"Measure from fore-part of main stem to after-part of stern port, above the upper deck; take the breadth thereof at broadest part above the main wales, one half of which breadth shall be accounted the depth. Deduct from the length three fifths of such breadth, multiply the remainder by the breadth and the product by the depth; divide by 95; quotient is tonnage."

(i.e., if length = x, and breadth = y;

Niles states that the British mode, as taken from Steele's "Shipmaster's Assistant," was this: Drop plumb-line over stem of ship and measure distance between such line and the after part of the stern port at the load water-mark; then measure from top of said plumb-line in parallel direction with the water to perpendicular point immediately over the load water-mark of the fore part of main stem; subtract from such admeasurement the above distance; the remainder is ship's extreme length, from which deduct 3 inches for every foot of the load-draught of water for the rake abaft, and also three fifths of the ship's breadth for the rake forward; remainder is length of keel for tonnage. Breadth shall be taken from outside to outside of the plank in broadest part of the ship either above or below the main wales, exclusive of all manner of sheathing or doubling. Depth is to be considered as one half the length. Tonnage will then be the length into the depth into breadth, divided by 94.

Tonnage was thus estimated in a purely arbitrary manner, with no regard to actual capacity or displacement; and, moreover, what is of more importance, the British method differed from the American so much that a ship measured in the latter way would be nominally about 15 per cent. larger than if measured by British rules. This is the exact reverse of the statement made by the British naval historian, James. His mistake is pardonable, for great confusion existed on the subject at that time, even the officers not knowing the tonnage of their own ships. When the President was captured, her officers stated that she measured about 1,400 tons; in reality she tonned 1,576, American measure. Still more singular was the testimony of the officers of the Argus, who thought her to be of about 350 tons, while she was of 298, by American, or 244, by British measurement. These errors were the more excusable as they occurred also in higher quarters. The earliest notice we have about the three 44-gun frigates of the Constitution's class, is in the letter of Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddart, on Dec. 24, 1798, [Footnote: "American State Papers," xiv, 57.] where they are expressly said to be of 1,576 tons; and this tonnage is given them in every navy list that mentions it for 40 years afterward; yet Secretary Paul Hamilton in one of his letters incidentally alludes to them as of 1,444 tons. Later, I think about the year 1838, the method of measuring was changed, and their tonnage was put down as 1,607. James takes the American tonnage from Secretary Hamilton's letter as 1,444, and states (vol. vi, p. 5), that this is equivalent to 1,533 tons, English. But in reality, by American measurement, the tonnage was 1,576; so that even according to James' own figures the British way of measurement made the frigate 43 tons smaller than the American way did; actually the difference was nearer 290 tons. James' statements as to the size of our various ships would seem to have been largely mere guesswork, as he sometimes makes them smaller and sometimes larger than they were according to the official navy lists. Thus, the Constitution, President, and United States, each of 1,576, he puts down as of 1,533; the Wasp, of 450, as of 434; the Hornet, of 480, as of 460; and the Chesapeake, of 1,244, as of 1,135 tons. On the other hand the Enterprise, of 165 tons, he states to be of 245; the Argus of 298, he considers to be of 316, and the Peacock, Frolic, etc., of 509 each, as of 539. He thus certainly adopts different standards of measurement, not only for the American as distinguished from the British vessels, but even among the various American vessels themselves. And there are other difficulties to be encountered; not only were there different ways of casting tonnage from given measurements, but also there were different ways of getting what purported to be the same measurement. A ship, that, according to the British method of measurement was of a certain length, would, according to the American method, be about 5 per cent. longer; and so if two vessels were the same size, the American would have the greatest nominal tonnage. For example, James in his "Naval Occurrences" (p. 467) gives the length of the __Cyane's__ main deck as 118 feet 2 inches. This same Cyane was carefully surveyed and measured, under orders from the United States navy department, by Lieut. B. F. Hoffman, and in his published report [Footnote: "American State Papers," xiv, p. 417.] he gives, among the other dimensions: "Length of spar-deck, 124 feet 9 inches," and "length of gun-deck 123 feet 3 inches." With such a difference in the way of taking measurements, as well as of computing tonnage from the measurements when taken, it is not surprising that according to the American method the Cyane should have ranked as of about 659 tons, instead of 539. As James takes no account of any of these differences I hardly know how to treat his statements of comparative tonnage. Thus he makes the Hornet 460 tons, and the Peacock and Penguin, which she at different times captured, about 388 each. As it happens both Captain Lawrence and Captain Biddle, who commanded the Hornet in her two successful actions, had their prizes measured. The Peacock sank so rapidly that Lawrence could not get very accurate measurements of her; he states her to be four feet shorter and half a foot broader than the Hornet. The British naval historian, Brenton (vol. v, p. 111), also states that they were of about the same tonnage. But we have more satisfactory evidence from Captain Biddle. He stayed by his prize nearly two days, and had her thoroughly examined in every way; and his testimony is, of course, final. He reports that the Penguin was by actual measurement two feet shorter, and somewhat broader than the Hornet, and with thicker scantling. She tonned 477, compared to the Hornet's 480—a difference of about one half of one per cent. This testimony is corroborated by that of the naval inspectors who examined the Epervier after she was captured by the Peacock. Those two vessels were respectively of 477 and 509 tons, and as such they ranked on the navy lists. The American Peacock and her sister ships were very much longer than the brig sloops of the Epervier's class, but were no broader, the latter being very tubby. All the English sloops were broader in proportion than the American ones were; thus the __Levant_, which was to have mounted the same number of guns as the Peacock, had much more beam, and was of greater tonnage, although of rather less length. The Macedonian, when captured, ranked on our lists as of 1,325 tons, [Footnote: See the work of Lieutenant Emmons, who had access to all the official records.] the United States as of 1,576; and they thus continued until, as I have said before, the method of measurement was changed, when the former ranked as of 1,341, and the latter as of 1,607 tons. James, however, makes them respectively, 1,081, and 1,533. Now to get the comparative force he ought to have adopted the first set of measurements given, or else have made them 1,081 and 1,286. Out of the twelve single-ship actions of the war, four were fought with 38-gun frigates like the Macedonian, and seven with 18-gun brig sloops of the Epervier's class; and as the Macedonian and Epervier were both regularly rated in our navy, we get a very exact idea of our antagonists in those eleven cases. The twelfth was the fight between the Enterprise and the Boxer, in which the latter was captured; the Enterprise was apparently a little smaller than her foe, but had two more guns, which she carried in her bridle ports.

As my purpose in giving the tonnage is to get it comparatively, and not absolutely, I have given it throughout for both sides as estimated by the American method of that day. The tonnage of the vessels on the lakes has been already noticed.

Appendix B

PREVIOUS HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVY

Very few students of naval history will deny that in 1812 the average American ship was superior to the average British ship of the same strength; and that the latter was in turn superior to the average French ship. The explanation given by the victor is in each case the same; the American writer ascribes the success of his nation to "the aptitude of the American character for the sea," and the Briton similarly writes that "the English are inherently better suited for the sea than the French." Race characteristics may have had some little effect between the last pair of combatants (although only a little), and it is possible that they somewhat affected the outcome of the Anglo-American struggle, but they did not form the main cause. This can best be proved by examining the combats of two preceding periods, in which the English, French, and Americans were at war with one another.

During the years 1798-1800, the United States carried on a desultory conflict with France, then at war with England. Our navy was just built, and was rated in the most extraordinary manner; the Chesapeake, carrying 18-pounders, was called a 44; and the Constellation which carried 24's, a 36, while the Washington, rating 24, was really much heavier than the Boston, rating 28. On Feb. 9, 1799, after an hour's conflict, the Constellation captured the French frigate Insurgente; the Americans lost 3, the French 70 men, killed and wounded. The Constitution carried but 38 guns; 28 long 24's, on the main-deck, and 10 long 12's on the quarter-deck, with a crew of 309 men. According to Troude (iii, 169), l'lnsurgente carried 26 long 12's, 10 long 6's, and 4 36-pound carronades; the Americans report her number of men as nearly four hundred. Thus in actual [Footnote: French shot was really very much heavier than the nominally corresponding English shot, as the following table, taken from Captain T. L. Simmon's work on "Heavy Ordnance" (London, 1837, p. 62) will show:

Nominal French Weight Actual Weight of Same Shot in of Shot. English Pounds. 36 lbs. 43 lbs 4 oz. 24 " 28 " 8 3/4" 18 " 21 " 4 1/2" 12 " 14 " 7 " ] (not nominal) weight of shot the Constitution was superior by about 80 pounds, and was inferior in crew by from 50 to 100 men. This would make the vessels apparently nearly equal in force; but of course the long 24's of the Constellation made it impossible that l'lnsurgente, armed only with long 12's, should contend with her. As already said, a superiority in number of men makes very little difference, provided each vessel has ample to handle the guns, repair damages, work the sails, etc. Troude goes more into details than any other French historian; but I think his details are generally wrong. In this case he gives the Constellation 12's, instead of the 24's she really carried; and also supplies her with 10 32-pound carronades—of which species of ordnance there was then not one piece in our navy. The first carronades we ever had were those carried by the same frigate on her next voyage. She had completely changed her armament, having 28 long 18's on the main-deck, ten 24-pound carronades on the quarter-deck; and, I believe, 6 long 12's on the forecastle, with a crew of 310 men. Thus armed, she encountered and fought a drawn battle with la Vengeance. Troude (vol. iii, pp. 201, and 216) describes the armament of the latter as 26 long 18's, 10 long 8's, and 4 36-pound carronades. On board of her was an American prisoner, James Howe, who swore she had 52 guns, and 400 men (see Cooper, i, 306). The French and American accounts thus radically disagree. The point is settled definitely by the report of the British captain Milne, who, in the Seine frigate, captured la Vengeance in the same year, and then reported her armament as being 28 long 18's, 16 long 12's, and 8 36-pound carronades, with 326 men. As the American and British accounts, written entirely independently of one another, tally almost exactly, it is evident that Troude was very greatly mistaken. He blunders very much over the Constellation's armament.

Thus in this action the American frigate fought a draw with an antagonist, nearly as much superior to herself as an American 44 was to a British 38. In November, 1800, the "28-gun frigate," Boston, of 530 tons, 200 men, carrying 24 long 9's on the main-deck, and on the spar-deck 8 long 6's (or possibly 12-pound carronades) captured, after two hours action, the French corvette Berceau, of 24 guns, long 8's; the Boston was about the same size as her foe, with the same number of men, and superior in metal about as ten to nine. She lost 15, and the Berceau 40 men. Troude (iii, p. 219) gives the Berceau 30 guns, 22 long 8's, and 8 12-pound carronades. If this is true she was in reality of equal force with the Boston. But I question if Troude really knew anything about the combatants; he gives the Boston (of the same size and build as the Cyane) 48 guns—a number impossible for her to carry. He continually makes the grossest errors; in this same (the third) volume, for example, he arms a British 50-gun-ship with 72 cannon, giving her a broadside fifty per cent. heavier than it should be (p. 141); and, still worse, states the ordinary complement of a British 32-gun frigate to be 384 men, instead of about 220 (p. 417). He is by no means as trustworthy as James, though less rancorous.

The United States schooner Experiment, of 12 guns, long 6's, and 70 men, captured the French man-of-war three-masted-schooner La Diane, of 14 guns (either 4- or 6-pounders), with a crew of 60 men, and 30 passengers; and the Enterprise, the sister vessel of the Experiment, captured numerous strong privateers. One of them, a much heavier vessel than her captor, made a most obstinate fight. She was the Flambeau brig of fourteen 8-pounders and 100 men, of whom half were killed or wounded. The Enterprise had 3 killed and 7 wounded.

Comparing these different actions, it is evident that the Americans were superior to the French in fighting capacity during the years 1799 and 1800. During the same two years there had been numerous single contests between vessels of Britain and France, ending almost invariably in favor of the former, which I mention first in each couple. The 12-pounder frigate Daedalus captured the 12-pounder frigate Prudente, of equal force. The British 18-pounder frigate Sybille captured the frigate Forte, armed with 52 guns, 30 of them long 24's on the main-deck; she was formidably armed and as heavy as the Constitution. The Sybille lost 22 and the Forte 145 men killed and wounded. The 18-pounder frigate Clyde, with the loss of 5 men, captured the 12-pounder frigate Vestale, which lost 32. The cutter Courser, of twelve 4-pounders and 40 men, captured the privateer Guerrière, of fourteen 4-pounders and 44 men. The cutter Viper, of fourteen 4-pounders and 48 men, captured the privateer Suret, of fourteen 4-pounders and 57 men. The 16-gun ship-sloop, Peterel, with 89 men, engaged the Cerf, 14, Lejoille, 6, and Ligurienne, 16, with in all 240 men, and captured the Ligunenne. The 30-gun corvette Dart captured by surprise the 38-gun frigate Desirée. The Gypsey, of ten 4-pounders and 82 men, captured the Quidproquo, of 8 guns, 4- and 8-pounders, and 98 men. The schooner Milbrook of sixteen 18-pounder carronades and 47 men, fought a draw with the privateer Bellone, of 24 long 8's and six 36-pound carronades. Finally, six months after the Vengeance had escaped from the Constellation (or beaten her off, as the French say) she was captured by the British frigate Seine, which threw a broadside about 30 pounds more than the American did in her action, and had some 29 men less aboard. So that her commander, Captain Milne, with the same force as Commodore Truxtun, of the Constellation, accomplished what the latter failed to do.

Reviewing all these actions, it seems pretty clear that, while the Americans were then undoubtedly much superior to the French, they were still, at least slightly, inferior to the British.

From 1777 to 1782 the state of things was very different. The single combats were too numerous for me to mention them here; and besides it would be impossible to get at the truth without going to a great deal of trouble—the accounts given by Cooper, Sohomberg, and Troude differing so widely that they can often hardly be recognized as treating of the same events. But it is certain that the British were very much superior to the Americans. Some of the American ships behaved most disgracefully, deserting their consorts and fleeing from much smaller foes. Generally the American ship was captured when opposed by an equal force—although there were some brilliant exceptions to this. With the French things were more equal; their frigates were sunk or captured time and again, but nearly as often they sunk or captured their antagonists. Some of the most gallant fights on record are recounted of French frigates of this period; in 1781 the Minerve, 32, resisted the Courageous, 74, till she had lost 73 men and had actually inflicted a loss of 17 men on her gigantic antagonist, and the previous year the Bellepoule, 32, had performed a similar feat with the Nonsuch, 64, while the Capricieuse, 32, had fought for five hours before surrendering to the Prudente and Licorne, each of force equal to herself. She lost 100 men, inflicting a loss of 55 upon her two antagonists. Such instances make us feel rather ashamed when we compare them with the fight in which the British ship Glasgow, 20, beat off an American squadron of 5 ships, including two of equal force to herself, or with the time when the Ariadne, 20, and Ceres, 14, attacked and captured without resistance the Alfred, 20, the latter ship being deserted in the most outrageously cowardly manner by her consort the Raleigh, 32. At that period the average American ship was certainly by no means equal to the average French ship of the same force, and the latter in turn was a little, but only a little, inferior to the average British ship of equal strength.

Thus in 1782 the British stood first in nautical prowess, separated but by a very narrow interval from the French, while the Americans made a bad third. In 1789 the British still stood first, while the Americans had made a great stride forward, coming close on their heels, and the French had fallen far behind into the third place. In 1812 the relative positions of the British and French were unchanged, but the Americans had taken another very decided step in advance, and stood nearly as far ahead of the British as the latter were ahead of the French.

The explanation of these changes is not difficult. In 1782 the American war vessels were in reality privateers; the crews were unpracticed, the officers untrained, and they had none of the traditions and discipline of a regular service. At the same time the French marine was at its highest point; it was commanded by officers of ability and experience, promoted largely for merit, and with crews thoroughly trained, especially in gunnery, by a long course of service on the sea. In courage, and in skill in the management of guns, musketry, etc., they were the full equals of their English antagonists; their slight average inferiority in seamanship may, it is possible, be fairly put down to the difference in race. (It seems certain that, when serving in a neutral vessel, for example, the Englishmen aboard are apt to make better sailors than the Frenchmen.) In 1799 the revolution had deprived the French of all their best officers, had let the character of the marine run down, and the discipline of the service become utterly disorganized; this exposed them to frightful reverses, and these in turn prevented the character of the service from recovering its former tone. Meanwhile the Americans had established for the first time a regular navy, and, as there was excellent material to work with, it at once came up close to the English; constant and arduous service, fine discipline, promotion for merit, and the most unflagging attention to practical seamanship and gunnery had in 1812 raised it far above even the high English standard. During all these three periods the English marine, it must be remembered, did not fall off, but at least kept its position; the French, on the contrary, did fall off, while the American navy advanced by great strides to the first place.