Apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends mainly upon—
(1) The theatre of the war.
(2) The various theatres of operation available within it.
1. Theatre of the War.—Usually defined as "All the territory upon which the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an Island Power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer definition: "Geographical areas within which must lie the operations necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war and of the subordinate objects that lead up to them."
A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."
2. Theatre of Operations.—Is generally used of the operations of one belligerent only.
An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.
A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory we seek to take possession of or to defend.
A truer definition is: "The area, whether of sea or land or both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the particular operation."
Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another.
Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or movements may be offensive.
As the plan of war determines the theatres of operation in the theatre of war, so in each theatre of operation it determines the lines of operation and the objectives.
Objective
An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is directed." Thus, where the object in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually be the objective.
"Objective" in ordinary use is frequently confused with "object." For purposes of strategical discussion it is desirable to keep them sharply distinguished. Objective is the end of some particular movement or operation, and is the special concern of the officer in command. Object is the end of a system of operations and is the special concern of the general staff or director of the war. An objective is some definite point which we wish to get from the enemy or prevent his occupying, or some part of his strength which we wish to destroy. It is incorrect to use the term of anything we already possess. Thus, Vladivostock is often said to have been Rojesvensky's objective. It was, strictly speaking, only his destination. To reach it and concentrate with the units already there was the primary object of the operations entrusted to him. He had no true objective before him except Togo's fleet.
An objective is always subordinate to some object. It is a step to the attainment of that object.
Lines of Operation
A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our objectives."
Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said to hold the interior lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a position is called an interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior Positions" are the converse of these.
Lines of Communication
This expression is used of three different things:—
(1) Lines of supply, running from the base of operations to the point which the operating force has reached.
(2) Lines of lateral communication by which several forces engaged in one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to each other's support.
(3) Lines of retreat, which are usually lines of supply reversed, i.e., leading back to the base.
For naval purposes these three ideas are best described by the term "lines of passage and communication," which were in use at the end of the 18th century, and they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to be supplied.
Maritime Communications
The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet may have to operate are:—
(1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond to the communications of armies operating ashore). These have greatly increased in importance strategically with the increased dependence of modern fleets on a regular supply of coals, stores, ammunition, &c.
(2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea base, that is, communication between the advanced and the main base.
(3) Trade Routes, that is, the communications upon which depend the national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of belligerents' possessions.
In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on communications, but probably it does so, as will appear from a consideration of Maritime Communications, and the extent to which they are the main preoccupation of naval operations; that is to say, all problems of Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and communication," and this is probably the best method of solving them.
PART TWO
NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND COMMUNICATION
NAVAL STRATEGY DEFINED
By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the major operations of the fleet. Such operations have for their object "passage and communication"; that is, the fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those of the enemy.
We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. This means something quite different from the military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. The value of the sea in the political system of the world is as a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned. The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular operations.
History shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been threefold:—
1. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.
2. The protection or destruction of commerce.
3. The prevention or securing of alliances (i.e., deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the war).
EXAMPLES.—The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.
In the first case, there came a crisis when it was more important to demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis XIV, than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.
In this way we get a Definition of the Aim of Naval Strategy, expressed in terms of the actual functions of the fleet. For practical purposes it will be found the most useful definition as emphasising the intimate connection of Naval Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of Major Strategy.
These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two ways:—
(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed (bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.).
(2) By getting command of the sea, i.e., establishing ourselves in such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the enemy's territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.
The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of all proportion to that of the first—direct attack. Indeed, the first can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a question of communications.
But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge part of its function by direct action against territory before there is time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and military considerations may deflect the normal operation of Naval Strategy.)
EXAMPLES.—Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet. Holmes's capture of Emden in 1758.
Still, the fact remains that the key to the effective performance of the fleet's duties is almost always to secure communications as soon as possible by battle.
COMMAND OF THE SEA
Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have adequate naval positions, and an adequate fleet to secure the command when war breaks out.
Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing, but that he cannot seriously interfere with the undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war and to force our will upon him.
Various Conditions of Command
1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.
(a) General command is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to use or defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.
This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send squadrons to sea.
(b) Local command implies a state of things in which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in one or more theatres of operation.
2. Both general and local command may be (a) temporary; {b) permanent.
{a) Temporary command is when we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining the object in view (i.e., the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign). This condition existed after Togo's first action. It was also that at which Napoleon aimed in his instructions to Villeneuve in 1805.
(b) Permanent command is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the situation, i.e., when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This condition existed after Tsushima.
Command in Dispute
The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.
The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, i.e., till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.
It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with England.
It must be remembered that general command of the sea is not essential to all oversea operations.
In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate or be induced to concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view, while the weaker Power takes advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere.
Thus in a state of dispute, although the weaker Power may not be able to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own.
EXAMPLES.—This condition of dispute existed during the first three years of the Seven Years' War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a decision by defeating Conflans and De la Clue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar.
When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (i.e., leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.
METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL
1. Permanent general control can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions.
2. Local and temporary control may be secured by—
(a) An action not necessarily entirely successful (containing).
(b) Inducing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).
(c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing).
(d) Blockade.
Action of a Fleet off an Enemy's Port
A belligerent fleet off an enemy's port may carry out three different operations, for certain purposes; each quite separate from the others, and intended to obtain an entirely different result:—
(1) Close Blockade.—This is to prevent the enemy's fighting ships from putting to sea. In this case the object is to secure local control for some purpose that is not purely naval, such as was carried out by the Japanese off Port Arthur in 1904, so as to enable their transports to cross the Yellow Sea without fear of molestation from any of the Russian ships in Port Arthur. Since the cruisers in Vladivostok were able to emerge (that port not being blockaded), the operation was not complete, and a danger of interference always existed.
This method of blockade is far more difficult to carry out in the present day, than formerly; owing to the existence of submarines and torpedo craft, the blockading ships have to remain further away from the port; there have to be inner lines of cruisers, scouts and destroyers; and quick concentration takes longer owing to the greater space covered by the blockading force, and more ships of all natures are required for the same reason.
Greater and more vigilance are required than in former days, because the enemy's ships can come out regardless of weather (thick weather would be their opportunity), and it is most important that not a single craft, from a battleship to a torpedo boat, be allowed to escape.
This method of blockade includes the commercial blockade, and all countries would be informed of its having been established.
(2) Commercial Blockade.—To prevent floating commerce from entering or leaving the blockaded harbour. The blockading force would not be powerful enough to prevent a squadron of battleships or cruisers from entering or leaving the port blockaded; and it would not be instituted outside a fortified military port, or one containing a strong naval force. But it would be able to stop scouts and torpedo craft from entering or emerging, unless in very great numbers; and if unable to stop them from emerging, would give warning of their escape and the direction in which they are going.
In both these forms of blockade it is usual, as a matter of courtesy, to allow neutral armed ships belonging to foreign navies to enter and leave for their own purposes, presumably connected with the subjects of their own country who are in the blockaded port. This, however, is not a right, and the country to which the blockading ships belong has a right to refuse it, and to back her refusal by force.
All countries must be notified of a properly instituted commercial blockade, in accordance with International Agreement.
(3) Observing a Port.—This, with its subsidiary operations, should be conducted in such a way as to induce the enemy to put to sea, the object of observing the port being primarily a naval one, viz., to bring him to decisive action.
The principal observing force (consisting of battleships and cruisers) would be either in one squadron, or more, provided that they were in supporting reach of each other, and so placed as to be able to cut off the enemy's fleet on emerging from the port observed before it can get dangerously near its probable objective, and yet sufficiently far out to ensure a battle before it can regain the shelter of its own ports. It is also worth noting that the battle should, if possible, be fought so as to make it difficult for the enemy's damaged ships to obtain the shelter of a friendly neutral's harbours before being captured.
The observed port must be watched closely, so that immediate notice of the enemy's exit may be given; and this would be done by small cruisers, scouts and destroyers, which should be strong and numerous enough to attack any torpedo craft trying to get to sea.
In order to induce the enemy's main force to put to sea it is important that every means be used to prevent his knowing that our fleet is observing the port, or if that be impossible, to do nothing which will lead him to suppose that his port is being observed.
This operation is not a blockade.
Subsidiary operations to induce the enemy's fleet to put to sea, may take the form of a diversion on the enemy's coast, or against some important part of his sea-borne trade, either by the observing fleet or by a force affiliated to it, or by any oversea movements calculated to interfere seriously with the enemy's war plan.
Concentration
The guiding feature of modern preparation for war is to be ready for rapid action. It is true at sea, more even than on land, that upon the first movements depend the initiative, the power of controlling the enemy's strategy, and of making him conform to our movements. This readiness for rapid action will depend on a proper distribution of the fleet so as to meet all the requirements.
The distribution of the fleet should be dominated by the idea of concentration, but it must be understood clearly what concentration means. Clausewitz says:—"The best strategy is always to be sufficiently strong, at first generally, then at the decisive point. There is therefore no higher or simpler law for strategy than this—keep your forces together."
The maxim "Keep your forces together" does not, however, necessarily mean keeping them all concentrated in one mass, but rather keeping them so disposed that they can unite readily at will. At sea it is more difficult than on land to foretell where the decisive point will be; but since it is quicker and easier at sea to concentrate forces at any particular point than on land, in applying this maxim for our purposes, the rule should be to dispose the forces at sea so as to be able to concentrate them in time at the decisive point so soon as this point is determined, and also so as to conceal from the enemy what it is intended to make the decisive point.
If the forces are rightly disposed within due limits, adequate control of all the lines of passage and communication can be assured, and if the enemy undertakes any operations it should be possible to ensure that sufficient forces can be concentrated in time to defeat his object. On the other hand, if the forces are concentrated in one mass, there can be little chance of deceiving or confusing the enemy, while it gives him an opportunity of successfully carrying out some operation by evasion.
THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS
Since the whole idea of command of the sea rests on the control of communications, it cannot be fully apprehended without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications.
Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend as a rule to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point.
At sea, the reverse is frequently the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of communications of either belligerent often tend to run approximately parallel if, indeed, they are not identical.
Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines of communication would be identical.
This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France.
This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare. Nearly all our current maxims of Naval Strategy can be traced to the pressure it exerts on naval thought.
It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval Strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and confusion which have arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the communications and the operations against them in each case.
On land, the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications at once is that, as a rule, we cannot do so without exposing our own. At sea, on the contrary, when the great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's.
Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get our fleet into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our attempting to get a fleet off Brest before the French could sail.
Hence the maxims "That the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's coast," "The enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like.
But these maxims are not universally true; witness Togo's strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.
Take, again, the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. Here, again, Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.
The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them unsafe it must be put out of action."
The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.
EXAMPLE.—Opening of the War of the Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. In 1703, the chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and particularly of Portugal. Rooke's official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened the common communications.
RESULT.—By 1704 we had gained a naval position from which France could not eject us, and she abandoned the struggle for sea communications.
But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable—
(a) Because for us general permanent command is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the enemy's fleet.
(b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt to dispute the control of the common communications.
(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex (i.e., the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a blow which will solve all the difficulties; e.g., Sir. Palmes Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703.
Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (i.e., forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign.
This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon Fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, but by the operation of strategical law).
Practically all great naval actions have been brought about in this way, that is, they have been the outcome of an effort to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet; e.g., Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.
Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.
In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne in mind that if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it, except at very heavy cost. It is far better to make it come to you, and this has often been done by merely sitting on the common communications.
Again, if you seek out the enemy's fleet without being certain of getting contact, you may merely assist it in evading you, and enable it to get into a position on your own communications, from which it may be very costly to dislodge it. It was for this reason that the Elizabethan Government kept the fleet in home waters in 1588. Sampson, in the Spanish-American War, was actually permitted to make this mistake. By going to seek out Cervera without being sure of contact, he left him a clear run into Cienfuegos or even Havana, which it was the main function of the fleet to prevent. Captain Mahan has since modified this maxim as follows:—"Seek out the enemy's fleet, if you are sure of getting contact." A truer maxim would seem to be "Seek contact with the enemy's fleet in the most certain and favourable manner that is open to you." To seek out the enemy's fleet is only one way of doing this, and not always the best way. It must be remembered that other conditions being equal, it is an obvious advantage to fight in your own waters rather than in those of the enemy, and more likely to ensure that a defeat of the enemy will be decisive.
RN WAR COLLEGE PORTSMOUTH
JANUARY 1909