Our wars, sir, are, therefore, to be determined by naval battles, and those nations have very little to fear from us who have no trade to be disturbed, and no navies to be destroyed; if they can only fit out cruisers, which may always be done by granting commissions to foreign adventurers, they may ruin our merchants by captures, exhaust the nation by the necessity of convoys, and give neutral traders an opportunity of establishing their credit at those markets which have been, hitherto, supplied by our manufactures.
This is, indeed, far from being at present an exact account of the state of Spain, whose wide-extended dominions are liable to insults, and from whom many of her most wealthy provinces may be torn without great hazard or difficulty. The particular state of her commerce, which, being only carried on from one part of her dominions to another, can only be for a time interrupted, but is in no danger of being invaded by any rival, or lost by disuse, at least requires our consideration, and we ought to make war with the utmost frugality, against a people whom no hostilities can really impoverish, whose commerce may be said to lie at rest rather than to be shackled, as it will rise into greater vigour at the end of the war, and whose treasures, though the want of them is a present inconvenience, are only piled up for a time of security.
As the only method, sir, of reducing this nation, must be that of invading its colonies, and dismembering its provinces, by which the chief persons will be deprived of their revenues, and a general discontent be spread over the people, the forces which are levied for this expedition, an expedition on which so much of the honour of our arms and the prosperity of our trade must necessarily depend, ought to be selected with the greatest care, and disciplined with the exactest regularity.
On this occasion, therefore, it is surely improper to employ troops newly collected from shops and villages, and yet more irrational to trust them to the direction of boys called on this occasion from the frolicks of a school, or forced from the bosoms of their mothers, and the softness of the nursery. It is not without compassion, compassion very far extended, that I consider the unhappy striplings doomed to a camp, from whom the sun has hitherto been screened, and the wind excluded, who have been taught, by many tender lectures, the unwholesomeness of the evening mists and the morning dews, who have been wrapt in furs in winter, and cooled with fans in summer, who have lived without any fatigue but that of dress, or any care but that of their complexion.
Who can forbear, sir, some degree of sympathy, when he sees animals like these taking their last farewell of the maid that has fed them with sweetmeats, and defended them from insects; when he sees them drest up in the habiliments of soldiers, loaded with a sword, and invested with a command, not to mount the guard at the palace, nor to display their lace at a review; not to protect ladies at the door of an assembly room, nor to show their intrepidity at a country fair, but to enter into a kind of fellowship with the rugged sailor, to hear the tumult of a storm, to sustain the change of climates, and to be set on shore in an enemy's dominions?
Surely, he that can see such spectacles without sorrow, must have hardened his heart beyond the common degrees of cruelty, and it may reasonably be expected, that he who can propose any method by which such hardships may be escaped, will be thought entitled to gratitude and praise.
For my part, I should imagine, sir, that an easy method might be discovered of obviating such misery, without lessening that number of officers, which, perhaps, in opposition to reason and experience, some gentlemen will continue to think necessary, and hope that this may be no improper time to declare my opinion.
I have observed, that for some time no private centinel has ever risen to any rank above that of a serjeant, and that commissions have been reserved as rewards for other services than those of the camp. This procedure I cannot but think at once impolitick and unjust.
It is impolitick, sir, as it has a natural tendency to extinguish in the soldiery all emulation and all industry. Soldiers have an equal genius with other men, and undoubtedly there might be found among them great numbers capable of learning and of improving the military sciences; but they have, likewise, the same love of ease, and the desire of honour and of profit, and will not condemn themselves to labour without the prospect of reward, nor sacrifice their time to the attainment of that knowledge, which can have no other effect than to make them discover the stupidity of their commanders, and render their obedience more difficult, as it will destroy that reverence which is necessary to subordination.
It is unjust, sir, because it is not to be doubted, that some soldiers, by the natural force of their faculties, or by a laudable activity of mind, have extended their knowledge beyond the duties of a private station; and he that excels in his profession, has an equitable claim to distinction and preferment. To advance any man in the army, because his father is an orator in the senate, or the chief inhabitant of a borough, seems not more rational, than to make another man a judge, because some of his ancestors were skilled in gunnery; nor would the lawyers have juster reasons for complaint in one case, than the soldiers in the other.
It is, therefore, sir, in my opinion, necessary to the advancement of military knowledge, that, as a centinel is, for excelling in his profession, advanced to the degree of a serjeant, the serjeant, who continues his application, and performs his duty, should, in time, be honoured with a commission.
It may be objected, indeed, that serjeants, though they are skilful commanders in war, can very seldom arrive at any remarkable skill in politicks, and though they should be so fortunate as to gain estates, could never be of any use as the representatives of a borough; and to what purpose should those men be advanced, who can only serve their country, but can contribute very little to the support of the court?
This is, I own, sir, an objection, which I despair of answering to the satisfaction of those by whom it will be raised. The hardy serjeant would never cringe gracefully at a levee, would never attain to any successful degree of address in soliciting votes; and if he should by mere bribery be deputed hither, would be unable to defend the conduct of his directors.
In vindication of the present scheme, I believe few of those rugged warriours would find many arguments; they would not recommend to the nation a troop of boys, under the command of boys, as the most proper forces to be sent to make conquests in distant countries, nor would imagine, that unskilful soldiers could, under the direction of officers equally ignorant with themselves, attain the knowledge of their duty in the same time as if they were incorporated with regular troops, in which every man might receive instructions, and learn his business from his comrade.
I had lately, sir, the opportunity of hearing the opinion of one of the greatest generals in the world, on this subject, who declared, with the utmost confidence of certainty, that raw troops could be disciplined in a short time, only by being incorporated with those that had been already taught their duty, and asserted, that with an army so mixed, he should think himself sufficiently enabled to meet any forces of the same number, and should not fear to acquit himself successfully, either in attacking or defending.
Such are the sentiments of this great man, to whom I know not whether any name can be opposed that deserves equally to be reverenced. He has had the honour of defending the rights of his country in the senate as well as in the field, has signalized himself equally in the debate and in the battle, and, perhaps, deserves less regard for having hazarded his life, than for having been divested of his employments.
Since, therefore, it is apparent that great numbers of officers are by no means necessary to success in war, since they are dangerous to our liberty in time of peace, since they are certainly expensive, and at best not certainly useful; and since the greatest general of the present age has declared, that our new levies ought to be mingled with our standing forces, I shall think it my duty to vote against the present scheme of raising new regiments, and shall agree to no other supplies than such as may be sufficient for adding the same numbers to the present army.
General WADE then spoke as follows:—Sir, though I cannot pretend to pursue the honourable gentleman through the whole compass of his argument, nor shall attempt to stand up as his rival, either in extent of knowledge, or elegance of language, yet as my course of life has necessarily furnished me with some observations relating to the question before us, and my present station in the army may, in some measure, be said to make it my duty to declare my opinion, I shall lay before the house a few considerations, with the artless simplicity of a plain soldier, without engaging in a formal debate, or attempting to overthrow the arguments of others.
It is observed, sir, that for the greatest part, the farther any man has advanced in life, the less confidence he places in speculation, and the more he learns to rest upon experience, as the only sure guide in human affairs; and as the transactions in which he is engaged are more important, with the greater anxiety does he inquire after precedents, and the more timorously does he proceed, when he is obliged to regulate his conduct by conjecture or by deliberation.
This remark, sir, though it may be just with regard to all states of life, is yet more constantly and certainly applicable to that of the soldier; because, as his profession is more hazardous than any other, he must with more caution guard against miscarriages and errours. The old soldier, therefore, very rarely ventures beyond the verge of experience, unless in compliance with particular accidents, which does not make any change in his general scheme, or in situations where nothing can preserve him but some new stratagem or unprecedented effort, which are not to be mentioned as part of his original plan of operation, because they are produced always by unforeseen emergencies, and are to be imputed, not to choice, but to necessity; for, in consequence of my first principle, an old soldier never willingly involves himself in difficulties, or proceeds in such a manner as that he may not expect success by the regular operations of war.
It will not, therefore, be strange, if I, who, having served in the army, in the wars of king William, may justly claim the title of an old soldier, should not easily depart from the methods established in my youth; methods of which their effects have shown me, that they at least answer the intention for which they were contrived, and which, therefore, I shall be afraid of rejecting, lest those which it is proposed to substitute in their place, however probable in speculation, should be found defective in practice, and the reasonings, which, indeed, I cannot answer, should be confuted in the field, where eloquence has very little power.
The troops of Britain, formed according to the present establishment, have been found successful; they have preserved the liberties of Europe, and driven the armies of France before them; they have appeared equally formidable in sieges and in battles, and with strength equally irresistible have pressed forward in the field, and mounted the breach. It may be urged, that this vigour, alacrity, and success, cannot be proved to have been produced by the number of officers by whom they were commanded; but since, on the contrary, it cannot be shown that the number of officers did not contribute to their victories, I think it not prudent to try the experiment, which, if it should succeed, as it possibly may, would produce no great advantage; and if it should fail, and that it may fail no man will deny, must bring upon us, not only the expense which we are so solicitous to avoid, but disgrace and losses, a long interruption of our trade, and the slaughter of great numbers of our fellow-subjects.
Thus far, sir, I have proceeded upon a supposition that the balance of argument is equal on both sides, and that nothing could be alleged on one part but experience, or objected to the other but the want of it; but as I am now called to declare my opinion in a question relating to my profession, a question of great importance to the publick, I should think that I had not discharged my duty to my country with that fidelity which may justly be exacted from me, if I should omit any observation that my memory may suggest, by which the house may be better enabled to proceed in this inquiry.
I think it, therefore, proper to declare, that we not only, in the last great war, experienced the usefulness of numerous officers, but that we have likewise felt the want of them on a signal occasion, and that the only great advantage which our enemies obtained, was gained over an army rendered weak by the want of the usual number of officers. Such were the forces that were defeated at the fatal battle of Almanza, by which almost all Spain was recovered from us. And it is, sir, the opinion of very skilful commanders, that the Germans, only by having fewer officers than the French, did not succeed in those long and obstinate battles of Parma and Guastalla.
It is, indeed, natural to imagine, that a greater number of officers must promote success, because courage is kindled by example, and it is, therefore, of use to every man to have his leader in his view. Shame, at one time, and affection at another, may produce the effects of courage where it is wanted, and those may follow their commander, who are inclined to desert their duty; for it is seldom known that, while the officers appear confident, the soldiers despair, or that they think of retreating but after the example of their leaders.
Where there are only few officers, it is apparent that more is left to chance, in which it becomes not a wise man to place any confidence; for if the officers are killed at the beginning of the action, the soldiers must become an useless, defenceless herd, without order, without unanimity, and without design; but by the present method, if an officer happens to fall, his place is immediately supplied by another, the action goes forward, and the enemy receives no advantage from confusion or delay.
I am, therefore of opinion, that in raising troops for the expedition now intended, the established method ought to be followed, and that we ought not to hazard the success of our attempt by new regulations, of which no human sagacity can fortell the event.
Though it cannot be denied, that some addition might be made to our companies without any visible or certain inconvenience, yet the augmentation now intended is too numerous to be so incorporated without some neglect of discipline, as the officers would be charged with more men than they could properly superintend.
There is, indeed, sir, another method of incorporation, by adding new companies to each regiment; but of this method the advantage would be small, because the number of captains and inferiour officers must be the same, and the pay of only the field officers would be saved, and this trifling gain would be far over-balanced by the inconveniencies which experience has shown to arise from it. There have been regiments formed of thirteen companies, instead of ten; but it was found, that as the officers of a company may be over-charged with soldiers, a colonel may likewise have more companies than he can conveniently inspect, and the ancient regulation was restored, as the least liable to difficulties and objections.
Having thus endeavoured to vindicate the manner in which our new troops are proposed to be levied, it may be expected that I should now make some observations on the service in which they are to be employed, which I cannot think liable to any unanswerable objection. It is now, sir, in our choice whether we will send the new regiments abroad or keep them at home; and our choice may easily be determined by comparing the value of our colonies with that of their mother country. If it be not necessary to have any army here to defend us against insults and invasions, the question about the manner of raising or employing new regiments is superfluous, because none ought to be raised, as our old troops are sufficiently numerous for foreign service. But if the security of the nation requires an army, would it not be madness to send those troops to a distant part of the world, in which we can confide most! Would not those, who speak with such contempt of an expedition undertaken by boys, have a better reason for their censure, if only boys were stationed on our coasts to repel the veterans of France? Would not such measures animate our enemies, and invite an invasion?
It may, perhaps, be urged farther, that the troops which are sent into America, are more likely to succeed in their design, than any regiment of ancient establishment. The chief danger to be feared in that part of the world, is not from the enemy but the climate, with which young men are most able to contend, though they may not be equally qualified for attempts in which skill is equally necessary with vigour.
I am convinced, sir, that this war has hitherto been prosecuted with ardour and fidelity, and that no measures have been taken but such as experience and reason have supported, and therefore affirm, without scruple, that if we are not successful, our miscarriages must be imputed to the chance of war, from which no prudence can exempt us.
Lord QUARENDON spoke next, in the following manner, being his first speech:—Sir, having-but very lately had the honour of a seat in this assembly, I am conscious how little I am acquainted with either the subjects or forms of debate, and should, therefore, continue to listen to the sentiments of persons more experienced, with silent veneration, did I not observe with how much indulgence they are heard who mean well, however deficient in knowledge, or in eloquence.
As the honourable gentleman who spoke last, sir, professes to have formed his opinion rather from facts than arguments, I hope I shall be indulged by the house, in an attempt to examine those facts which he has produced, because I think them not sufficient to support his positions, which must, therefore, be established by some other proofs, before a decision of this question can be fixed by them.
With regard to his experience, to which undoubtedly no small degree of veneration is due, he confesses that we have tried only one of the two forms of establishment now in competition, and that, therefore, though he has had reason to approve that with which he is most acquainted, he has no certain proofs of the inefficacy or imperfection of the other.
But experience, sir, may be extended much farther than our own personal transactions, and may very justly comprehend those observations which we have had opportunities of making upon the conduct and success of others. This gentleman, though he has only commanded in the armies of Britain, has seen the forces of other nations, has remarked their regulations, and heard of their actions with our confederates in the last war; he has probably acted in conjunction, and though it is known that they differ from us in the proportion of soldiers and officers, he has mentioned no disadvantage which might be supposed to arise from their establishment, and therefore, I suppose, he cannot deny that their behaviour and success was the same with that of our own troops.
The battles of Almanza, Parma, and Guastalla, which he has particularly mentioned, were lost, as he informs us, by armies not officered according to the establishment which he recommends to us: but it is observable that his argument is defective in an essential part; for though he affirms that the armies which were defeated had fewer officers than the enemy, he has neither shown, nor attempted to show, that the want of officers occasioned the defeat, or that the loss would have been prevented by a greater number.
These instances, therefore, can be of no effect on the determination of the present question; for though it is certain that at Germany, and at other places, armies with few officers have lost the battle, it is not less common for those troops that are more liberally supplied, to be overthrown by others which are differently modelled.
With regard, sir, to the troops of Germany, I have heard them praised, in many parts of Europe, as not inferiour either to those of France, or of any other nation, and have been informed, that their ill success, both at Parma and Guastalla, may be justly imputed to other causes than the want of officers.
There has, perhaps, sir, seldom been an example of firmness, discipline, and resolution, beyond that which was shown by the Germans at the action of Parma, where they attacked the trenches of the French, sustained the fire of the ramparts of the city, and though they lost their commander-in-chief and two others, towards the beginning of the action, they continued the fight for eleven hours, and at last retired only at the approach of night.
At Guastalla, sir, they attacked the French in their trenches, even with forces inferiour in number, so far were they from any diffidence in the form of their establishment; and after a fight of seven hours, in which their loss was, under all their disadvantages, not greater than that of their enemies, they retreated to their former camp unmolested and unpursued. The French, sir, were preserved in both these battles, not by the number of their officers, but by their situation, by woods, cassines, ditches, and intrenchments.
Nor do I discover, sir, what can be inferred from his observation of the influence of example in time of action, but that officers should be selected with great care, and not be promoted by favour, or interest, or caprice; for an example of cowardice in a leader must be pernicious, in proportion as that of bravery is beneficial; and as, where more officers are supposed necessary, there is less room for choice, it must be allowed that the troops, which have more officers than other forces, are in more danger of being infected with cowardice.
It appears, therefore, to me that the expense of the present establishment is a certain evil, and that the advantages are very doubtful: it appears that the present state of the nation requires frugality, and, therefore, I shall vote for the incorporation of our new levies with the old regiments.
By this incorporation, sir, our new-levied troops will be no longer distinguished from our veterans; they will be equally acquainted with discipline, and will learn, from the conversation of their associates, a spirit of enterprise, and a contempt of danger; we may then employ forces equally formidable in all parts of the publick service, and invade the dominions of our enemies, without leaving our own country desolate.
The arguments which the honourable gentleman has offered in defence of sending our younger troops to America, which may likewise be used against an incorporation, is, in my opinion, sir, far from being conclusive; for it supposes, what will not be granted, that a cold climate may be changed for a hotter with more safety by a young than an old man. I have been told, on the contrary, that superabundant heat is the great disease of youth, and that the want of it produces most of the infirmities of age; and every one has known the lives of persons languishing with age, prolonged by a removal into warm countries. I am, therefore, of opinion, that the honourable gentleman's argument is defective in all its parts, and hope that I shall not be charged with obstinacy or perverseness for dissenting from him.
Mr. HOWE spoke next, in substance as follows:—Sir, before I engage in a discussion of the question, I cannot but think it necessary to observe, that the honourable gentleman who spoke the second in this debate, has been very far from consulting either policy or justice in his declamation, and that he deviated from the subject only to ridicule his country, to exalt our enemies, and depress our efforts.
He has described, sir, the British youth, the sons of noble families, and the hopes of the nation, in terms too contemptuous to be heard without indignation; he has amused himself with displaying their ignorance and their effeminacy, and has indulged his imagination in a malignant kind of gaiety, which, however it may divert himself, is very far from contributing either to the reformation or prevention of those practices which he censures.
I believe, sir, it will be granted, that nothing ought to please but in proportion to its propriety and truth; and, if we try the satire that we have lately heard, by this test, it will be found to have very little claim to applause; for our armies must be composed of the youth of the nation; and, for my part, I cannot discover what advantage we shall gain over the Spaniards, by informing them how little our troops are accustomed to danger, how short a time they have been acquainted with fatigue, how tenderly they have been nursed, how easily they may be frighted, and how certainly they will be conquered, if they but meet with opposition.
Nor, sir, is such an account of the youth of Britain more true, in my opinion, than it is prudent. I am far from discovering any such remarkable degeneracy in the age, or any great prevalence of cowardice and unmanly delicacy; nor do I doubt of hearing that our youth, if they are sent upon any expedition, have shown that the British courage is not yet extinguished, and that, if they are ranged on the plains of America, they will discover themselves the sons of those that forced those passes, and those trenches, that other troops would have failed in attempting.
That the degeneracy of the British youth, is, at least, not universal, we have just now sir, received an incontestable proof from the gentleman who spoke last, and spoke with so much elegance of language, and justness of reasoning, as shows, that there are to be found, among the youth of Britain, persons very well qualified for the senate; and I have never heard that a post in the army required greater abilities.
The pleasure, however, with which I have attended to his remarks, has not so far prejudiced me in favour of his opinion, as that I shall easily consent to change that method of discipline, to which our troops have been accustomed, and of which we know by experience, that it is, at least, not less efficacious than that of any other nation. Customs, if they are not bad, are not to be changed, because it is an argument in favour of a practice that the people have experienced it, and approved it, and every change is disagreeable to those who judge only by prejudice, of whom I need not say how great is the number.
Many arguments may, sir, in my opinion, be added to our experience in favour of the present establishment. The number of officers—but I find myself unable to pursue my design, because I can no longer read my notes, which, being written by another hand, somewhat embarrass me in this decline of the light. I shall, therefore, only make some observations upon the speech of the gentleman who spoke the second in this debate, and hope that I shall be allowed to deviate from the principal question, since I do it only in pursuit of another.
He has observed, that our troopers are mounted upon horses that are of no use; a remark, sir, which I never heard from any other person, and for which, I believe, no authority can be produced: they are mounted, indeed, upon horses very different from those which are used by other nations, because scarcely any other country breeds horses of equal size and strength, and, therefore, I am informed that the French have purchased horses from this island, and believe that all the cavalry of Europe would be mounted upon our horses if they could procure them. I have been informed, that their pressure in the shock of battle is such, as no forces in the world are able to sustain; and that it was not less by the strength of our horses than the spirit of our soldiers, that the squadrons of France were, in the battle of Blenheim, pushed into the Danube.
Nor do I less disapprove his censure of the choice which has been made of the troops intended for the American service, which, though I ardently desire its success, I cannot think of equal importance with the defence of our own country; for though we may be disgraced by a defeat, we can be endangered only by an invasion; and, therefore, I think it necessary to retain those troops on which we may best rely for the security of this island, lest our enemies should take the advantage of their absence, and set the pretender on the throne.
Sir William YONGE next rose, and spoke to the effect following:—Sir, it is a standing maxim, both in private life and public transactions, that no man can obtain great advantages who is afraid of petty inconveniencies; and that he that will hope to obtain his end without expense, will languish for ever in fruitless wishes, and have the mortification of seeing the adventurous and the liberal enjoy that felicity, which, though it is within his reach, he is afraid of seizing.
When the depredations of the Spaniards became first the subject of our debates, nothing was heard amongst us but threats of vengeance, demands of reparation, assertions of sovereignty, and resolutions to obtain security: the importance of our commerce, the necessity of rigorous measures, the danger of pusillanimity, the meanness of negotiation, and the disadvantages of delay, were thundered from every part of the house. Every man seemed to imagine that there was no mean between victory and ruin, and that not to humble Spain was to betray our country to insults, ignominy, and slavery.