CHAPTER IV
THE STATE OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES – SPECIMEN OF THE BARBARITY OF SOME OF THE AUSTRIAN OFFICERS – THE ARMISTICE
The Austrian army, with its imposing numbers, high military reputation, and menacing attitude a few weeks before, when threatening and afterward invading Piedmont, from the line of the Mincio, had now become vastly weakened, reduced, and disheartened by the successive conflicts and defeats which have been briefly described. The causes of its misfortunes have been accounted for, by an eye-witness, in remarks which we abridge as follows:
"The Austrian military system has been changed completely within the last six or seven years; yet the change in part explains the shortcomings of the past few weeks. The Austrian army, up to this date, has been an army of very young soldiers, not long under training. According to the regulations, a fixed number of corps has to be maintained throughout the Austrian empire. At a fixed period of every year the youth of that empire are drafted into the army, and distributed among the corps. The arrival of these new drafts liberates an equal number of men who have already served. The latter, after one, or two, or three years' service, at the option of the colonels of regiments, retire to their homes on a furlough of indefinite duration, and are only called out again in the event of a war. The Austrian army at Montebello, Palestro, Magenta, and Cavriana was thus composed of young soldiers. It would have been wiser, doubtless, had the Austrians thought of this matter in time. They were aware that Louis Napoleon would move, if he moved at all, with the flower of his army. They knew that he had paid high premiums to induce old soldiers to remain in the ranks after the expiration of their usual time, and that the picked men of the French army, tried under the fierce sun of Africa, and in the hard campaign of the Crimea, would be opposed to them, and be assisted besides by an artillery of a novel and most effective kind. They did not take sufficient heed of these important facts, any more than they considered that generals who, ten years ago, fought with ability and success in the campaigns of Italy might possibly have lost some of their original vigor. The result has been such as to open their eyes to the necessity of supplying defects. The question, as far as the present war is concerned, is this: Which is best, to risk all the tried men first, and trust to recruits after, or employ first the young soldiers, and bring up reserves after? As far as the present campaign is concerned, the results favor the first of these alternatives.
"The advisers of his Imperial Majesty Francis Joseph, at last made up their minds that it was impossible, under present circumstances, to defend the line of the Mincio. Accordingly, the headquarters of the 2d Army, under Count Schlick, came into Verona from Villafranca; the headquarters of the 1st Army, under Wimpffen, being transferred to Mantua. Verona, Mantua, and the other strongholds of this great military quadrangle are very much stronger than they were ten years ago. There are great field works to be taken before any approach can be made to the main defences, and in the meanwhile Austria may have brought together again an army capable of risking another general action. The soldiers had one moment of enthusiasm; that was when the emperor led them in person on the 23d to the advanced position from which he intended to attack the enemy; but the events of the 24th seriously affected the morale of the army. Instead of attacking, as they were led to expect, they had to repel the assaults of the Allies, who knowing what was before them, had halted for a meal at two o'clock in the morning. The Austrians, whose baggage and cooking utensils accompany the columns even in the advance, bivouacked on the night of the 23d, and were attacked before they could get their breakfast. The baggage and cooking-carts were obliged to return to the rear out of the fire of the Allies, and the result was that the army of the Kaiser had to fight on empty stomachs. Hunger and hard knocks have a tendency to discourage even the bravest soldier. I was astonished to see men from the field of Solferino retiring unwounded, and lying down exhausted when out of the reach of the enemy's fire. I am told that many so exhausted laid themselves down only to die. The mystery is explained when one considers that these cases arose from want of ordinary sustenance.
"Lichtenstein's corps (the 2d) which should have taken part in the action of the day, was halted in consequence of the approach of some French cavalry in its vicinity, and Prince Lichtenstein, for reasons which he will doubtless have to explain, returned to Mantua. Again, General Zedwitz, commanding the cavalry brigade of the 1st Army, instead of advancing, as he should have done, fell back on Goito, thus depriving the emperor of six regiments of horse and a considerable amount of artillery. Thus, while on the part of the allies all the available guns that could be brought into action were used, on the side of the Austrians the artillery was weak and utterly unable to oppose an effectual fire to that of the enemy. It is true, on the other hand, that the French artillery did not commit the havoc which it might have done had its fire throughout the day been true to the mark, instead of being over it. Still, the effect of the inferiority under which the Austrians suffered in this respect, was disastrous, as it prevented them from repelling the advance of the infantry opposed to them. Among the wounded, to the number of 4,000 or 5,000 in Verona and the surrounding villages, it is remarkable how few suffered from wounds inflicted by artillery."
In contrast with the condition of the Austrian army, those of Piedmont and France were in most respects superior, and still more in the principles for which they fought. To mention again Napoleon's rifled cannon, in the words of a late writer:
"The superiority of the French artillery during the late Italian campaign was obvious to every one who made himself acquainted with the details of the great battles. At Solferino the heavy and very dangerous Austrian cavalry was thrown into disorder and rendered almost useless at distances to which their own batteries, more favorably placed, would not carry. The Austrians never yielded a foot on the hill of Solferino, till a battery of French rifled cannon was brought to bear upon them at a distance at which their own balls fell short. The Tower could not have otherwise been taken but with an infinitely greater slaughter than that which occurred. When Niel and McMahon had driven the Austrians back as far as the large open space known as the plain of Guidizzolo, there was a fair trial of artillery, which cost the Austrians dear; it was the last stand made by the immense left wing of the Austrian army, and one can well imagine how officers and men grew dispirited in face of artillery that silenced their own wherever it showed itself."
The following remarks on the plans and conduct of the war we abridge from the "London Times," of July 8th, 1860:
"As far as the Allies are concerned, their aim was driving the Austrians out of Italy. With this aim clearly and distinctly before them, the difficulties and chances could be more or less calculated in advance, and all that vagueness and uncertainty avoided which gives rise to those useless moves in two armies, neither of which knows what it is to do next.
"The Austrians were in this latter case when they began the war, nobody knew why, and while they were allowed to amuse themselves with their harmless offensive movements you saw all those insignificant skirmishes occur on the Sesia, which were put a speedy end to by the advance of the Allies. Since that time the war has been rolling along in great waves. The Allies went straight toward their aim, and the Austrians were so hard pressed, that they endeavored to oppose to a grand plan, executed with the most determined will, equally grand operations.
"Thus, when the Austrians found themselves outwitted by the flank movement on the Ticino, they brought up their troops in all haste to oppose the advance. They were beaten, and immediately resolved to withdraw behind the Mincio. The fight at Malegnano only took place in order to insure this retreat, but from that time they avoided opposing the advance of the Allies, by making a stand at the river lines. On the other hand, the Allies, intent only on carrying out their own great plans, did not think for one moment of molesting their retreat.
"After the Allies had crossed the Chiese, and made preparations for the passage of the Mincio, the Austrians attempted one great blow; and, collecting all their forces, tried an offensive movement, which was speedily checked by the battle of Solferino. The battle lost, the French, whose preparations were not completed, did not press the retreating Austrians very hard; while these latter, instead of trying a desultory defence of the Mincio, opposed no resistance to the passage of it, but, without wasting any forces, retired between Peschiera and Verona, to await there the attack of the Allies, or perhaps watch their time for another great offensive movement.
"This avoiding on both sides of those little encounters, deprives the war considerably of its picturesque element of its individual features, as it were. This whole campaign resolves itself into an alternation between preparations and great decisive blows.
"The Mincio passage was effected without any difficulty, offering by its good arrangements matter of thought to the military, but otherwise being a subject rather for a landscape painter than for a painter of battles. Although the Austrians had gone back from the river, all the precautions were taken as if there had been a constant danger from an attack. The whole had very much the appearance of a field manœuvre in peaceable times, with the difference, however, that even the thin line representing the hostile forces on such occasions, was entirely wanting. But the movements had to be so combined, that the army should be in readiness to receive the enemy in case he came down from his position between Verona and Peschiera. The enemy's position was on the left flank of the allied armies, facing the Mincio, with Peschiera just at the angle formed by the intersection of the Mincio with his extreme right. The Allies were thus obliged, while crossing the Mincio, to change their front and face to the left. For this purpose the Sardinians, who had kept the position of San Martino, took up the line from Rivoltella, on the lake, in the neighborhood of Pozzolengo. The 1st French corps, which had been next to them in the ordre de bataille of the 27th, marched to Pozzolengo, and, occupying Ponti, faced against Peschiera. The 2d corps, next to it, kept its original direction toward the Mincio, joining the 1st corps at Castellaro, where the road leads down to Monzambano. To the right of this corps was the 4th, at Volta, likewise facing the Mincio, and the 3d at Goito. The crossing took place at almost all points simultaneously, with just sufficient interval between the corps to allow time for that furthest to the right to accomplish its change of front, and come into the same direction with the others. Thus, the 4th corps, which was furthest, with the exception of the 3d, detached toward Goito, was the first to cross at Borghetto and Vallegio, to gain the high road to Verona, and take up its position toward Villafranca. This was on the morning of the 29th. Since that time, all the corps have crossed successively, changing their direction from west to east, and making front against the Austrian position.
"While we are discussing the progress of the plot and speculating as to the nature of the catastrophe, the curtain falls. Yesterday France and Austria were upon the point of joining in another desperate battle. The celebrated fortified Quadrangle had been reached, Peschiera had been invested, Mantua had been masked, Verona was upon the point of being summoned, Venice was threatened, and Garibaldi was manœuvering upon the rear of the great fortresses. The waves of warfare were undulating and vibrating to another great burst in foam. To-day the Spirit of Peace has breathed upon the waters, and the storm is for the moment at an end. Three months ago we expected peace and were surprised by war. To-day Europe was waiting in breathless expectation for a great battle, fought in the very fortresses of Austria, and is again surprised by the calm announcement that an armistice has been concluded, and that the two great armies are for the moment no longer enemies."
The cruelties practised by Austrians in Italy will be disgraceful to the memory of their government, its officers and soldiers. A single instance of the crimes of General Urban, in Lombardy, in 1859, will suffice. By his order, a whole family were butchered. It consisted of seven persons, including a grandfather, eighty-two years of age, a boy of fourteen, and a girl of twelve. Merely for the purpose of striking terror into the people; it appears, and without any pretext of fault in them, he had them all put to death, and left their mangled corpses unburied. This atrocious act has been denied; but the king's government have since instituted a regular legal investigation, ascertained its truth, and erected a monument in memory of it.
THE ARMISTICE
The war, its progress, results, and prospects were not less unexpected or surprising than the armistice which Louis Napoleon, without any warning, suddenly concluded, in an interview with the Emperor of Austria, on the 11th of July. The cause of it still remains a matter of conjecture. It was followed by a treaty, by which the war was terminated and harmony restored, but the promise of Louis not fulfilled, of driving out the foreigners from Italy. Austria was left in possession of the four great fortresses of Lombardy, as well as of Venetia.
The armistice was first announced to France by the following telegram:
"Vallegio, July 11, 1859.
"THE EMPEROR TO THE EMPRESS
"Peace has been signed between the Emperor of Austria and myself.
"The bases agreed to are an Italian confederation, under the honorary Presidentship of the Pope.
"The Emperor of Austria cedes his rights over Lombardy to the Emperor of the French, who hands them over to the King of Sardinia.
"The Emperor of Austria preserves Venetia, but that country forms an integral part of the Italian Confederation.
"General armistice."
It was made known to the army on the following day, by this proclamation:
"Soldiers – The bases of peace have been arranged with the Emperor of Austria; the principal object of the war has been obtained; Italy is about to become for the first time a nation. A confederation of all the Italian States under the honorary Presidency of the Holy Father, will unite them together as the members of one family. Venetia, it is true, remains under the sceptre of Austria. It will, nevertheless, be an Italian province, constituting a part of the confederation.
"The union of Lombardy with Piedmont creates for us on this side of the Alps a powerful ally, who will owe to us his independence. The governments unconnected with this movement, (en dehors du mouvement), or recalled to their possessions, will comprehend the necessity of salutary reforms. A general amnesty will cause to disappear the traces of civil discord. Italy, henceforth mistress of her destinies, will only have to blame herself if she do not regularly progress in order and liberty.
"You will soon return to France. The grateful country will welcome with transport those soldiers who have borne so high the glory of our arms at Montebello, Palestro, Turbigo, Magenta, Mariguan, and Solferino, who in two months have emancipated Piedmont and Lombardy, and only paused because the struggle was about to assume proportions inconsistent with the interests of France in connection with this formidable war.
"Be also proud of your success, proud of the results obtained, proud, above all, of being the well beloved children of that France which will ever continue a great nation, so long as it shall have a heart to comprehend noble causes, and men like yourselves to defend them.
"At the Imperial Headquarters of Vallegio, 12th of July, 1859.
"Napoleon."
The following considerations are suggested by the peace just concluded:
The cession of Lombardy to Piedmont comprehends that of the two fortresses, Mantua and Peschiera. The superfices of Lombardy is 8,538 square miles. Its population is 2,800,000 souls. Lombardy has hitherto been divided, administratively, into nine provinces or delegations, viz.: – Milan, Pavia, Lodi, Corma, Cremona, Como, Mantua, Sondrio, Breschia, and Bergamo. The fortified towns of Mantua and Peschiera form part of the province of Mantua. The fortress of Pezzighettone is comprised in the province of Cremona. After the annexation of Lombardy and Piedmont, this kingdom (the island of Sardinia both included) will contain a superfices of 37,640 square miles, with a population of 7,800,000. As regards territorial extent, it will occupy a tenth rank in Europe, and will come immediately after the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and before Portugal and Bavaria. With respect to population, Sardinia will stand in the ninth rank, on a level with Naples, and will be above Sweden and Norway, Belgium, and Bavaria.
The following table completes the comparison as regards Italy:
Although disappointed, by the imperfect accomplishment of the work of securing all Italy to the Italians, there was much reason to rejoice, that the overflowing fountains of human blood, which had exhibited a spectacle shocking to humanity, had been stopped. The terms of peace were settled by the Treaty of Villafranca.
CHAPTER V
"A brighter course has never
A hero true display'd;
Unblemish'd in the hour of peace,
In danger undismay'd." —
Lines to Garibaldi.
THE CHARACTER OF ITALIAN PATRIOTS – HOW IT HAS BEEN DISPLAYED BY EXILES IN THE UNITED STATES – IGNORANCE OF ITALY IN AMERICA – GARIBALDI'S APPEARANCE AND CHARACTER – HIS BAND – HIS "ENGLISHMAN," COL. PEARD
And now that we have arrived at another peaceful interval in the life of this extraordinary man, the astonishing effects of his superior skill, bravery, and success, having broken the arm of Austria in Italy, and nothing but the shield of Louis Napoleon having sheltered her head, a sudden suspension of hostilities left the world at leisure to admire the past, feel astounded at the unexpected present state of things, and look with interest, but painful uncertainty, for the future. All observers, who had not before made Italy or Italians their attentive study, were anxious to know more of the people who had suddenly sprung from a low general estimation as patriots and soldiers, to the rank due to the conquerors at Palestro, Montebello, and Solferino, and had furnished the files of the heroic and irresistible hunters of the Alps, and their leader, Garibaldi himself. Let us turn a few moments to inquiries of the same kind; for even at the present time, there is too much reason to fear, there are few, even of our most intelligent countrymen, who have paid sufficient attention to the affairs of Italy during the past half century, to give full and clear replies to these questions.
Few indeed have had the best opportunities to learn the general truths, and fewer still have had access to many of those details, by which alone the causes can be well understood, and the effects clearly accounted for. The published accounts of Italians and their affairs have been presented to the world in a detached, uncertain and often confused and even contradictory form, which most readers had neither the disposition, the time, nor the means to unravel, reconcile and correct. There have always been, however, intelligent and virtuous patriotic Italians residing in the United States, and especially in New York, who were able and ready to communicate real facts and just opinions on every event and question of importance. And to such are justly due some portion of the facts contained in this volume, and of the views and spirit under which they are now laid before the American people. With their assistance, and at their urgent request also, was done the little which has ever been effected in this country in past years, to explain and vindicate their cause, to relieve its exiled victims, to expose the insidious intrigues of their enemies against American institutions, and to invite and foster mutual acquaintance, and brotherly affection and coöperation between us and the noble patriots of Italy.
Americans have but one excuse to give for their neglect of Italy in her more triumphant struggle against her combined enemies and oppressors. The intrigues of her enemies and their insidious calumnies were sufficient to mislead the incautious and the honest. But we have long since lost the spirit of our Protestant ancestors, who were men of clearer sight, greater knowledge, stronger judgment, and more resolution, bravery and perseverance than their descendants. They distinguished, as we do not, between great truths and great falsehoods; between great rights and great wrongs; and acted with promptitude and vigor whenever the time arrived to vindicate or secure the one, and to expose and counteract the other. And such a spirit was displayed by the Italian exiles on our soil. They set us examples of similar ways of thinking, speaking and acting; and well would it have been if we had rightly appreciated the knowledge which they possessed, the manly views which they entertained, and the plans which they proposed for our mutual benefit.
The following description of Garibaldi we translate from the "History of the Glorious Campaign of the Cacciatori delle Alpi, in the war of 1859," by one of his officers, Col. Francesco Corrano:
"Giuseppe Garibaldi is of middle stature, with broad and square shoulders, herculean limbs, long brownish hair, and beard slightly grey; a heavy and strong step, sailor-like air, look, and manner of speaking; his vest buttoned up to his throat, a hat with a broad brim, in the Calabrian style, and large trousers. The noises of the city annoy and disturb him. Commanding mountains please him, covered with evergreen trees, and the sight of the vast horizon and the boundless sea.
"His nose is straight and almost vertical, and his aspect at once vivacious and sweet. Often, under his very heavy beard, his lips are gently moved by a natural and fascinating smile. He converses frankly and unaffectedly, condemns with decision, and praises warmly but briefly; but he is ever animated, fluent, and even eloquent, whenever the conversation turns on Italy, liberty, and deeds of daring and skill; to overcome the enemy, and to overdo them (sopraffare), his favorite word. Above all things, he prizes faithfulness and valor in chivalrous warfare, though it be not accompanied by fame or popular applause. Proud despiser of pay and money, he loves Italy above all things.
"Cuneo, who is called his friend for life, by Garibaldi himself, writes of him: 'A man of humanity, he is laboring to secure in the future the brotherhood of the people; but at the banquet of nations he will sit only as an equal, or not sit at all.' He is by nature tolerant of every suggestion. He has trust and sympathy in discipline produced by love, more than by the rigor of laws.
"It would be difficult to find a successor to Garibaldi. His name is popular in Italy, through all Europe, and in America also, as no other is in our day; and it was owing chiefly to his name, that ten thousand Italians, from every province in the country, and in a short space of time, hastened to join him, and to write their names as 'Cacciatori delle Alpi.' But, more than to command battalions, he is fitted to lead them in fine order; prepared to fight, and with ten-fold moral force, by his terrible name, to overcome and scatter the enemy; to conquer or to fall with signal honor."
The intelligence and respectability of Garibaldi's soldiers were attested by an English gentleman who visited his camp at Firano, August 5th. He wrote:
"You are already aware that in this singular corps the soldier generally belongs to the best class of Italian society. In consequence of this peculiarity, each of this gallant band is a politician of the first class. The doings of our ministers are sensibly discussed in these bivouacs.
"The only Englishman who is among them has become the lion of this singular corps. In my former letter I had occasion to speak of Captain Peard, the gentleman in question. He comes from Cornwall, and belongs to a militia regiment, whose uniform he wears with a decidedly martial bearing. He is a man of tall and colossal frame, nearer sixty than fifty, and is considered the best shot in the party. Although he has been attached to Garibaldi's staff, he makes war at his own expense, and he was always to be found in the thick of the fray. Whenever he had killed an Austrian, he was seen to mark him down in his pocket-book. A few days ago I met Captain Peard at Brescia, and he was kind enough to show me his book, from which it was apparent that twenty-five Austrians were killed by him during the campaign, besides ten who were under the head of 'uncertain.'
"There are also with Garibaldi two rather eccentric young Frenchmen, dressed in a peculiar costume of their own, who are members of the Paris Jockey Club. These two gentlemen have been so charmed by the gallant general, that I am told they will share his fate, whatever it may be. Five American citizens, and a few Germans, are going to do the same, together with a Chinese, who, were I to believe what he told me, is one of the few who escaped the slaughter of Commissioner Yeh at Canton. Most of Garibaldi's officers belong to the upper classes of Lombardy, and have borne arms with him either in South America or in Rome."
The interval which occurred between the day of Garibaldi's departure from Turin, with his Alpine Huntsmen, and the dispersion of the forty thousand Austrians at Calatrava, is one of the most interesting and important in modern history. While the most anxious fears prevailed among his friends, and the most alarming reports were circulated by his enemies; while the promise of being supported by the number of troops which he had thought indispensable was entirely disappointed, by the inability of Cialdini to cross the rivers, Garibaldi, as we have seen, undismayed by that and other difficulties, pursued his way with unfailing resolution and complete success. He raised the country in insurrection wherever he went; kindled a flame in every heart from the electric fire which had so long been cherished in his own; unhesitatingly attacked the opposing hosts of the enemy, and put them all to flight. Thus he alarmed, weakened, and terrified the invaders, and animated the Allies, whose precursor he was; gave an impulse to the war at the commencement, and a most powerful support to it till the close, which will ever secure to him an indisputable claim to a large, a very large, share of the victory and its results. This claim, we may surely foretell, will never be made by himself. It will, however, be made by the world – by mankind – on whom he has conferred the inestimable benefits of his great deeds, and his pure and noble example. Such concurrences and successions of events, such men as have been employed in the various scenes, and especially such a heroic leader, could have been devised only by infinite wisdom, and conducted to such results only by an Almighty hand.