negative object, i.e., they aim at preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are usually made in greater force than diversions.
Examples.—Diversion.—Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force, about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instruction, "a diversion on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the army employed in the defence of Canada"; i.e., the intention was negative—preventive—defensive. Eccentric Attack.—Operations against New Orleans in 1815. Intended force, 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; i.e., the intention was positive—to acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) with those against Martinique and Belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the Seven Years' War.
This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists, viz., raids, incursions, and invasions. These correspond respectively with our modern diversions, eccentric attacks, and true direct offensive.
LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WARS
From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification of wars, according to whether such object is limited or unlimited.
(1) War with limited object ("limited war") is where the object is merely to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions or interests; e.g., Spanish-American War, where the object was the liberation of Cuba.
(2) War with an unlimited object is where the object is to overthrow the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must agree to do our will (become subservient); e.g., Franco-German War.
PLANS OF WAR
System of Operations
Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object (i.e., whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or unlimited), Strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of the war."